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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The World in History of Science 
This thesis is about the role of the world in history of science: the question what role the 
things scientists study play in our historical accounts of the development of science. As such, 
it is about a foundational question in history of science, belonging to philosophy of history 
of science. As I will try to show in this introductory chapter, this question touches upon 
many other issues. Generally speaking, different answers to questions about the role of the 
world are connected to different views about what the function and scope of history of 
science is, and how it should relate to its subject matter – the history of science – and to the 
science whose history it studies.  
 The question of the role of the world brings into focus heated controversies in 
history of science and related fields. According to some scholars science is, in the end, all 
about the world, and in order to understand why current theories about the solar system are 
what they are, what we need to understand is the solar system itself. According to others, 
this approach would lead inexorably towards Whiggism and ‘scientists’ history’, robbing 
historiography of its autonomy and critical potential and turning it into the handmaid of 
science. A third perspective tells us that it is unhelpful to try to put a conceptual fence 
between scientists and the world that they study, and that without such a fence, the 
question of the role of ‘the world’ in history of science turns out to be meaningless.  
 These possible perspectives, and others, will be dealt with extensively in later 
chapters, and I will build on them to formulate my own position in the final chapter of this 
thesis. In the remainder of this introduction, I will try to sketch out some of the motifs with 
which I believe controversies about the explanatory role of the world in history of science 
may be fruitfully connected. These are, first, the question to which extent science can be 
historicized at all; second, the metaphor of history of science as ‘bridging’ some kind of gap 
– a gap between science and the humanities, or between nature and culture, or between 
science and tradition; and third, the problem of the autonomy and authority of history and 
science. 
 
1.2 History of Science and the Sciences 
One important tension that haunts the relation between history of science and science is that 
between the apparent history-transcending nature of scientific results and the historicity of 
scientific activity.1 One way to resolve this tension is to declare only the latter to be 
amenable to historical research, and say with Alistair Crombie that “the results of scientific 
activity may be to a large extent impersonal and timeless, but the activity that produces 
                                                     
1 Cf. Chin (2014, 316) on the relation between ‘subliming’ and ‘subverting’ perspectives and their 
different stances with regard to the contingency and historicity of science. 
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them is an activity of particular men sharing in the conditions of life, opportunities, and 
much of the intellectual outlook of a given society and period”.2  
 This strategy, distinguishing science as an activity from scientific results, is most 
pronounced in Helge Kragh’s distinction between two senses of science: S1 and S2. S1 he 
defines as: 
  
a collection of empirical and formal statements about nature, the theories and data that, at a 
given moment in time, comprise accepted scientific knowledge. […] Since S1 is not really 
conceived as human behavior, it is not the kind of science that would be likely to appeal to 
the historian.3 
 
It seems here that Kragh considers the finished product of science to be outside historical 
interest, since it is not really part of human behavior. This is confirmed when Kragh goes on 
to define S2: 
 
the science (S2) that is historically relevant consists of the activities or behavior of the 
scientists, including factors of importance to this, in so far as these activities have been 
connected with scientific endeavours. Thus S2 is science as human behavior whether or not 
this behavior leads to true, objective knowledge about nature. S2 encompasses S1 as the result 
of the process but the process itself is not reflected in S1.4 
 
This is a somewhat confusing image: historians of science are interested in S2, which 
encompasses S1, but S2 also becomes invisible in S1. The distinction Kragh makes may be 
likened to that between theology and Church history; Church history does not coincide with 
abstract thought about the divine, but may encompass it. But would we say that in that case, 
this history is not reflected in the resulting theology?  
 Kragh wants to do justice to the intuition that there is something to science that is 
not a straightforward result of historical human behavior, but he also wants to talk 
historically about science. This makes the split between S1 and S2 understandable. However, 
such a split strongly suggests that insights in the historical aspects of science may turn out to 
fail to touch at all upon its non-historical aspects. Some authors have been skeptical as to 
whether science has anything at all to learn from an understanding of its own history – 
“does one make better cabinets for knowing the history of carpentry?”5 This rhetorical 
question, to be sure, could turn out to have an affirmative answer for many reasons,6 but if 
                                                     
2 Crombie and Hoskin (1963, 757). 
3 Kragh (1987, 22). 
4 Kragh (1987, 23). 
5 Turner (1990, 23-24). 
6 Guerlac (1959, 238-239); in general, see Maienschein (2000) and Maienschein and Laubichler (2008) for 
arguments upholding that awareness of history can improve scientific practice.  
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we hold on to the supposition that there is an essentially a-historical aspect to science, the 
scope of history of science will always turn out to be limited. 
 It seems that the scope of historiography is unnecessarily restricted by an insistence 
that historians are not interested in any aspect of science that is commonly supposed to be 
grounded in something other than history. In practice, as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 
have noted, history of science in the past decades refuses above all “to exempt anything, no 
matter how seemingly self-evident, from historical scrutiny”.7 We need to make sense of 
what this means, but at least it should not be the case, as Larry Laudan complained in 1990, 
that historians “[attend] to virtually everything about […] scientists except their ideas about the 
natural world.”8 
Laudan perhaps confused a refusal to ascribe an important role to the world in 
historical accounts with a refusal to deal seriously with scientists’ beliefs – as we will see in 
chapter 5, the ‘Strong Programme’ in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) has 
provided some arguments why in explaining scientific belief formation, we should avoid 
reference to the external world. But we can only agree with him that there is no reason why 
scientific beliefs about the natural world should not be of historical interest – after all, these 
beliefs are themselves historically important. Therefore, we should let go of the split 
between S1 and S2.  
This leaves open the question whether history in fact matters to scientific beliefs, 
and what this means. Is science not “an on-going present which swallows its own past”?9 In 
chapter 2, we will consider this question in terms of the contingentism-inevitabilism debate, 
and in chapter 4 we will consider reasons for believing that in the end, the past is not 
reflected in scientific results. The tension between ‘being about nature’ and ‘being historical’ 
will not be resolved quickly, but our attitude towards it ought to be that an affirmation of 
the historicity of science does not amount to undermining the scientific enterprise.10 As Ian 
Hacking said (paraphrasing Nietzsche): “no longer shall we […] show our respect for 
science by dehistoricizing it.”11 
  
                                                     
7 Daston and Galison (2012, 30).  
8 Laudan (1990, 51). 
9 Alder (2006, 298). 
10 See also Kuukkanen (2011, 597-598) on the distinction between scientific knowledge as being about 
every time and place on the one hand, and being true in any time and place on the other.  
11 Hacking (1983, 16). 
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1.3 A Bridge between Two Cultures?  
Some authors have ascribed to history of science the task of bridging the gap between the 
sciences and the humanities.12 This is plausible enough, since as a branch of history it 
belongs to the humanities, and it seeks to understand the sciences. However, the question of 
what exactly the divide between the sciences and the humanities entails is a complex one.13 
The distinction is often interpreted through the ‘two cultures’ framework sketched 
by C.P. Snow in his 1959 Rede lecture, which banks on supposed difference in the attitudes 
of ‘literary intellectuals’ and ‘scientists’ towards progress. According to Snow, scientists 
“have the future in their bones”;14 their knowledge and mentality is suited to finding 
technological solutions to problems of overpopulation and poverty. But within the context 
of history of science, we find an altogether different formulation of the distinction by George 
Sarton. Sarton laments the “difference of opinion, of outlook, between men of letters, 
historians, philosophers, the so-called humanists, on the one side, and scientists on the 
other.”15 The task of the historian of science, according to Sarton, is to reconcile the sciences 
with the humanities.16 
Contrary to Snow’s, Sarton’s aim is anti-technocratic and anti-utilitarian, and he 
specifically chastises humanists for their impoverished utilitarian view of science.17 The 
progress of science as a revolutionary force in history suggests that there is an antithesis 
between science and tradition, which may lead us to forget that many aspects of science 
have built on historical developments. The historicity and humanity of science are 
connected; declaring the past dead means dehumanizing the scientific enterprise.18 History 
of science is to save the ‘humanity’ of science by reminding us of its historicity. 
Sarton compares the writing of the history of science to the writing of a biography 
of a great man, the main point of which would be “to explain the development of his genius, 
the gradual accomplishment of his special mission.”19 The history of mankind is a history of 
its creation of beauty, justice, and truth – things which need no definition because we will 
recognize them when we see them – and this creation takes place in history. Science is 
special in this regard because it is the only tradition that is clearly cumulative.20 However, its 
progress consists not in a transcending of its human origins in a movement towards 
objectivity, but rather in an unfolding in history of the relation between man and nature. 
“Nothing could be more foolish than to oppose the study of nature to the study of man.”21 
                                                     
12 E.g. Butterfield (1957, vii). 
13 See also Bouterse and Karstens (2015). 
14 Snow (1959, 10). 
15 Sarton (1931, 69). 
16 Sarton (1953, 14). 
17 Sarton (1931, 29); cf. also Sarton (1952b, xi-xii). 
18 Sarton (1952a, 8). 
19 Sarton (1931, 21). 
20 Sarton (1931, 24-31). 
21 Sarton (1931, 39). 
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Sarton declares science to be both human and about nature at the same time. “Each 
scientific result is a fruit of humanity, a proof of its virtue. [...] Each time that we understand 
the world a little better, we are also able to appreciate more keenly our relationship to it.”22 
He also shows how taking seriously the science we have at one point in history does not 
require us to say that from that point, the past has disappeared: 
 
Far from there being any conflict between science and tradition, one might claim that 
tradition is the very life of science. […] Science is not simply the top of the tree; it is the whole 
tree growing upward, downward and in every direction; the living tree, alive not only in its 
periphery but in its whole being.23 
 
The complexity of this tree can be understood only if we study its growth from its 
beginnings.24 Sarton gives an example of how to historicize science (even critically)25 without 
giving up its relation to nature.  
However, this particular bridging of the gap as Sarton perceives it puts a lot of 
pressure upon terms such as ‘reason’ or ‘genius’, which suggest that the values for which 
science stands are themselves transcendental or at least universally (and a-temporally) 
human. This is confirmed when Sarton says that “the views of Einstein were accepted 
because their truth was proved; those of Velikovsky were rejected because they were 
unproved or rather unprovable. That is all there is to it.”26 Of course, we believe with Sarton 
that Einstein got it by and large right, and that Velikovksy got his attempt to re-write both 
history and astronomy tremendously wrong; but what does it entail to say that this is all 
there was to it, and to see this as a model of how battles between reason and unreason play 
out in history?27 Do we not need to explain what it means to ‘prove’ something in a 
particular historical context, and to trace how that particular context has come about? Surely, 
the simple fact that we know that Velikovsky got it wrong does not suffice to explain why 
others believed he got it wrong, or – to complicate matters even more – it does not all by 
itself explain why we believe he got it wrong? 
Even if we, like the young doctor in Molière’s exam, upheld that we believe things 
because they have a ‘quality of truth’ to them, it seems that such a view would fall short of 
genuinely historicizing science. If we can safely inject history-transcending concepts such as 
genius, reason and truth into history of science because these are rooted in our humanity, 
then what meaning is there in the claim that we need to understand the scientific tradition – 
the whole tree – in order to understand its most recent time-slice?  
                                                     
22 Sarton (1931, 68) 
23 Sarton (1952a, 12). 
24 Sarton (1953, 6). 
25 Sarton (1952a, 15). 
26 Sarton (1953, 37). 
27 See Gordin (2012) for a contextualization of the Velikovsky affair, which turned out to have a longer 
tail than Sarton (who played a small part in it himself) knew at the time. 
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1.4 Science and Its Past 
Another way of fleshing out the bridging metaphor can be found in the thought of Reijer 
Hooykaas: in a 1982 article, he remarks that science and the arts have alienated themselves 
from each other more and more, and proposes that history of science has a particular 
cultural mission here.  
The humanities are concerned with the thought and actions of people, and the 
sciences with nature as distinct from human culture; but in history of science, we see that 
the human element does not get eliminated – which is why it can be the object of a 
humanistic discipline. After all, there are no natural scientists “in a chemically pure 
condition”: that scientists live in a particular society and family, and have particular 
character traits and beliefs, influences their thought, however hard they try to eliminate 
these conditions and be objective.28 “History shows that the whole person is involved in the 
natural sciences as well as in the humanities.29 
This is what enables the bridging work of history of science for Hooykaas: in 
showing how science is the result of the human spirit, it ‘demythologizes’ science, showing 
how it is not infallible but genuinely falls within history; but Hooykaas also draws the very 
reasonable conclusion that we ourselves are genuinely in history, and that there is no 
privileged point of view from which we can bestow praise or blame. He therefore 
admonishes historians of science not to divide our ancestors in black and white sheep – an 
admonition that stands opposite to Sarton’s division between reason and unreason.30 
Hooykaas has a clear view of what the divide between the sciences and the 
humanities that needs to be bridged is, and what it is not. It is not simply the difference 
between nature and history, since nature itself is historical in the sense that it is unique and 
non-repeatable, and there are clear regularities in human history as well.31 Nonetheless, he 
says that we need to be careful when we apply naturalistic language – for instance, that of 
Darwinistic evolution – to the humanities, for it is only in human history that we have a 
sympathetic relation to our research object.32 History of science precisely establishes this 
relation for science; and in doing so, it reminds the scientist to see his work as a part of 
human culture, and to see himself as the inheritor of a long tradition. “However much 
natural science strives after objectification and dehumanization, its history is, after all, part 
of a history of human thought and action.”33 
The perspective proposed in this thesis will turn out to resemble rather closely 
these formulations by Hooykaas. It is useful to think of history of science as a bridge, not 
between the unique and historical on the one hand and the universal and regular on the 
                                                     
28 Hooykaas (1982, 154). 
29 Hooykaas (1982, 169 [my translation]). See also Hooykaas (1963, 7-8, 16-17).  
30 Hooykaas (1982, 163-164). 
31 Hooykaas (1966). 
32 Hooykaas (1982, 163). 
33 Hooykaas (1957, 409 [my translation]).  
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other (for such a bridge is neither possible nor necessary), and not primarily as a bridge 
between nature and human culture (for the object of history of science is an aspect of human 
culture as much as any subfield of history, which cannot be understood without its taking 
place in a natural environment); but as a mediator between current science and the history 
of which it is a part.  
What could this mean for the mutual relations between science and history? The 
history of history of science in the past half century has to a large extent been one of 
conscious emancipation from the grip scientists were perceived to hold upon the agenda of 
the discipline. If in 1963, Bernard Cohen could, while denying that history of science was a 
bridge between the sciences and the arts,34 confidently say that “obviously, scientific 
training is a necessary condition for studying the History of Science, as history is”,35 Paul 
Forman argued in 1991 that historians of science ought to be radically independent of the 
science they studied. Their discipline needed to be genuinely intellectually autonomous in 
order to avoid ‘whiggery’.36 It needed to operate under the notion of a fundamental 
difference between “‘us’ as historians and ‘them’ as scientists”.37 
 This also brings us back to the role of nature in history: if we do not want the 
discipline to be at risk of losing authority over its final explanations to scientists – the ‘them’ 
it is supposed to study critically – perhaps we had better assume that the reality scientists 
try to talk about is not crucial to the course of science. As Forman puts it: 
 
Only by thoroughly historicizing scientific knowledge - explaining possession of specific 
pieces or structures of it, not by appealing to a transcendent reality (whose mode of action in 
this world is no more than metaphorical), but by reference to mundane factors and human 
actors - can historians of science move away from whiggery and toward intellectual 
independence.38 
 
If we follow scientists in the idea that their mental products acquire some sort of history-
transcendence, this prevents us from “adopting the critical attitude essential for an 
independent apprehension of the reality that science was and is”, Forman claims.39  
It is one aim of this thesis to analyze this intuition – that for history of science, the 
desired intellectual autonomy, the possibility for a critical study of science, and a 
downplaying of the role of the ‘reality’ on which scientists themselves claim their 
intellectual products are based, come as a package. I think they do not, and I find Forman’s 
plea for radical independence to be fundamentally wrong, but without thereby arguing in 
favor of the kind of history of science that he claims to oppose – the objections brought in 
                                                     
34 Cohen (1963, 771-773). 
35 Cohen (1963, 775). 
36 Forman (1991, 87). 
37 Forman (1991, 71). 
38 Forman (1991, 78). 
39 Forman (1991, 85). 
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against Sarton’s perspective on the history of science in the previous section are by and large 
the same as Forman’s. 
History of science is indeed a subfield of history, not of science; but in order to be 
able to feed back into our ideas of what science is, it must take into account these same ideas. 
This is the core of the perspective upon history of science that this thesis will argue for, 
which will be approached from the perspective of the role of nature in history of science. 
 
1.5 Outline of this Thesis 
This main question, about the explanatory role of nature in history of science, can be 
approached from two angles: on the one hand, it is a question about the objective role of 
nature in deciding the course of history of science; on the other, it is a question about whose 
nature we are actually discussing in this context, and about what the complications are in 
employing our own beliefs about nature in a historiography that is supposed to shed light 
precisely on why we have come to believe what we do. This thesis tries to deal with these 
two questions at once, and culminates in a statement about the role of nature in history of 
science that covers both aspects. Nonetheless, some chapters belong more or less clearly to 
one or the other side of the question.  
 Chapter 2 provides an analysis of a pair of concepts – contingentism and 
inevitabilism – that is relevant to understanding what is at stake in the causal question about 
the role of nature. We will define inevitabilism as the claim that the content of science is 
insensitive to those aspects of historical reality that could have been different. 
 Chapter 3 analyzes problems connected to ‘Whig history’ or presentism, and brings 
us into the debate on the legitimate and illegitimate uses of our own conceptions and beliefs 
about science and nature. The main problem turns out to be what we will call ‘causal 
anachronism’, a species of historical error consisting in the claim that something was the 
case that in fact could not have been the case. This is what is at stake in debates about 
presentism, but I will argue that there is no anti-presentist methodological shortcut which 
can help us to avoid errors of anachronism.  
 Chapter 4 investigates the relation between inevitabilism and the role of nature in 
history of science, by looking at possible non-contingent factors that drive the history of 
science. We conclude that nature itself cannot render inevitable the historical development 
of science, and that though it can conceivably do so in combination with a non-contingent, 
history-transcending rationality, such a ‘normative inevitability thesis’ does not support a 
causal inevitability thesis as defined in chapter 2 – though our canons of rationality can 
serve as a hermeneutic point of departure through which we understand past intellectual 
efforts. We will also see that what at first sight look like alternatives to nature-based 
inevitabilism – the idealism of Alexandre Koyré and the Marxist social inevitabilism of Boris 
Hessen and John Desmond Bernal – in fact rely on the idea that the structure of the world 
determines the content of science, and that according to these authors too, what science 
looks like in the end can be understood from what nature looks like. 
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 At the other extreme we find the position that nature should not at all figure in our 
explanations of science, which we will discuss in chapter 5. We will discuss five arguments 
for this position: the argument from underdetermination; the argument that nature is a 
common factor that ‘drops out’; the argument that society rather than nature provides us 
with our categories; the argument that historians should deal only with their own areas of 
competence; and finally, the constructivist argument that nature is in fact the result of social 
constructions, not its cause. All these arguments will be found wanting, though the question 
of competence can be turned into a question of circularity which we do not fully resolve in 
chapter 5. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 work with the assumption of a distinction between society and 
nature. In chapter 6, we discuss Bruno Latour’s attempt to provide a vocabulary which 
overcomes the divide between these two. Latour’s Actor Network Theory tries to 
undermine the idea that historical entities need to be related in some way to one unified and 
stable reality. Since not just concepts, but also their corresponding realities are historically 
constructed, using current ideas about nature to describe the past may be causally 
anachronistic in the sense defined in chapter 3. However, the problems with Latour’s 
ontology regarding non-arbitrary addition of new actors to networks, the demarcation of 
networks, and the tracing of actor’s ontologies, suggest that his arguments do not force us to 
throw away our inherited ontologies completely. Though dislodging the distinction 
between nature and society, Latour does not demonstrate that the question of the relation 
between science and nature ceases to be meaningful: a gap can remain between how we see 
the world and how we believe the actors we follow saw it. 
 In chapter 7, we look at naturalistic ways of dealing with the relation between 
science and its objects. Under a naturalistic perspective, nature figures in history of science 
through causally influencing science. Invisible hand mechanisms can potentially explain 
both why science is successful and why it does not need to transcend naturalistic 
explanation. We will focus on David Hull’s evolutionary account of science. This turns out 
to have several virtues, notably its proposal to see science not as a kind, but as a historical 
individual: a lineage. This lineage evolves because of selection pressures, and it is these 
selection pressures that form the causal link between nature and science. However, we will 
also add a few caveats (consistent with some tendencies in Hull’s work but not with all), 
namely that not only the selection of scientific theories, but also the ways in which they 
mutate, are dependent on cultural and social contexts; this means that in order to explain the 
content of scientific theories, knowledge of nature is never enough, but detailed 
understanding of the scientists in their historical context is needed. 
This opens up the question of understanding, to which we turn in chapter 8. While 
chapter 7 dealt mainly with the causal aspect of our problem, chapter 8 also deals with its 
hermeneutic side – the question of the role of our inherited categories in our dealings with 
the history from which we inherited them. We can look at science as a tradition that 
develops in a path-dependent way and accumulates elements from both nature and society 
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or culture, in such a way that the causal influences of both cannot be disentangled in the 
result. This makes the role of the world in the development of science itself historically 
conditioned: it is dependent on the shape of the scientific culture of the age, which in turn is 
not an independent variable, but a result of a historical development in which the external 
world has continuously played its – ever history-dependent – part. The world is what the 
scientific tradition at any point interacts with, but this scientific tradition itself has been 
formed path-dependently by continuous interaction with the world. 
This causal thesis has repercussions for the hermeneutic position of history of 
science and the way in which our beliefs about nature can figure in our historical 
explanations. When attempting to understand earlier stages of the scientific tradition, our 
point of entry is a stage in history that has absorbed a lot of previous interactions with 
nature, on which not just our particular scientific beliefs but also the very demarcation of 
scientific beliefs from other beliefs causally depend. Making our historiography 
independent of current scientific categories and beliefs would require reversing in thought 
the historical process that has led to these categories and beliefs, and even as an ideal this 
rests on a misjudgment of what historical understanding is. We will end by discussing (and 
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Chapter 2: Contingentism and Inevitabilism in 
History of Science 
 
2.1 The Question 
A major question that, in one form or another, occupies scholars of scientific change is 
whether the actual history they study is the only possible one, or whether different histories 
were possible.40 This question is often seen through the prism of the debate about 
contingency and inevitability in the history of science. 
 My aim in this chapter is to reflect upon the meaning of this question specifically 
within the context of a philosophy of historiography of science, which means that somewhat 
different considerations come into play than discussions of this question within the context 
of philosophy of science. Notably, one traditional problem immediately retreats from focus, 
namely the question whether an alternative development of science could have led to 
something as epistemically successful as actual science – which in Ian Hacking’s classical 
formulation of the contingentism-inevitabilism polarity and most authoritative later 
discussions is the main question.41 
 My premise is that historians of science are interested not primarily in judging 
epistemic success, but in explaining why science developed as it did. This does not mean 
that questions about objectivity or justification can be avoided in this explanation, but it 
means that they are not what is at stake at the outset. Our question is in what sense it is 
possible to say that science could have developed differently, not in what sense it is possible 
to say that a different science could have been as successful as actual science. This may seem 
like dodging precisely the philosophically interesting questions – everybody can easily 
imagine much less sophisticated alternatives to the current state of knowledge to have 
occurred, for example if external factors had made sure that human civilization never left 
the bronze age.42 However, I want to show that this question can be understood in such a 
way that we can align different historiographical approaches to different answers to it.  
 In particular, I will argue that inevitabilist positions have a strong affinity with the 
idea that the content of science can be explained only by reference to the world that science 
itself seeks to describe and explain.  
 
  
                                                     
40 E.g. Hull (1988, 2). 
41 Hacking (2000a, 58-61); Soler (2008a; 2008b, 230-231). 
42 Martin (2013, 925); Fuller (2011, 568). 
18 | Chapter 2: Contingentism and Inevitabilism in History of Science 
2.2 Contingency and Indeterminacy 
As a first step, we need to realize that what is at stake in the contingentism-inevitabilism 
debate cannot be captured in terms of the distinction between indeterminism and 
determinism, and is in fact almost completely independent of it.43 One can be an inevitabilist 
while adhering to some kind of indeterminism, or a contingentist while holding fast to the 
regulative ideal of determinism.44 
 Of course, this means that contingentism is not by definition identical to 
indeterminism or inevitabilism to determinism.45 By determinism I mean the belief that any 
state of reality is compatible with only one state of reality at a later time.46 Indeterminism is 
a denial of this; the belief that at least some states of reality are compatible with multiple 
states at some later time. Graphically represented:47 
 
 
In the deterministic set of worlds A, being on a point on a timeline means inevitably to be on 
a specific other point later; different outcomes require different conditions. In the 
indeterministic world B, different outcomes are compatible with the same starting point. 
Now, for our current purposes it is crucial that we may be interested in other 
aspects of possible timelines than their determinacy. Notably, we may be interested in 
                                                     
43 Contrary to Martin (2013, 926), who sees indeterminism as a strong version of what he calls 
unpredictability contingency. 
44 Cf. Adcock (2007); see also Nagel (1960) on determinism as a regulative principle for science, 
including history, and Loewer (2008, esp. 331-334) for a critical evaluation of the idea that determinism 
has become obsolete because of quantum mechanics. 
45 Ben-Menahem 2009. 
46 Cf. Dennett (2003, 25). This definition is less strict than that of Earman (1986, 12-14), who says that 
those worlds are deterministic which are identical at any time, are identical at all times. 
47 In the timelines used as illustration here, the horizontal dimension represents time; the vertical 
dimension indicates likeness – that is to say, points that coincide in time differ more when they are 
further away from each other. This particular illustration is practically identical to that in Beatty (2006, 
340). 
Figure 1: Determinism versus indeterminism 
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whether possible timelines converge or diverge from each other. Figure 2 represents two 
qualitatively different but both deterministic sets of timelines: 
 
   
Figure 2: Divergence and convergence in deterministic sets of worlds 
 
In the set of possible timelines A, end-states are more sensitive to the initial conditions than 
in the set of possible timelines B. Even if from the perspective of one timeline, things are as 
inevitable in A as in B, doing counterfactual history in set A will lead to different 
conclusions than in set B: in A, after all, a slight difference in initial conditions would have 
led to a comparatively large difference in end-states, and in B it is the other way round. (I 
consider leading to identical situations to be an option as well.)48 
 In one indeterministic world, possible timelines are bound to diverge at some point 
– because they are identical in the beginning and non-identical later – but it is conceivable 
both that they will converge again, and that they will diverge further from each other (figure 
3): 
                                                     
48 Ben-Menahem (2009) defines contingency in this way, in terms of sensitivity to initial conditions. 
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Figure 3: indeterministic divergence and convergence 
 
When we ask the question whether we were bound to end up where now are, we are not 
asking whether we live in an indeterministic world, but whether the causal processes in our 
world work in such a way that all or most of the different path that were possible converge 
towards where we actually ended up. 
 
2.3 Contingency as Path-Dependent Historical Possibility 
Next, we need to see that we can meaningfully talk about historical possibility not only in 
indeterministic worlds, but in deterministic worlds as well. In a deterministic world, after all, 
there is objectively no possibility: even if the Laplacian demon could give a true answer to 
the question what would have been different if a certain aspect of the initial situation had 
been different, he cannot convince himself that things actually could have been different. 
Historians usually want their counterfactuals to depend not on hypothetical miracles but on 
what I will call ‘historical possibilities’.49 It may seem that these exist only in indeterministic 
worlds. 
 However, it is important here that we differ from the Laplacian demon in that our 
knowledge of causally relevant factors in history is always finite, and all our claims 
concerning them are inherently dependent on abstraction and selection. Many of our 
knowledge claims are compatible with a multitude of states of reality, and span a range of 
relatively close possible worlds.50 For instance, our knowledge of the macroscopic fact that 
there was an assassination attempt on an Austro-Hungarian archduke in 1914 does not fix 
                                                     
49 Cf. Reiss (2009, 718-722); for history of science, French (2008, e.g. 575). 
50 Cf. also Berry (2009).  
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precisely which world we live in, and it is therefore itself consistent with multiple different 
outcomes – importantly, both survival and death of the victim. 
 It may be that deterministic worlds that were close to each other at this point (to 
the point that they are hardly distinguishable) have diverged further apart from each other 
depending on the outcome of this assassination attempt.51 That is, we can believe both that 
we live in a deterministic world and that it is meaningful to state that Franz Ferdinand 
could have survived and the First World War might have been avoided.52 We can equally 
well believe that the First World War was both determined and inevitable in this stronger 
sense – it also happened in close worlds in which Franz Ferdinand did not die.  
 I define contingentism and inevitabilism as theses about the extent to which 
historically possible alternative paths in history diverge or converge. ‘Historical possibility’ 
here means that the occurrence of an alternative is not forbidden by what is implied by our 
historical descriptions – thus, for instance, survival of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 is 
not forbidden by the fact that he was the victim of an assassination attempt on that day. On 
the other hand, the fact that Franz Ferdinand did die forbids that he could lead the Austrian-
Hungarian armies in the First World War. Whatever is forbidden by some historical 
knowledge in combination with background knowledge is an anachronism with respect to 
that knowledge (see section 3.3), what is not forbidden by this knowledge is historically 
possible. 
 Historical possibility and the corresponding notion of anachronism are 
distinguished from other kinds of possibility by the fact that its boundaries are dependent 
on historical time and place. Caesar both crossing the Rubicon at a given moment in 49BC 
and not crossing the Rubicon then is impossible, but it is a logical impossibility. Caesar 
flying over the Rubicon by his own strength is a biological or physical impossibility – that is, 
it is forbidden by our knowledge of the physical environment and the human body, not by 
our knowledge of the specific context of ancient Rome. Caesar wearing a watch is logically 
and physically possible: there is nothing we know about watches that implies that they 
could not function in 49BC, or be worn by Caesar. However, it is forbidden by our 
knowledge of a specific time and context, namely that of ancient Rome. 
 The convergence and divergence of historically possible paths can be related to the 
notion of path dependence, a term used in economics to denote processes whose dynamics 
do not guarantee convergence to a “unique, globally stable equilibrium configuration”;53 
processes, that is, to which “history matters”.54  
                                                     
51 Loewer (2008, 334-336) 
52 Cf. Dennett (1984) on the difference between deterministic and fatalistic worlds; cf. also Taylor and 
Dennett (2002) and Dennett (2003, 63-95, which also contains another assassination-related example).  
53 David (2007, 97). 
54 David (2007, 92). See Vergne (2010) on the relation between path dependence and randomness.  
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There are some connotations to the usage of this term in economic discourse that I 
should want to avoid. First, its usual relation to lack of change.55 I assume that science is 
subject to historical processes of change in any historically possible scenario. Second, its 
association with notions of efficiency; mechanisms of path dependence, such as increasing 
returns or lock-in, explain why sub-optimal institutions survive.56 Setting aside the question 
whether this is useful even in economics,57 it is hard to translate this aspect of path 
dependence to history of science, not just in practice but in principle: it presupposes that we 
can assess the relative efficiency of our existing science and a possible alternative. Whereas 
we can, in principle, assess this difference when it comes to technologies actually in use and 
their conceivable alternatives, it seems paradoxical to do so for our systems of knowledge. 
For instance, even if we believe that it was possible for phlogiston theory to have developed 
into a (in some sense that would need to be specified) more efficient chemistry than 
Lavoisier’s chemistry, it is paradoxical to agree upon the superiority of the alternative 
without adopting it.58 
Taking this into account, the notion of path dependence is very useful: it awakens 
us to the possibility that the likelihood of something happening is influenced by what 
happens before.59 It seems to me that a general contingency thesis with respect to the history 
of science is well described as the belief that the likelihood of particular later stages in the 
history of science depends to a large extent upon things that happened before that could 
well have gone otherwise, so that the content of science in the year 2065 is much more fixed 
now (in 2015) than it was in 1915, for instance, since a lot of alternative diverging paths that 
were still possible in 1915 have not been taken. As John Beatty and Isabel Carrera write, 
“when a particular future depends on a particular past that was not bound to happen, but 
did, history matters.”60 
The inevitabilist, on the other hand, believes that there were no or relatively few 
historically possible alternatives in 1915 that would not have converged to roughly our 
current state by now – either because very few alternatives were historically possible, or 
because the dynamics of science leads these alternatives to converge in the end.  
 
  
                                                     
55 Boas (2007, 35-37); Crouch and Farrell (2004, 5-6). 
56 Page (2006, 90); Boas (2007, 35-37); Crouch and Farrell (2004, 5-6). 
57 For an insightful criticism of this (esp. concerning the relationship drawn between path dependence 
and market failure by Liebowitz and Margolis (1995), who on the basis of this relationship claim that 
there can be no path dependence in economics) see David (2000, 8-12). Cf. Boas (2007, 38n8) on path 
dependence in political science. 
58 Chang (2012, 42-50, 62-65). Chang claims that phlogiston theory has been prematurely abandoned and 
its survival would have ‘accelerated’ developments in chemistry and physics (65). Consistent with what 
I am claiming here, Chang goes on to argue that phlogiston theory is and ought to be a part of modern 
chemistry as well. Cf. also Stanford (2006, 3-26) on unconceived alternatives. 
59 Crouch and Farrell (2004, 12). 
60 Beatty and Carrera (2011, 495). 
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2.4 Contingency, Historical Explanation, and the World 
This distinction between contingentism and inevitabilism leads us to a hypothesis 
concerning the different status they will ascribe to the external world. If the inevitabilist 
maintains that historical developments do not make a difference to the content of science, 
she will most likely claim that this content is in the end decided by the world outside history. 
The contingentist, on the other hand, will usually say that the makeup of nature does not fix 
the eventual content of science, but that additional explanantes are needed, contingent upon 
histories that could have been otherwise.  
 This means that there is no necessary trade-off between contingency and 
explicability, as there is between indeterminacy and explicability. Contingentism in history 
of science is rather a statement about the insufficiency of ahistorical explanations: saying that 
the development of the concept of quarks is contingent means that an ahistorical 
explanation, such as the actual existence of quarks in nature, does not suffice, for there is a 
lot of relevant historical knowledge consistent with the existence of quarks under which it is 
possible that science would not come to contain quark physics.61 The inevitabilist would 
make the opposing claim that all or almost all worlds that contain quarks and modern 
physics will eventually contain a quark concept. Importantly, neither the inevitabilist nor 
the contingentist needs to believe that the concept of quark is not determined; they disagree 
only about what it is determined by.  
 I will illustrate this interpretation of the contingency-inevitability polarity by a few 
historiographical examples. When Bruno Latour seeks to understand how Pasteur and the 
Pasteurians were accepted, he says that “the first rule of method common to history and the 
sociology of science is to convince ourselves that this was not necessary.”62 He elaborates: 
 
it might have been said – it ought to have been said – that this handful of scientists was 
precisely no more than a handful. It might – and ought – to have been said that they were 
‘only theoreticians shut away in their laboratories, without contact with the outside world.’ 
This was not said. Why?63 
 
Latour says here that it was not inevitable that Pasteurianism was accepted; it could have 
been ignored. He goes on to provide an extensive account of the groups that Pasteur was 
able to enlist thanks to his various movements, and of his ability thereby to involve larger 
movements in his own. Latour’s denial of inevitability does not amount to a denial of 
explicability; he seems to claim not that Pasteur’s success was not determined, but rather that 
                                                     
61 There are, of course, other points of departure conceivable than a belief in quarks: a belief in the non-
existence of quarks for example, agnosticism about quarks, or the opinion that the question of the 
existence or non-existence of quarks is meaningless. The point here is that even if one assents to the 
existence of quarks, these quarks do not necessarily and sufficiently explain the existence of belief in 
quarks. 
62 Latour (1993b, 61). 
63 Latour (1993b, 61). 
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it was not inevitably linked to the content of Pasteurianism. It was possible for the history of 
science to look differently even after Pasteur’s doctrines were conceived of, and recognizing 
this is important because it creates room for all the other factors involved in the success of 
Pasteurianism. 
 Jim Endersby, in a study of the Victorian Darwinian Joseph Hooker, says that: 
 
once we examine the details of Hooker’s career and compare them with those of his 
contemporaries, it becomes clear that there was nothing inevitable about the changes he 
participated in. […] I shall also show that there was nothing predictable about Hooker’s 
embrace of Darwinism, which was supposedly the common, secularizing ideology of the 
scientific professionalizers. Indeed, I shall argue that Hooker’s acceptance of Darwinism was 
more complex and ambiguous than has hitherto been recognized.64 
 
Here, too, the denial of inevitability is not a denial of determinacy, but a rhetorical move to 
make room for additional explanantes, by saying that straightforward, law-like relations 
between phenomena (for instance, between scientific professionalizers and Darwinism) 
actually disappear in the complexity of the historical narrative.65 
 I will zoom in closer on my last example: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s 
declaration in Leviathan and the air-pump that: 
 
we want to show that there was nothing self-evident or inevitable about the series of 
historical judgments which yielded a natural philosophical consensus in favour of the 
experimental programme66 
 
Shapin and Schaffer, too, continue with a book-long account that in the end leaves the 
reader with the satisfied feeling that the triumph of experimental science actually falls 
comfortably within the limited range of outcomes consistent with the social and political 
context of Restoration England. They certainly do not want to claim that this constellation 
randomly favored Boyle’s natural philosophy rather than Hobbes, and they sum up their 
beliefs in quite deterministic language in the final chapter: “he who has the most, and the 
most powerful, allies wins.”67 
 The point is not that Boyle’s triumph is inexplicable, but that there is no ahistorical 
entity or fact such as the possibility of a vacuum which by itself determined the outcome of 
the debate. The allies that Boyle had, and his assumed rightness, must themselves be 
considered to be historical products.68 Boyle’s victory is determined – thus inevitable – in a 
world in which we take into account all the forces that were in play in Restoration England, 
                                                     
64 Endersby (2008, 5-6). 
65 Cf. also Kracauer (1969, 27-44). 
66 Shapin and Schaffer (1985, 13). 
67 Shapin and Schaffer (1985, 243). 
68 Shapin and Schaffer (1985, 14). 
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but this polity could have been different; and the fact that the fate of Boyle’s science 
depended on that polity and not (just) on nature means that it is right to say that it was not 
historically inevitable. 
 I hope to have done justice to what Shapin and Schaffer are saying while 
rephrasing their thesis to fit my definition of contingentism and inevitabilism in the history 
of science. It seems to me that they are committed to the statement that things could have 
been different now, in the sense that a chain of historically possible events exists (starting 
from the 17th century) which leads to a significantly different science which looks less like 
Boyle’s. Inevitabilists are committed to the inverse statement, that there is no chain of 
historically possible events that would have led to a significantly different science in the end. 
The crucial semantic issue in each individual case is what counts as ‘historically possible’ 
(and as ‘significantly different’); the crucial substantive issue is whether anything that could 
be agreed  to be historically possible would indeed have led to a significantly 
different science. 
 We have not established that inevitabilism can be grounded only by the external 
world (we will discuss this further in chapter 4), but controversy about historical possibility 
and the divergence and convergence of possible histories will inescapably involve questions 
about the causal importance of different factors in history. Contingency claims are made 
with this rhetorical goal in mind: to show the insufficiency of other explanations, and 
replace these by a superior one.69 Thus, the causal role of the world in history of science is of 
direct relevance for the contingency-inevitability polarity.  
 
2.4 The Special Position of History of Science 
Historians usually work with macroscopic, culture-laden entities and facts – such as Austro-
Hungarian archdukes and assassination attempts – whose interrelations display a large 
measure of subjective indeterminacy. Though they can usually readily admit the influence 
of non-cultural ‘natural’ factors, there are reasons why this may be more complicated in the 
case of history of science. 
 Often, descriptions of historical events in terms other than those of mainstream 
general history do not compete with this history for explanatory relevance: for instance, we 
can zoom in on the medical details of the assault on Franz Ferdinand without thereby 
jeopardizing the possibility to attribute his death to social, political or ideological causes. In 
this case, medical and political-historical explanations do not compete. In other cases, they 
may compete; for example, Jared Diamond’s claim that (among other things) diseases to 
which European conquerors were but American indigenous peoples were not immune 
explain Western dominance in the modern era is made in explicit competition with cultural 
explanations of Western dominance.70 
                                                     
69 On this, see Henry (2008) and Sankey (2008) – Sankey believes that inevitabilism and realism are 
strongly connected.  
70 Diamond (2005, 405-425). 
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 In addition to this, the historiography of science has a specific problem that other 
branches of history do not, because it studies specific cultural entities, which are supposed 
to have a necessary relation to certain natural entities. Usually, historical contingentism as 
defined above is not in opposition to scientific claims that there are known necessary 
relations between the entities that populate our universe. However, a tension arises if we 
claim that our knowledge of those necessary relations is contingent. After all, the following 
three claims cannot all be true: 
 [1] Scientific theories are historical entities 
 [2] Historical entities are historically contingent 
[3] Scientific theories have a uniform and necessary relation to the non-historically 
contingent things they describe. 
 
One way to solve this is to deny [1]: to deny that scientific theories are genuinely historical 
entities in the sense implied by [2]. This is the position that Steven Weinberg takes, when he 
says that the laws of nature as known by science are: 
 
culture-free and they are permanent [...] in their final form, in which cultural influences are 
refined away. I will even use the dangerous words ‘nothing but’: aside from inessentials like 
the mathematical notation we use, the laws of physics as we understand them now are 
nothing but a description of reality.71 
 
Based on his view that science reflects the world, Weinberg’s view of physics in particular is 
highly inevitabilist: he believes that physics 
 
is moving toward a fixed point […] a theory that, when finally reached, will be a permanent 
part of our knowledge of the world. Then our work as elementary particle physicists is done, 
and will become nothing but history.72 
 
This confirms that a plausible argument for the inevitabilist is to say that there is a necessary 
relation between a feature of nature and a feature of some cultural products (namely 
finished science), while the contingentist will have to maintain that this relation is path-
dependent.  
I want to emphasize that I consider the inevitabilist position to be a logically valid 
one. It is not clear to me, however, how scientific theories can pass from a culture-laden to a 
culture-free state; how cultural influences are ‘refined away’ (we will discuss Weinberg 
further in section 3.2). Contrary to Weinberg, I see no reason not to regard scientific theories 
as cultural products, but their being cultural does not itself preclude their being determined 
partly (and even significantly) by nature.  
                                                     
71 Weinberg (1996, 136). 
72 Weinberg (1996, 137). 
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  There is not even necessarily a question of truth here: a definite truth-relation is 
only one of the ways in which the world may determine the shape of cultural products, and 
moreover, there may be multiple non-contradicting and true theories about this world. 
Inversely, natural phenomena may be necessary causes of some untrue beliefs. Most 
importantly, it is unclear where ‘truth’ enters the chain of causality leading to scientific 
theories, except as a principle or value in the minds of the scientists.  
I repeat that historiographically speaking, the interesting question is not whether 
scientific theories are true or justified or whether different ones could have been as true or 
justified. Rather, it is about the ways in which nature plays a causal role in determining the 
cultural products that are scientific theories. Can these products be simply reduced to nature 
(which would imply commitment to [3] and to inevitabilism), are they determined by 
something other than nature (which means rejecting [3] and creating space for 
contingentism), or is there some kind of complex interplay, and if so, is there any 
identifiable pattern in the way nature plays its part in this interplay? Can the world ‘resist’ 
certain scientific theories under certain circumstances, and how?73  
Conceptualizing the ways in which the world or nature may co-determine some 
cultural products is a legitimate question for history of science. This, however, requires the 
conceptual space that this chapter has sought to make. Importantly, it requires the 
recognition that contingentism – the legitimate default position for historians, since it 
maximizes the importance of historical knowledge – does not imply that nature cannot be a 
necessary cause of a certain scientific theory. 
 
  
                                                     
73 Trizio (2008, 253-256) observes that there are several histories of geographical discoveries conceivable 
but that given the actual distribution of land over the globe, the results of these histories still (in a 
certain sense inevitably) tend to converge. He asks the question whether the same would hold for high-
level hypotheses and theories in physics, and if not, what the differences are that point to contingentism 
in those areas – for example, that geographical discoverers did not create a new ontology but only 
added individual entities.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
The two main points argued in this chapter are: 
1) Controversies between contingentism and inevitabilism in history of science are 
best understood as different views on the extent to which historically possible 
alternative paths tend to converge towards similar or identical later states. 
Contingentists believe that science is relatively path dependent, whereas 
inevitabilists believe it is not. 
2) Inevitabilism has an affinity with the view that the content of science is eventually 
explained only by what the world is like. 
Chapter 4 continues the second point. The relation between contingentism and the role the 
world can play in our historical explanations is much more complicated, since it involves 
both the causal question what precisely the role of the world is, and the question whether 
our beliefs about nature can shed light at all upon possible histories that do not contain 
those beliefs.  
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Chapter 3: Whig History and Anachronism in 
History of Science 
 
3.1 Whose Nature? 
We are dealing in this thesis with the question of what role nature can play in history of 
science. Inescapably, then, we have to deal with the question whose nature we are talking 
about. Is it our own ideas about nature that inform our explanations and interpretations of 
past science? 
For if that is the case, are we not assuming the superiority of our own ideas about 
nature and making this superiority an essential interpretive device in our historical 
interpretation? In general, what legitimate and illegitimate uses can we make of our own 
concepts and beliefs? Can we say that Aristotle was a biologist, or that Galileo was a 
scientist? Can we talk about electrons in a historical account of the discovery of electrons 
before the time they were discovered? Or is this anachronistic, presentist, or Whiggish, and is 
it not inextricably connected to the kind of scientists’ history that historiography of science 
needs to leave behind?74 
The avoidance of Whiggism seems to be solidly ingrained in the ethos of the 
historian of science, but precisely this term is, as Peter Dear and Sheila Jasanoff have noticed, 
rather “loosely defined”.75 When historians accuse each other of Whiggism (which does not 
happen often in journal articles, and when it does, usually in reviews),76 the term is used in a 
slightly different way each time: for denoting the tendency of interpreting the earlier works 
of scientists “through the lens” of their later works;77 as a qualification for a history in which 
“everything is seen as contributing to the great march forward” and where deviations from 
that path are treated as “mere digressions or […] reinterpreted from today’s perspective”;78 
                                                     
74 On the supposed connection between Whig history and scientists’ history, see Forman (1991, 78) and 
the quotes in section 1.4. That the historical relations between innovations in history of science and the 
contributions of scientists to the discipline are rather less straightforward is made clear by Mayer (2000; 
2004). 
75 Dear and Jasanoff (2010, 771). Dear and Jasanoff associate the fear of Whiggishness with the fear of 
anachronism. 
76 Alvargonzález (2013, 86) says that the Whig label “brands a deep stigma”, but without providing 
examples of this stigma. It is in my interest as well to uphold that Whiggism and its connotations play 
an important role in policing the boundaries of historiography of science (and I do believe that this is 
the case), but it is also worth pointing out that its workings are not always easy to trace in print. Rickles 
(2011), nevertheless, is an example where the accusation of Whiggism figures in a (not unjustified) 
strong denunciation of the reviewed work (409-410), together with accusations of factual error and 
plagiarism. 
77 White (2005, 129). 
78 French (2006, 191).  
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as a history where projects fail owing to “ignorance and lack of understanding”;79 and as 
“manifest destiny history”80 – the last case, interestingly, used in a review by Ian Hacking to 
make the case that an author who calls his history “Whig” actually is not one. What further 
complicates matters is that the label of ‘Whig’ historian is sometimes worn with pride, as a 
way of dismantling what is perceived as too crude a weapon with which to attack one’s 
opponents.81  
In this chapter, we will unpack some of the intuitions and theses associated with 
the notion of Whig history, starting with a short discussion of its classical formulation by 
Herbert Butterfield (section 3.2), and evaluating later treatments by theorists in history of 
science and continuing to analyze the issues of anachronism, progress and presentism 
separately. It will be argued that the issue of anachronism is a real one (section 3.3); that the 
judgment that science exhibits cumulative progress, which has been used by some authors 
to justify presentism in history of science, does not in fact support this aim (section 3.4); but 
that the problem of anachronism itself does not justify a general anti-presentism (section 3.5).  
The chapter culminates in a proposal to think of our historical categories as 
themselves developing path-dependently in dialogue between our pre-existing beliefs and 
our sources.  
 
3.2 Whig History According to Butterfield 
Herbert Butterfield’s The Whig Interpretation of History is a sustained plea to look at the past 
with the eyes of the past, rather than subordinating it to present perspectives and 
judgments.82 The text is essayistic and its claims are argued for in a loose manner, and any 
selection of the main feature of Whig history as defined by Butterfield can itself only be an 
interpretation – or, in Butterfield’s view, a ‘Whiggish’ abridgment. Nonetheless, we will try 
to identify some recurring themes. 
 What Whig history is, and does wrong, is that it studies the past with direct 
reference to the present,83 while “real historical understanding is not achieved by the 
subordination of the past to the present, but rather by making the past our present and 
attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own.”84 This we will define 
as the problem of presentism here: the, in Butterfield’s view, mistaken belief that our present 
beliefs and categories can genuinely enlighten the past, when actually they ought to be left 
at the door when we start doing historiography. Related to the vice of presentism is the 
                                                     
79 Barnes (2006, 384). Barnes consciously uses the label of Whiggism in a slightly unconventional context, 
since in the book under review, it is precisely the scientific experts whose project fails because of a lack 
of understanding.  
80 Hacking (2004, 463).  
81 Mayr (1990, 301); Bod (2010, 479); Alvargonzález (2013). 
82 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 14). 
83 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 11-13). 
84 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 14). 
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abstraction of things from their historical context;85 this abstraction entails selection and 
abridgment, which implies a failure to do justice to the complexity and unpredictability of 
the past.86 “All history must tend to become more whig in proportion as it becomes more 
abridged.”87 
 Whig history also defines and judges events and persons in reference to their 
relation to progress. This is connected to the mistake of presentism – it is the failure to see 
that in past conflicts, all parties are alien to us, and that the quarrels of 16th-century 
Protestants and Catholics are “as unrelated to ourselves as the factions of Blues and Greens 
in ancient Constantinople.”88 But it also rests on a mistaken idea that value judgments can be 
part of history at all.89 
 By making distinctions in the past that make sense only from a present-day 
perspective, and especially by attempting to reduce what happens in the past to ‘deeper’ 
causes,90 we try to add to the locality and concreteness of the past, and these additions can 
only lead to error. For instance, “the Whig historian is apt to imagine the British constitution 
as coming down to us safely at last, in spite of so many vicissitudes; when in reality it is the 
result of those very vicissitudes of which he seems to complain.”91 Here the point seems to 
be a kind of anachronism: the Whig historian thinks he can see the outlines of the British 
constitution when it is in fact not there. The error of anachronism is closely related to the 
error of presentism: by imagining that the present-day British constitution has a history-
transcending status that allows it to cast light upon a 16th century in which in fact it did not 
exist, the historian makes an error.  
 Modern categories are of no use in understanding. If we are to understand history, 
we are to leave the present behind and immerse ourselves completely in the complexity and 
strangeness of the past. Anything short of this will lead to historical errors and undue claims 
of progress. In the following sections, we will deal with the issues of anachronism, progress, 
and presentism and selectivity separately, and see that their relations are not as tight as 
Butterfield suggests.   
 
3.3 Causal and Conceptual Anachronism 
Our first problem is that of anachronism. Anachronism can denote a kind of historical error 
that is stronger than a simple factual mistake: saying that a proposition is anachronistic 
amounts to saying that it not only was not the case, but that it could not have been the case at 
the time. Einstein not just was not a falsificationist; he couldn’t have been, since 
                                                     
85 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 30). 
86 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 20-24). 
87 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 7). 
88 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 38). 
89 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 117). 
90 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 57-58). 
91 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 41). 
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falsificationism had not yet been formulated.92 Our conception of what is historically 
possible identifies which claims constitute anachronisms in this sense; in fact, debates about 
this kind of anachronism can be seen as debates about historical possibility (see also section 
2.3).  
In practice, the term ‘anachronism’ is also used for something different, namely the 
application of our own beliefs and concepts to times and places in which those beliefs or 
concepts were unavailable.93 This has in itself nothing to do with the identification of entities 
or processes that were impossible at the time, but is rather a historiographical counterpart to 
the anthropological distinction between ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ descriptions.94  
For the sake of clarity, then, we need to distinguish between these two senses in 
which the term is used, which I will here call causal and conceptual anachronisms. A causal 
anachronism is, as we defined above, the belief that something was the case that was 
actually historically impossible; a conceptual anachronism is the application of concepts or 
beliefs to times in which they did not exist.95 (Our definition of conceptual anachronism is 
not the same as that of presentism; the belief that present categories and beliefs can help us 
to understand the past, which may rely on historical continuities between past and present 
beliefs.) I will take for granted that a causal anachronism is always worth avoiding. The 
question is whether, and under which circumstances, we should avoid conceptual 
anachronism. Here it is worthwhile to revisit some arguments put forward by Quentin 
Skinner in his ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.’96 
Skinner attacks the “anachronistic mythologies”97 he identifies in history of ideas in 
his time: these involve the idea that there are perennial problems that both we and earlier 
authors are occupied with, and an insistence that the views of the authors we interpret must 
have remained stable over time, rather than being linked with concrete and time-bound 
contexts.98 Both mythologies lead to an anachronism that has to do with the usage of 
                                                     
92 The example comes from Newall (2009, 268-269), who deals with anachronism as a ‘logical fallacy’. 
93 Cf. Spelda (2012, 93). 
94 Cf. Jardine (2004). 
95 The term ‘conceptual anachronism’ can be found in Poe (1996, 352). In Poe’s classification, it is one of 
three species of anachronism, and it means “the propensity thoughtlessly to use concepts from our time 
to describe another” or “a corruption of the use of modern concepts in historical narratives”. Poe’s other 
two species are ‘determinism’, by which he means something like inevitabilism or fatalism (which for 
our current purposes we keep distinct from anachronism); and ‘partisanship’, which is “the habit of 
making moral judgment where none should be made”. It will be clear that, when I use the term 
‘conceptual anachronism’, I do not employ either Poe’s classification of anachronism or his definition of 
this type and its reliance on the psychological state of the historian; I mean all applications of our 
concepts to times and places at which those concepts were unavailable. A distinction that resembles the 
current one more closely can be found in Jardine (2000); Jardine (2003) also uses the term ‘conceptual 
anachronism’. 
96 Skinner (1969).  
97 Skinner (1969, 40). 
98 See also the criticism by Burns (2011) that Skinner overlooks the possibility of historical continuities 
between earlier and later terms and concepts.  
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concepts. This leads to historical error when, for instance, a historian of the English 
Revolution interprets the Levellers’ concern with the extension of the right to vote as an 
argument for democracy, and applies his own paradigm of a democracy – a liberal 
democracy including general (male) suffrage and “some anachronistic concept of ‘the 
welfare state’” – to the beliefs of the Levellers.99  
 We can see that this would indeed be wrong, but what precisely goes wrong, and 
what does it have to do with conceptual anachronism? When are anachronistic descriptions 
misleading? Skinner’s criterion is rather interesting: his point turns out to be that an account 
of “an agent’s behavior” cannot survive the criticism that it is “dependent on the use of 
criteria of description and classification not available to the agent himself.”100 This, in fact, 
goes beyond an indictment of anachronism, to a point where all sociological or 
psychological explanations become illegitimate. Skinner’s point seems to be more about 
agency or action, which is (again, according to him) by definition about more or less 
conscious intention and which for that reason needs to be understandable in terms available 
to the consciousness of the agent.101 When Skinner satirizes that a “fourteenth-century anti-
papalist pamphleteer can scarcely have been intending to contribute to an eighteenth-century 
French constitutionalist debate”,102 his primary enemy is not anachronism, but an improper 
view of what it means to understand someone’s actions at all.103  
In keeping with the spirit of his intentions, we ought to be careful not to read 
Skinner as trying to answer our problems – his problem is, in the end, not primarily that of 
anachronism but of the possibility of treating doctrines as “self-sufficient object[s] of inquiry 
and understanding”.104 This means that if we abstract from his arguments about agency, 
Skinner actually delivers rather little in the way of arguments against conceptual 
anachronism as such.  
But we do see how such an argument might get off the ground: by showing that 
there is, not just a psychological, but a stronger relation between conceptual anachronisms 
and causal anachronisms, such that the use of a conceptual anachronism will always 
amount to a causal anachronism (which it does under Skinner’s assumption about historical 
                                                     
99 Skinner (1969, 27). 
100 Skinner (1969, 29). 
101 This distinguishes Skinner’s view on linguistic conventions from that of Pocock (1985), in whose 
view language goes further in determining the intentions and the boundaries of the actors’ possibility to 
act. See also Bevir (2009), who describes how in practice, Cambridge contextualism has let go of 
Skinner’s and Pocock’s methodological prescriptions in favor of a ‘broad historicist sensibility’ (222).  
102 Skinner (1969, 29). 
103 See also McIntyre (2008, 154-155), and Martinich’s (2009) painstaking but ultimately unconvincing 
distinction between four kinds of meaning in Skinner’s theory of interpretation: in particular, 
Martinich’s claim that historians are interested primarily in ‘significance’ rather than communicative 
meaning, and the claim that Skinner conflates these two, are respectively doubtful and belied by 
Skinner (1969, 23), though indeed Skinner’s talks in a rather eclectic way about meaning. See also Skodo 
(2009, 311-313).  
104 Skinner (1969, 31). See also the critical discussion by Lamb (2009).  
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understanding). This seems to be the case everywhere where the possibility of a certain 
practice or action is dependent on the availability of a certain concept.  
Ian Hacking has made this case in detail for concepts in psychiatry, such as child 
abuse, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or multiple personalities.105 His 
position, which he has dubbed ‘dynamic nominalism’ to signify that the categories created 
by people are not fixed and to distance himself from an anti-realist nominalism, is that there 
are kinds that come into being together with the concepts that denote them.  
 
The claim […] is not that there was a kind of person who came increasingly to be recognized 
by bureaucrats or by students of human nature, but rather that a kind of person came into 
being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented. My claim about making up 
people is that in a few interesting respects multiple personalities (and much else) are more 
like gloves than like horses. The category and the people emerged hand in hand.106 
 
It is not just a matter of semantics; not just that under our descriptions, someone in the 19th 
century is a child abuser while under 19th-century descriptions he is not. The point is that 
even under our own concepts, it is not clear that someone could be a child abuser in a 
society or culture that lacked the corresponding concept.107  
 Hacking’s claim is not logical, but causal; his point about ADHD, for instance, is 
that it is an ‘interactive kind’. The existence of the category in a society influences the people 
that fall under this category, possibly because of their awareness of this category but also 
because of institutions whose existence depends on the category and which are influencing 
the behavior of the people denoted by the category.108 The phenomena that ADHD refers to 
could not have taken their precise shape without the category of ADHD. Whether this is the 
case for a specific category depends on what it denotes; Hacking does not say that all 
categories are interactive kinds. 
 The two kinds of anachronism approach each other more when the phenomenon a 
concept refers to has specific causal relations to the existence of that same concept in society. 
Whether this is the case depends on what we mean by our concepts and on our causal 
beliefs. For instance, if homosexuality necessarily (by definition or with regard to the 
conditions for its existence) involves the existence of a specific social role for the homosexual, 
there is a mistake in calling classical Greek pederasty homosexual: it would suggest that 
ancient Greece had this social role, and mistakenly identify ancient Greeks as homosexuals. 
By contrast, if the causal explanation of homosexuality is just about genes, identifying 
ancient Greeks as homosexuals may be conceptually anachronistic but, properly understood, 
causally impeccable. 
                                                     
105 Hacking (2000b, 125-162; 2002, 51-72, 64-69, 99-114). 
106 Hacking (2002, 106-107). 
107 Cf. Gustafson (2010, 311-316). 
108 Hacking (2000b, 100-124). 
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 Making the case that some proposition is causally anachronistic depends in each 
case again on our present beliefs about which things are interactive kinds. We see an 
example of this when Andrew Cunningham, in line with his thesis on the ‘modern origin of 
science’,109 argues that it was impossible for pre-modern thinkers to be scientists. Science, he 
argues, is an intentional, game-like activity that someone cannot take part in without 
knowing it. Pre-modern thinkers knew themselves to be doing natural philosophy, which 
was an activity directed not primarily at knowing nature but rather at knowing God in 
nature. Calling Aristotle or 17th-century natural philosophers scientists misidentifies what 
they were doing, since they could not have been scientists in a period where that concept was 
not available. 110  
 Cunningham phrases his argument in anti-presentist terms – he says that our 
misjudgment of past natural philosophy flows from an inability to “get out of the present” 
that the historian ought to overcome in some way.111 I believe this misconstrues the problem, 
and this is illustrated by Cunningham’s ensuing debate with Peter Dear. Dear accuses 
Cunningham of essentialism, since natural philosophy was not necessarily defined by its 
link to God, while 19th-century science could still, albeit in different senses, be about God.112 
In his response, Cunningham effectively bites the bullet, saying that as far as he is concerned, 
natural philosophy and science have essential characteristics without which they cease to be 
natural philosophy and science, respectively.113 
If anything, this shows the extent to which Cunningham’s own thesis depends on 
the validity and applicability of his present distinctions. The ‘essences’ he consciously 
provides are helpful in identifying whether someone in the past was a philosopher or a 
scientist or neither, and in spelling out Cunningham’s thesis that the proposition that there 
were scientists before the 19th century constitutes what we here call a causal anachronism; 
but this distinction is itself something in the present.  
It turns out that what is at stake in a controversy like this is not the question of 
which side is more ‘presentist’ and therefore more in the wrong, but rather the combined 
semantic and substantive issues of what we mean by science, and of what we believe people 
in the past did or did not do, and could or could not have done. The problem of when 
conceptual anachronisms constitute causal anachronisms is real, but it is hardly soluble in 
general terms, any more than the problem of ‘avoiding historical error’ is. If we take 




                                                     
109 Cunningham and Williams (1993). 
110 Cunningham (1988, esp. 373-386). 
111 Cunningham (1988, 367). 
112 Dear (2001). 
113 Cunningham (2001). 
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3.4 Progress and Scientific Exceptionalism 
In the light of Butterfield’s remarks against Whig history, it seems ironical that when 
Butterfield himself turns to history of science (“in order to try to set that subject on its 
feet”),114 he seems to commit a lot of Whiggish sins. He identifies the scientific revolution as 
“the real origin both of the modern world and of the modern mentality”115 and tells a lot of 
smaller origin stories (with ‘steps towards’ certain outcomes) within this framework.116 He 
looks at the history of science on a large scale: a period of five centuries, to which he ascribes 
a high measure of unity and continuity.117 He explicitly judges scientific theories in relation 
to the current state of science, and even sees it as an important task of history of science to 
draw attention to “the intellectual obstruction which, at a given moment, is checking the 
progress of thought – the hurdle which it was then particularly necessary for the mind to 
surmount”.118 
The irony has been noted by others,119 and been used to discredit Butterfield’s 
argument against Whig history specifically for history of science: didn’t this prove that it 
was impossible for the historian not to believe in the progress of science? This is the 
conclusion that Rupert Hall draws: compared to other branches of history, the historian of 
science distinguishes himself by actually knowing the right answer to the problems that past 
scientists were breaking their heads over. “Rightness and wrongness over matters like the 
velocity of light, the oxides of nitrogen or the charge on an electron have in the long run 
nothing to do with the theories or even the frailty, error, or inconsistency of the original 
investigator. [...] Thus, it seems to me, the Whiggish idea of progress has inevitably to be 
built in the history of science.”120 Ernst Mayr gives a similar reason for why the label of 
Whig history was inapplicable to history of science: change in science is different from 
change in politics, because of its more obviously cumulative character.121 More recently, the 
point has been made by David Alvargonzález that history of science may be ‘essentially’ 
Whiggish because of the progressive nature of science.122  
 I believe this line of answer to Butterfield fails, for several reasons. First, it can be 
undermined by the contention that scientific knowledge is not, in fact, progressive – 
                                                     
114 Butterfield in a letter to the historian R.F. Treharne, 21 July 1947, as quoted by Bentley (2012, 188). 
Bentley explains that Butterfield intended to save history of science from the whiggish perspectives of 
scientists (189).  
115 Butterfield ([1949] 1957, 8); cf. also Butterfield ([1931] 1959). 
116 E.g. Butterfield ([1949] 1957, 13, 56, 57, 221). 
117 Butterfield ([1949] 1957, 7, 203). 
118 Butterfield ([1949] 1957, 204). Cf. also e.g. Butterfield ([1949] 1957, 15, 42, 54-55). 
119 E.g. Hall(1983, 58); Wilson and Ashplant (1988, 3-4); Ashplant and Wilson (1988, 253), Henry (2002, 4); 
Carr (1961, 35-36). 
120 Hall (1983, 56-57). 
121 Mayr (1990, 302). 
122 Alvargonzález (2013, esp. 90-94). Alvargonzález is more careful about attributing progress to the 
social sciences, and says that this also poses a difficulty for the discussion of Whiggism in their history 
(94). 
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drawing us into a debate that belongs primarily to philosophy of science, rather than 
(philosophy of) historiography of science. In order to substantiate our claims about scientific 
progress, for instance, we have to decide what is of primary importance when we want to 
measure whether science has progressed, and we have to decide when progress counts as 
cumulative.  
 Second, it is very well possible that science in general manifests progress according 
to some measure, but that this progress is a contingent rather than a necessary fact about 
science. If things could have gone otherwise, our present-day beliefs about science do not 
have a status that significantly differs from our beliefs about other things, which may, after 
all, also have progressed on some scale. Thus, the question of the legitimacy of presentism 
here becomes connected to the question of the inevitability or contingency of scientific 
beliefs. Hall means to say that unlike in other areas, in science we would ‘in the long run’ 
always have ended up giving the same answers we do now. But this is not just belief in 
progress in the actual history of science; it is scientific inevitabilism as defined in the 
previous chapter. There is indeed a plausible connection between conceptual presentism 
and inevitabilism, though it is based on considerations not concerning the avoidance of 
anachronism but rather concerning the avoidance of circularity, as we will see in section 
5.3.4. 
This route also brings us into a minefield of demarcation issues. For each new 
interpretation or explanation of an episode in the history of science, we would have to 
establish first that it is genuinely science, in the sense of: part of a necessarily progressive 
inquiry series. This fits ill with the fact that historians generally try to historicize and 
contextualize not just scientific theories, but the very boundaries between science and non-
science.  
 Third, as an answer to Butterfield, the thesis that science is necessarily progressive, 
even if demonstrably true, misses the point. When Butterfield forbids us to talk about 
progress in political history, he does not forbid us to say that we would rather live in his 
20th-century Britain than in the 16th century, or even to be confident that on some scale there 
has been evident progress; his point is that saying this now does not add anything to our 
understanding of what happened in the past. The progress in question is not a 16th-century 
actor’s category; it is something we say, and something we say only as a result of history. In 
no way can such a statement be regarded as doing justice to the past on its own terms. When 
we say “progress” where the historical actors didn’t, we are, according to Butterfield, doing 
something other than history. 
 
The truth is that [...] historical explaining does not condemn; neither does it excuse; it does 
not even touch the realm in which words like these have meaning or relevance; it is 
compounded of observations made upon the events of the concrete world; it is neither more 
nor less than the process of seeing things in their context.123  
                                                     
123 Butterfield ([1931] 1959, 117). 
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It is important that though Butterfield clearly treated the history of science as one of 
progress, he tried to shake off presentism and anachronism in history of science as well as in 
any other field of history.124  
 Our response to Butterfield’s radical historicism, then, can never be that history of 
science is special because it turns out to manifest progress, no matter how subtle and 
nuanced our conception of this progress may be.125 If we disagree with Butterfield’s point 
that judgments about progress need to be avoided in historiography because they are 
conceptually anachronistic and all conceptual anachronism needs to be avoided, then our 
disagreement stretches to political history as well as to history of science.  
 
3.5 Selection and Presentism 
The critics of Butterfield mentioned in the previous section seem to be on strong ground not 
on the issue of progress, but on the issue of selectivity. Perhaps Butterfield’s insistence, 
stated emphatically in The whig interpretation but also in that apparently Whiggish Origins of 
modern science, that we should never abridge because “all history must tend to become more 
whig in proportion as it becomes more abridged”,126 that we should look through a 
microscope,127 is itself a plea for the unattainable. As Hall comments, “I am not confident 
that the ‘concrete facts’ seen through the microscope assemble themselves a-theoretically 
into ‘explanations’, whether one examines cells or the French Revolution.”128 This argument 
for the inescapability of selection and abstraction can be turned into an argument against 
Butterfield’s anti-presentism: it does not really make sense to publish a book as its own 
translation, David Hull says,129 and similarly present-day concerns can be used responsibly 
when we want to make sense of the past for the present. 
Maybe Butterfield’s intuition that some history-writing gets the relation between 
the present and the past wrong is correct, but his diagnosis of why this is the case is not. 
This is what that A. Wilson and T.G. Ashplant argue in a two-part article on Whig history. 
They follow Hall (as I do) in his criticism that selection is inevitable and should be non-
arbitrary,130 and go on to reformulate where, according to them, the problem of Whiggism 
actually begins: for Butterfield, the Whig fallacy is the principle of “direct reference to the 
present”, that is, “with one eye on the present”;131 another way of interpreting it, which 
Butterfield’s choice of words sometimes suggests and which Wilson and Ashplant explicitly 
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embrace, is the problem that historians are “with both eyes in the present”,132 that is, 
“constrained by the perceptual and conceptual categories of the present, bound within the 
framework of the present, deploying a perceptual ‘set’ derived from the present.”133 This 
predicament can lead to misunderstandings that do not disappear simply because of a closer 
look at the sources: “present-centred categories can well survive the experience of research, 
for that research can be subordinated to those categories.”134 
Wilson and Ashplant are thinking of cases in which an explanatory asymmetry is 
made between beliefs in the past that resemble modern beliefs and therefore require no 
explanation, and beliefs in the past that do not resemble modern beliefs and therefore do 
require explanation. For example, assuming a present-day contrast between science and 
superstition, reason and magic and reading such a contrast into the past will lead to an 
unbalanced view, in which astrology and belief in ghosts in the 17th century require more 
explanation than rationalism or skepticism.135 That this attitude tends towards a mistaken 
view of history is evident from the fact that the history of science has precisely turned out to 
undermine a dichotomy between science and magic in the 17th century, Wilson and 
Ashplant say. “An adequate understanding of the thinking of seventeenth-century men and 
women requires that we go beyond our own initial present-centredness.”136 We are on the 
terrain of historiographical virtues and vices again, and presentism tends to lead us astray.  
This is a convincing example, but let us proceed carefully. What this example 
shows is how, from the perspective of a present-day scholarly consensus about the relation 
between science and magic in the 17th century, other scholarly beliefs about this relation look 
like a conceptual and possibly a causal anachronism. Now, the point is not to argue against 
the judgment that these earlier beliefs constituted an anachronism; it is rather that this 
judgment is based on semantic and causal beliefs – beliefs about what science and magic 
mean and about how the things they refer to actually related in the 17th century.  
Saying that distinguishing between science and magic is an instance of 
anachronism only establishes disagreement about the meaning of concepts and the modal 
structure of history; it does not establish that this disagreement follows from the fact that 
one side is ‘present-centered’. The fact that Joseph Agassi, in a 1963 invective against 
presentism in history of science, chastised other historians precisely for failing to apply a 
distinction between science and magic, illustrates this.137  
 How could scholars become aware that their categories did not match those of the 
sources? One possible answer is that the scholar always ought to acquire his categories from 
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the sources. This approaches Butterfield’s solution of shunning all abridgment. After all, it is 
when we fill in the gaps in our source material with our own beliefs and according to our 
own categories that we start committing conceptual anachronisms and thereby (according to 
Butterfield) historical errors. Wilson and Ashplant are right that this is a misdiagnosis: 
present-centered categories are unavoidable and can survive research, and therefore 
empirical research will not simply and autonomously erase them.138 
Another possible answer is that the historian ought to have been aware all along 
that categories like science and magic are not cultural universals. When someone says that 
Aristotle was a ‘biologist’, the problem is not just that she has not studied the sources closely 
enough, but rather that she forgets that the notion of biologist is embedded to such an extent 
in specific and historically contingent institutions and practices that it is highly unlikely that 
the term could be applied to classical Greece at all without being severely misleading.139 
There is a gap between our category system and that in which the historical evidence was 
produced, and Wilson and Ashplant say that the historian needs to be “first aware of that 
gap”140 – though even then, present-centeredness is inherent in historical research, which is 
therefore inherently problematical.141 
I believe this is too pessimistic. A more dialectical relationship between categories 
and sources is at least possible. It is conceivable that we approach 17th-century sources with 
the assumption of a clear distinction between science and magic, but that what we find in 
the sources does, if not unequivocally falsify the applicability of this distinction, at least 
contradict some of the expectations that accompany it: the expectation, for instance, that 
science and magic will be practiced by different persons in the 17th century, or be connected 
to different social roles. If we find that enough of our implicit expectations are contradicted, 
we can proceed to revise some of our assumptions. One of the ways in which we can do that 
may turn out to be letting go of the opposition between science and magic.  
In this particular case, our knowledge that the distinction between science and 
magic is both a conceptual and a causal anachronism (since science and magic are 
interactive kinds and since they are not so clearly distinct in the 17th century) has been made 
possible by historical study of the 17th century. Far from providing, as Peter Dear has called 
it, an illustration “of the fallacies that can result from […] hermeneutic circularity”,142 it is 
better to say that Wilson and Ashplant’s narrative puts hermeneutic circularity in a positive 
light, where from the dialogue between our original categories and the historical sources 
there follows a change not just in our view of the sources, but also in our own categories. We 
do get beyond our initial present-centeredness, but we do so only because it is challenged by 
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historical research – research to which we bring our present beliefs and categories, in the 
knowledge that they are revisable and that history bears on them.  
This attitude differs from Butterfield’s empiricism or historicism and from 
presentism, and may be aptly called hermeneutic: it recognizes that present and past 
‘horizons’ differ, but assumes that the past is not completely alien and that we can build on 
continuities between it and the present in order to bridge some of the gaps between it and 
ourselves. 
 
3.6 Avoiding Anachronism in a Changing Present 
From the preceding, we can draw some general conclusions about Whiggism in history of 
science, bringing together the separate strands of anachronism, progress, and selectivity and 
presentism.  
Butterfield is mistaken in his suggestion that all selection and abstraction 
proceeding from a present-day perspective are necessarily wrong, but the reason is not, as 
has often been claimed, that in history of science the present-day perspective is especially 
privileged thanks to scientific progress, and therefore better equipped for looking back than 
present-day perspectives in other fields. Nor is it the case, as Wilson and Ashplant suggest, 
that bringing our present-day categories to historical research is always a hindrance to 
understanding, and one that the historical sources cannot modify. The confrontation with 
historical sources can modify our categories, and those categories are what we understand 
history with. 
There are instances in which our categories are conceptually anachronistic, which 
can become instances of historical error when the categories in question are interactive kinds 
in Ian Hacking’s sense. In those cases, our conceptual anachronisms may spill over into 
causal anachronisms – leading us to believe that there were scientists in a period where 
there could not have been, for instance. But recognizing this causal anachronism (if it is one) 
results from insight into the extent to which ‘scientist’ is an interactive kind combined with 
familiarity with the sources; not from a general insight in the wrongness of presentism. 
Dear’s and Cunningham’s disagreement about the usage of the term ‘scientist’ underlines 
this. 
Other examples abound. When Thomas Kuhn advises that in so far as possible, the 
“historian should set aside the science that he knows” and should learn it from the 
sources,143 or when Collins and Pinch claim that “we shall not understand the Pasteur-
Pouchet debate as it was lived out unless we cut off our backward seeing faculty”,144 these 
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remarks stem from aspects of a historiographical ethos that they share with Butterfield and 
Cunningham, which exaggerates both the dangers of presentism and the promises of 
empiricism. In fact, presentism does not automatically lead to causal anachronism, and it is 
not necessarily based on the assumption of inevitable progress. 
 Our own categories and beliefs will always be something of the present, and 
though historians rightly avoid causal anachronism, the identification of causal 
anachronism depends on those categories and beliefs. But our present changes, and its 
beliefs and categories may be modified as a result of historical knowledge. This is as it 
should be; after all, we cannot be expected to know of any phenomenon a priori whether or 
not it could be culturally universal – it is precisely because of historical (or, for that matter, 
anthropological) knowledge that we can assess the range of diversity between human 
cultures; it is precisely because we have been confronted with knowledge about past 
societies that we have come to believe some practices to be contingent that we might 
otherwise have considered natural and inevitable. If historiography plays this role for 
science, this is only for the better. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
What do these considerations imply for the role our beliefs about nature can play in 
historiography of science, as far as the problems of Whiggism in the sense of presentism, 
anachronism, and triumphalism (in the sense of belief in inevitable progress) are concerned? 
We can draw the following conclusions: 
1) The question we need to ask when we involve natural entities in historical accounts, 
is whether the involvement of these entities constitutes a causal anachronism. We 
have seen that this may, generally speaking, be the case under the assumption that 
natural entities, too, can be interactive kinds in Hacking’s sense of the word; that 
their existence goes hand in hand with the availability of a corresponding concept. 
In chapter 6, we will see that Bruno Latour holds this position, but unless it turns 
out that this case can indeed be made in general, there is no reason not to involve 
natural entities in historical accounts. 
2) That this is legitimate does not depend on scientific exceptionalism: it is not 
because science manifests progress that presentism with regard to natural entities 
does not constitute a causal anachronism. It is simply because what constitutes 
such an anachronism is identified by our present causal beliefs. Thus, there is no 
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Chapter 4: Roads to the Inevitable? Nature, 
Thought, and Society 
 
4.1 Candidates for the Great Explainer 
In chapter 2, we hypothesized that one plausible way to support the idea that it was 
historically impossible for science in the end to become something other than it has actually 
become, is to claim that the history of science is guided by factors outside of historical 
contingency. 
 We also saw that one plausible candidate for this guide is nature: ex hypothesi, 
nature is what exists independent of historical human action, and science seems to be highly 
sensitive to its structure. It may be that science tracks something stable and historically 
inevitable, and that it thereby participates in this inevitability; that, as Steven Weinberg has 
claimed, it “is the way it is not so much because of various adventitious historic acts of 
invention, but because of the way nature is.”145 Indeed, attempts to undermine inevitabilism 
often turn on discrediting the idea that the development of scientific disciplines is rendered 
inevitable by nature.146 
 However, there is no obvious reason why nature would be the only entity that 
could play this role. For instance, it seems that from a Marxist perspective it is possible to 
say that society has an inevitable final state from which a corresponding final state of science 
follows, so that inevitabilism about science is grounded in inevitabilism about the resolution 
to social dialectical processes. Yet another possibility is that there is an inevitable logic to the 
development of scientific concepts and ideas.  
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first, we proceed from the possibility that 
science is determined by nature alone. I will argue that this possibility cannot work, and that 
its apparent plausibility always relies on an implicit normative notion of universal 
rationality. This is not a reason for immediate rejection of this possibility, and we will 
continue this part by discussing the uses and abuses of rationality in history of science, by 
discussing Max Weber and Robert Merton. Second, from this discussion we move into the 
more idealist pole of the spectrum of possibilities sketched above; into the possibility that 
science is determined by an internal and necessary logic of the history of ideas. As possible 
representatives of this idea, we will discuss the work of Arthur Lovejoy, the Journal of the 
history of ideas in its early decades, and Alexandre Koyré. Finally, we will consider a Marxist 
view of the history of science, through Boris Hessen and John Desmond Bernal, in order to 
see in what sense this perspective manages to connect inevitable aspects of science both to 
society and to nature.  
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Together with the question of what, according to these authors, is the ‘great decider’ 
in science – what determines the contents of its beliefs about nature – and how it relates to 
nature, we will also take an interest in their perspectives on the role of our own 
understandings of nature and science in our interpretations of past science. That is, in their 
views on the hermeneutic status of our own beliefs. 
 
4.2 Nature-Based Inevitabilism 
4.2.1 Irresistible Nature: Steven Weinberg and the Teaching Machine 
Allan Franklin has tried to refute contingentism by connecting it to a “lack of belief in the 
efficacy of nature, as revealed by experiment, to decide scientific issues.”147 He argues that in 
fact, there are plenty of examples from the history of science – the rejection of the principle 
of parity conservation, and the solution of controversy around the existence of 17-keV 
neutrinos. Here, Franklin argues, experiment did decide the issue, and that this is an 
argument against contingentism.148 Conversely, Harry Collins argues that in scientific 
controversies, nature usually speaks very little: referring to the supernova that supposedly 
led to the first measuring of gravitational waves, he says that “nature would have spoken 
for only 0.00000000013% of this half century.”149 
 Not only in theoretical debates, but also in historiographical practice, the 
boundaries historians draw between the contingent and the inevitable often seem to fall 
together with what in science genuinely reflects the world and what does not. Peter Bowler 
has written on conceivable alternatives to Darwinism, asking the question what would have 
happened had Darwin not survived his journey on the Beagle – a historical possibility. 
Bowler’s position is to a large extent contingentist – the rise of Darwinism in the nineteenth 
century was not made inevitable by the way the world is, but the personality of Darwin was 
a necessary cause of its development and triumph, absence of which could have led to a 
wholly different theoretical development.150 However, Bowler has also explicitly stated that 
he believes that, though a lot would have been different if Darwin were deleted from history, 
the theory of evolution by natural selection would eventually be discovered “because it does 
reflect an aspect of how nature actually works.”151 
 What would it entail to say that nature on its own forces us to draw specific 
conclusions; that, as it has recently become more fashionable to say about material objects 
such as “gunpowder, dyestuffs, metals, clays and ceramics” et cetera, “all of them spoke 
irresistibly, and not only by interpretation and representation”?152 What does it entail to 
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believe that nature ‘irresistibly’ forces our beliefs upon us, or that evidence is 
“overwhelming”?153 
 Certainly, something other than that it logically forces these beliefs upon us. When 
we say that the evidence against geocentrism is overwhelming, we do not say that a crafty 
sophist could not still find logical space for maintaining it; it is that the existence of such a 
logical space cannot move us to consider the possibility of geocentrism as a ‘live option’.  
 If we want to say that the content of science is determined in this sense by nature 
alone, the negative, falsificationist way in which nature can speak irresistibly – by loudly 
shouting ‘No’ to the general beliefs that imply what turn out to be false predictions – does 
not suffice; we need a way for nature positively to force us to believe something. But is it at 
all possible for it to do this purely on its own? If that is the case, then how do we account for 
historical change in our beliefs? At the very least, the existence of different scientific beliefs 
in history means that our temporal and spatial relation to nature matters. The inevitabilist 
thesis is, obviously, one that spans many generations – it says that in the end, a scientific 
tradition will always arrive at the same point, not that nature forces everyone at all times to 
believe the same. But what mechanisms does nature have that force science to converge to 
the same point over time? 
 Steven Weinberg in his 2015 book To Explain the World provides a ‘nature-based’ 
inevitabilism along with a mechanism. According to Weinberg, successful scientific theories 
such as Isaac Newton’s theory of universal gravitation are what they are, in the end, because 
of the way the world is. This means that progress is made not by philosophically inspired 
methodological improvements such as that by Descartes – Descartes, after all, was wrong 
about many things,154 and this goes to show that the human mind has nothing to add to 
science. Rather, we learn everything related to science by confrontation with the world, 
which “acts on us like a teaching machine” and teaches us not just what nature, but what 
genuine science is.155 Science itself is discovered, not constructed; it fits the world it seeks to 
explain much like agriculture fits the biological realities which it exploits to gain food.156 
That science matches the world so directly is also reason for Weinberg to think that 
presentism is legitimate in history of science: though he tries to avoid anachronisms with 
regard to what the Presocratic philosophers could have thought, for instance,157 science, as a 
history-transcending entity that is grounded in nothing but the world, is never an 
anachronism. 
 How does this teaching work? The world, Weinberg says, gives someone who 
finds a good explanation an intense sense of joy and satisfaction.158 Weinberg quotes 
Ptolemy on the sense of joy he felt when describing the movement of the stars: “my feet no 
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longer touch the Earth, but, side by side with Zeus himself, I take my fill of ambrosia, the 
food of the gods.”159 He says that Copernicus must have been even happier when he could 
discard all the fine-tuning that Ptolemy’s system required by assuming the earth to move, 
and that Kepler must have enjoyed very much “replacing the Copernican mess with motion 
on ellipses”.160 
 This pleasure then serves as the basis for theory selection: 
 
[Newton’s model] provided universal principles that allowed the successful calculation of a 
great deal that had previously seemed mysterious. In this way, it provided an irresistible 
model for what a physical theory should be, and could be. 
This is an example of a kind of Darwinian selection operating in the history of science. We get 
intense pleasure when something has been successfully explained, as when Newton 
explained Kepler’s laws of planetary motion along with much else. The scientific theories and 
methods that survive are those that provide such pleasure, whether or not they fit any 
preexisting model of how science ought to be done.161 
 
This is an interesting but ultimately unconvincing mechanism. First, there is a tension 
between the metaphor of Darwinian selection and inevitabilism itself: though Darwinian 
processes of mutation and selection may explain the functionality of science in causal terms, 
it is not clear that they can support a thesis of inevitabilism – much like Darwinistic 
processes in the biological world, while they may explain the evolution of humankind, do 
not thereby state (let alone explain) that this evolution was inevitable.  
 Second, Weinberg’s sole feedback mechanism, according to which the world 
rewards success with pleasure, does not hold up. Crucially, and expectedly, delight in 
discovery can be misleading, as Weinberg himself at one point suggests: Ptolemy’s joy in 
astronomy was “flawed – it always is”. This is inconsistent with the idea that pleasure is the 
signum veritatis which Weinberg wants it to be, unless not only we, but all relevant historical 
actors have in the end been able to distinguish between genuine and illusory pleasure. 
Weinberg says that Ptolemaic epicycles are something to be “repelled” by, and seems to 
expect that Copernicus and Kepler must have experienced ever greater pleasure in doing 
away first with these epicycles and then with “the Copernican mess”;162 but as a mechanism 
for the development of ever-better theories, this is rather unbelievable. The implication 
would be that the world reserves an as yet unknown degree of delight for the discoverer of 
the Grand Unifying Theory. This begs the question why the world would, through natural 
processes, bring forth creatures with aesthetic sensibilities that are so well attuned in 
advance to the deep structure of the universe.  
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In fact, aesthetic sensibilities may differ over time – for instance, a model 
containing a proliferation of circles rather than a small number of ellipses may lead to 
different degrees of pleasure in different times. At the very least, Weinberg’s model would 
need to integrate in his model historical differences in the (aesthetic) evaluation of scientific 
theories: why did a different theory make Copernicus happy than did Ptolemy? 
 Weinberg does not, in fact, provide a mechanism that can sustain a solely nature-
based inevitabilism. We will discuss a more plausible Darwinian evolutionary model for the 
history of science in chapter 6.  
 The point to take away from the fact that a ‘nature-based’ inevitabilism that takes 
into account only the autonomous working of nature upon humans fails, is not a logical 
point about underdetermination (on which see section 5.3); it is rather that evidence does 
not in fact overwhelm different people in the same way. We need to specify to whom the 
evidence is overwhelming in what way. However, the nature-based inevitabilist may grant 
this, but add that it is a trivial exercise to identify which characteristics someone needs to 
have, in order for a specific overwhelming influence of the evidence to apply – namely that 
she is rational.  
This is, I think, the most plausible case for nature-based inevitabilism: that nature 
completely determines scientific development, if science is rational. Friedman aptly 
summarizes this within the context of an analysis of the competition between rationalistic 
philosophies of science and SSK: “if there were ‘super-cultural’ norms of rational argument 
and evidence, so the argument goes, then scientific theories would be determined one way 
or another by reality, experience, and reason”.163 
 
4.2.2 Nature and Rationality I: Max Weber and the Hermeneutic Function of Rationality 
One way to counter this view is by skepticism about the existence or accessibility of super-
cultural norms. We will deal with this and related problem in the next chapters. But within 
the context of philosophy of historiography of science, we also need to ask another question, 
namely what the existence of (and our access to) super-cultural norms, transcending 
historical contingency, would mean for the extent to which science is amenable to historical 
explanation. Can we talk about rationality ‘determining’ the relation of scientific theories to 
nature without declaring essential parts of science to be outside the reach of historical study 
(similar to the perspectives we discussed in section 1.2)? 
 As a window upon this problem, we will revisit and reinterpret some texts by Max 
Weber. The judgment of rationality plays a major role in Weber’s work, and although his 
project was much broader than ‘merely’ the understanding of Western science, his remarks 
on related subjects are suggestive of his solution to the problem of how to study institutions 
embodying rationality historically.  
                                                     
163 Friedman (1998, 244). A good example of a rationalist embracing this thesis, and the corresponding 
refusal to let sociology touch science at all, is Jarvie (1984). 
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 Weber applies a rigorous distinction between judgments of facts and judgments of 
value, between ‘is’ and ‘ought’.164 However, this distinction does not exhaust his opinions on 
the relation between value judgments and science, since judgments of fact require a 
judgment of the validity of a certain argument. While practical value judgments are 
inescapably subjective and may differ from person to person, a “methodically correct 
scientific argument” must be recognized as valid as well by a Chinese reader who does not 
share the ethical opinions of the Western scholar.165 
 The key word is ‘must’ (muβ): whence the duty of the Chinese reader to accept 
certain kinds of reasoning as valid? I interpret Weber as claiming that judgments of 
rationality have, in the end, objective validity. While people can legitimately differ about 
subjective value judgments, they can be objectively right or wrong in judgments of 
rationality, because, in the latter case, something in the world makes them right or wrong. 
 Science and values touch each other in another way: Weber clears away with some 
impatience the objection that his ideal of value-free science means that science cannot study 
the subjective judgments of other people.166 The very possibility of sociology depends on 
this. The scholar simply needs to separate his observations of empirical fact from his own 
practical judgments. The study of an empirical consensus is completely distinct from the 
attribution of validity to this consensus, and therefore a ‘realistic’ science about ethical 
things does not produce an ‘ethics’ in the sense of a body of claims about what ought to be 
the case. “No more so than” – and here Weber employs an analogy that is of interest to our 
present purpose; 
 
No more than a ‘realistic’ account of the astronomical conceptions of, say, the Chinese – one, 
that is, which shows from which practical motives and how they practiced astronomy, and to 
which results they came and why they came to these results – can ever aim to prove the 
validity of this Chinese astronomy.167 
  
In this passage, Weber quite naturally treats the case of the history of Chinese astronomy in 
relation to the validity of Chinese astronomy as analogous to the case of a science of ethics in 
relation to the desirability of a certain system of ethics. That Weber considers this analogy to 
be unproblematic in spite of the fact that the first involves something objectively valid and 
the second something inescapably subjective, will turn out to be part of his solution to the 
problem of the possibility of a history of science.  
 After these negative views – empirical science does not teach us about the validity 
of anything – Weber rehearses his positive views of research in the humanities:  
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Empirical-psychological and historical research into a specific value perspective 
with respect to its individual, social, and historical determinedness leads one only 
ever to explaining it though understanding. That is not nothing.168 
 
The notion of explaining through understanding – ‘verstehend Erklären’ – illustrates that 
there is no chasm in Weber’s thought between the scientific ideal of explanation and the 
humanistic ideal of understanding.169 The disciplines that study aspects of human history 
have to do explanatory work just like any other discipline, but they have to do so in part 
through understanding. For human actions have inner motives that are understandable in 
the sense that we can ‘re-experience’ them – though Weber formulates his remarks with care 
and with the necessary scare-quotes. There is no immediate access to past experiences, and 
there is a crucial step of ‘Wertbeziehung’: articulating one’s own experience by connecting it 
to values, through which the object of study can be constructed.170 
 This ‘construction’ of the object of study is a necessary step because an objective 
scientific analysis of anything – including human culture – can never be disconnected from 
the perspective through which it is analyzed. Any discipline that seeks to account for why 
reality is as it is immediately hits upon the problem of human finitude against the apparent 
infinitude of the world: life hands us a seemingly endless multitude of events, and any 
object will keep presenting itself to us as infinite. We have to identify meaningful wholes in 
reality, which we do through Wertbeziehung, of which the purest instantiation is the ideal 
type.171 
 It is worth pointing out that, in spite of the differences between the neo-Kantian 
tradition that Weber has inherited here and the hermeneutical perspectives that will inform 
the last chapter of this thesis, there are striking similarities between Weber’s views on 
historical understanding and that of Hans-Georg Gadamer (which we will discuss in section 
8.2.2). Both see understanding as something that can be achieved only indirectly, mediated 
by historically relative languages or concepts, and connect this view to the historically 
conditioned and finite nature of our understanding – which is no less finite when it comes to 
understanding of historical human culture.172 (In this sense Gadamer and Weber are closer 
to each other than to, for instance, Wilhelm Dilthey.) 
 Weber treats one kind of interpretive knowledge as a special case: ‘rational’ 
interpretation through the categories of ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’.173 This is a sensitive point in 
our discussion of his thought, since he seems to flirt here with the idea that rational and 
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irrational action differ objectively in such a way that they require different treatment, an 
idea that has become discredited in more recent debates about the study of science. 
 This issue hinges on the following question: if rational action can indeed be 
understood better than irrational action, is this because it is valid or because it resembles our 
own attitudes more? To clarify: if we fancy ourselves to know what the objectively rational 
course of action in a certain situation is, the ideal type of rational action is both something 
we consider to be objectively valid and something close to what we would do if we could 
freely act in the same situation. The question is which of these two attributes is relevant to 
our causal explanations. Is rational action, according to Weber, explained by its own validity, 
or is it ‘merely’ more readily understandable to us for pragmatic reasons? 
 I believe the latter option is the case. In his essay on value judgments and science, 
Weber confirms that the validity of judgments of rationality is different from the validity of 
value judgments, but also deals with “the place of the rational within empirical 
disciplines”.174 He says that “when the normatively valid becomes an object of empirical 
investigation, it loses – as object – its normative character: it is treated as ‘being’, not as 
‘valid’.”175 
 Weber’s example will clarify his point. When the work of an accountant becomes of 
scientific interest, our own familiarity with the multiplication table figures in two rather 
different ways. On the one hand, its normative validity is “of course absolutely supposed” 
in our own accounting work. On the other hand, when we want to say whether the 
accountant has used it ‘rightly’, its status is immediately different: we treat it  
 
as a factual rule of behavior, that one habitually uses as a result of education […] That it is 
normatively ‘valid’, i.e. that it is ‘right’, is in this case, where its usage is the ‘object’, beside 
the discussion and logically completely indifferent.176 
 
That this is, like the validity of Chinese astronomy, a matter of objective rather than 
subjective validity does not make a difference to Weber. The empirical fact that a 
mathematical rule is applied is completely independent of the fact that the normative 
validity of mathematical rules is “the a priori of all and every empirical science”.177  
 In the study of mental phenomena, this distinction can be lost sight of, precisely 
because ‘right’ thinking is more readily understandable to us than ‘wrong’ thinking.178 But 
that a thinker solves a problem in a way that to us seems self-evidently ‘right’ should not 
lead us to believe that the normatively valid functions in our explanations as right; it 
functions rather as “an instrument of ‘understanding’, in precisely the same way in which 
purely psychological ‘empathy’ (Einfühlen) provides this understanding with respect to 
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logically irrational relations of feelings and affects”.179 Our access to the normatively rational 
is part of our causal historical explanation of past behavior no more than our access to 
emotions is; it only provides us with a way of constructing the object of our research.  
 Weber shows us that it is possible to believe in the universal validity of certain 
kinds of reasoning, while this validity still disappears from historical explanations. Even the 
strongest belief that our own ways of reasoning are the only valid ones, in combination with 
the observation that a past scientist or school obeys our sacred standards to the last detail, 
does not take away the slightest bit from our duty to explain causally – by citing the 
individual influences that work on this individual scientist or school (i.e. by referring to 
context) – what this scientist or school does.180 The corollary of this is that relativizing our 
own ways of reasoning or, in general, our own way of doing science, does not equip us any 
better for a contextual study of past science.181 
 In the next section, we will employ this interpretation of Weber’s thought to assess 
the promises of nature-and-rationality-based inevitabilism in the views of Robert Merton. 
 
4.2.3 Nature and Rationality II: Robert Merton and the Normative Structure of Science 
In accounts of the development of science studies, Merton often figures as a representative 
of a traditional or ‘received’ view that is challenged for its reliance on internal-external 
distinctions,182 its normative demarcation of science from non-science and its corresponding 
monolithic and uncritical view of science,183 as well as its ‘traditional’ opinion that in science 
“competing claims to validity are settled by the universalistic facts of nature which are 
consonant with one and not with another theory”.184 
 Merton’s methodological papers tend to complicate these judgments. In fact, 
Merton is rather suspicious of attempts to regard the development of science and 
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technology as autonomous;185 science can mimic the caste structures of its cultural context, 
and even suppress, as a result of societal influences, the universalism that normatively 
defines it.186 Moreover, he regards his own delineation of science from non-science not as 
favoring externalist abstinence with regard to science itself,187 but as bringing sociological 
understanding closer to the core of science by subjecting the “social and cultural structure of 
science itself” to sociological scrutiny, thus overcoming some of the restrictions of other, 
externalist approaches.188 
 The rise of science, Merton says, was itself dependent on certain cultural and 
material conditions, such as Puritan ethics and the perceived economic and military uses of 
science. Nonetheless, other conditions could have done the same, and – similar to Weber’s 
thought on the relation between Protestant ethics and capitalism – after science became 
sufficiently ‘autonomous’, it relied less on these external sources of legitimacy.189 In the end, 
it is true that Merton identifies science not by its status in society, or the things it studies, or 
as a tradition, but as an ideal-type, defined by its values and embodied in practice by the 
mechanisms which can plausibly be regarded as realizing these values.  
 What does this mean for the role of the world in history of science, and the way in 
which this relates to sociological study? The most explicit claim about this in Merton’s work, 
about competing claims in science being settled by “the universalistic facts of nature”, 
stands alone and has a complex history. As Cole shows, Merton added this remark as a note 
to his famous paper on the normative structure of science, then adapted it for the collection 
of his methodological papers to say: “sooner or later, competing claims to validity are 
settled by universalistic criteria.”190 On the one hand, this editing history suggests that 
Merton consciously takes position as an inevitabilist; on the other hand, the role of nature in 
the decision of scientific controversy remains somewhat ambiguous. 
 Here our considerations concerning the relation between ideal types and 
explanation in Weber’s thought may plausibly fill in the gaps. The identification of science 
by its ‘normative structure’ means that we, hermeneutically speaking, have access to what 
science is, independent of the question of its causal integration within society – we recognize 
it because it resembles what we regard as science; or, to be precise, because it functions to 
realize the same ideals that we regard as being constitutive of science. If this reading is 
plausible, the thesis that competing claims are in the end settled by “the universalistic facts 
of nature” or “universalistic criteria” is the claim that a fully spelled-out ideal-type of 
science will be so clear and distinct that it contains norms that settle any debate once all the 
evidence is available. 
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 One objection to this is that the problem of underdetermination (see section 5.3) 
renders this impossible in principle; and even if Merton thinks it possible, he has certainly 
not spelled out a model that provides such specific norms. But more important to our 
current concerns is that even if the ideal-type of science contains a set of algorithms that 
makes theory choice trivial, the point remains that whenever scientists or scientific 
communities in practice follow this algorithm, their actions still require a full causal 
explanation. 
 This means that scientific norms in Mertonian sociology come with the same 
limitations as rationality in Weberian sociology. They may, in a much richer model than 
either Merton or Weber actually provides, plausibly be regarded as rendering, in 
conjunction with input from the world, the output of science inevitable; but this becomes the 
near truism of saying that the more the conjunction of evidence and processing of the 
evidence of others approaches our own, the more inevitable it is that their results will 
resemble ours as well.191 What the inevitabilist gains from this is the possibility to say that 
rationality, or the normative structure of science, has multiple ways of being instantiated in 
a society. But its instantiation still needs to be causally explained, and there is no general 
reason why the factors contributing to this instantiation could not, historically speaking, 
have been different. 
There is, to put it in the most succinct terms, no route from ‘normative 
inevitabilism’ to ‘causal inevitabilism’. A defense of inevitabilism saying that input from 
nature plus some model of rationality renders scientific content inevitable only moves the 
contingency from this content to the instantiation of this model of rationality. This is no 
futile exercise, for the ways in which input from the world is processed in science may be 
more readily hermeneutically accessible to us than the results of this processing; but it does 
not support a thesis of historical inevitability, since the more demanding the notion of 
scientific rationality becomes, the less historically inevitable science is – and the more 
scattered it will be. 
 
4.3 The Logic of Ideas 
4.3.1 The Early Decades of the Journal of the History of Ideas 
An ahistorical rationality cannot be employed to support inevitabilism. But a more 
‘historicized’ way of talking about reason in history is also conceivable. What if there is an 
inevitable logic to the development of scientific ideas, but the right or scientific way of 
thinking itself gets realized only over time? In that case, after all, there may still be an 
inevitable end-point to the development of science, but the history of this development may 
turn out to matter in some real way. 
 Where could we find representatives of such an ‘idealist inevitabilism’? We will 
look in two places. In the next section (4.3.2), we will focus on the work of Alexandre Koyré. 
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In the current section, we focus on the Journal of the History of Ideas in the 1940s and 1950s, 
which in those decades was an important locus of activity in history of science.192 Out of 
around 430 regular articles, about 60 were devoted to subjects closely related to the history 
of science, and the intersection of history of ideas and history of science makes these 
volumes an interesting source for studying a possible affinity between idealism and 
inevitabilism. 
 The founding editor of the journal, Arthur Lovejoy, uses his opening article to 
maintain, among other points, that history of ideas can survive the recognition of human 
irrationality. Indeed, he says, it “would be a misconception to suppose that the intellectual 
historian is concerned solely with the history of intellection.”193 But people are not therefore 
driven only by non-rational or social forces, which Lovejoy more or less equates; rather, 
there are “two types of factor” at work in the history of thought, whose respective influence 
can be measured.194  
 Lovejoy manifests confidence here in the possibility of abstracting intellectual 
factors from the flow of history;195 but this falls short of an idealist reductionism. He 
explicitly states that he does not believe in the “working of an immanent dialectic whereby 
ideas are progressively clarified and problems consecutively get themselves solved”;196 the 
intrusion of psychological or sociological factors makes sure that the history of philosophy is 
not one “in which objective truth progressively unfolds itself in a rational order.”197 
Somewhat mysteriously, however, and without explanation, Lovejoy exempts “the domain 
of strictly experimental science” from his anti-inevitabilist remarks.198 
 The articles in the Journal are united primarily in their presupposition that a focus 
on ‘ideas’ in the history of science is in some sense helpful; the Journal obviously does not 
force a doctrine with regard to historical causality upon its authors, and many authors feel 
comfortable zooming in on the social aspects of the history of ideas – emphasizing the 
importance of scientific societies, of social types corresponding to different attitude towards 
science, or presenting a “socio-statistical” study of reactions to Darwinism.199 A study by 
David Joravsky applies the specific drives towards cultural revolution and collectivized 
agriculture to explaining the course of Soviet biology before Lysenko.200 In one article, Edgar 
Zilsel develops his famous thesis that the development of modern science in the West must 
be seen as a “sociological process” resulting from the interaction of craftspeople and 
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scholars – experiment and theory meet each other when manual labor and scholarly intellect 
meet.201  
 How do the authors usually talk about the relation between ideas and experiment? 
Can experiments make a real difference, and how does their role relate to intellectual factors? 
Thomas S. Hall’s 1950 study of ‘the scientific origins of the protoplasm problem’ starts with 
describing a 19th-century experiment – Dujardin’s crushing the membrane of a single-celled 
animal – “which was to have far-reaching consequences for the future of biology”,202 but 
then moves on to trace the idea of a ‘protoplasm’ in Presocratic thought, rather than 
regarding it as the result of the aforementioned experiment. Aram Vartanian connects 
experiments and concepts more elegantly, by showing how the observed features of a polyp 
by Abraham Trembley shapes a range of 18th-century debates concerning materialism; 
thought about conceptual matters is rather directly triggered by observational input,203 and 
on occasion, the polyp figures almost as a Latourian actant, “favoring” materialist ideas.204 It 
does so mainly through altering the shape of the most rational conceptual system – it has 
materialist “implications”.205 Nonetheless, from the perspective of the pre-existing system, 
the relevant observations are obviously contingent – this is not an example of an irresistible 
inner logic in the history of scientific thought.  
 Stephen Toulmin, on the other hand, attacks the notion of a crucial experiment; this 
is a self-justifying notion, and a misleading one at that, as he demonstrates through 
Lavoisier’s red calx of mercury experiment. The experiment was originally Priestley’s, and 
far from providing “irresistible proof that the calx is compound not an element”,206 Toulmin 
maintains that Priestley could consistently deny this conclusion,207 and that one experiment 
cannot autonomously be logically crucial, though it may be crucial in a causal sense or given 
theoretical assumptions. There is a certain priority of concepts here, but on their own, these 
concepts don’t have an irresistible internal logic to them. 
 We do find a hint of the views we are looking for in E.W. Strong’s account of 
Whewell’s controversy with Mill about science, where Whewell defends the thesis that 
“there are scientific truths which are seen by intuition, but this intuition is progressive”;208 this is a 
defining feature of idealist inevitabilism, but though Strong is explicitly sympathetic 
towards Whewell in this debate, he believes that Whewell’s strongest point against Mill, that 
conceptions are formed by minds that are historically conditioned, “stands whether one 
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accepts or rejects his contention that intelligible relations (a priori Ideas) are progressively 
disclosed.”209 A strong, reductionist idealism is hard to find in the Journal. 
 The evidence with regard to inevitabilism is ambiguous as well, and mostly 
indirect: Charles Nauert uses teleological language when he says that Agrippa’s work 
approaches the idea of hypothesis and testing – “his mind is tending in this direction”.210 
While this can be a merely rhetorical device, Maurice Mandelbaum explicitly talks about 
scientific problems which “paved the way” for evolutionism, and Darwin’s Origin of Species 
presenting a view “toward which [multiple] scientific theories had tended to converge”.211 
He also claims elsewhere that “all that prevented Darwin from denying the truth of Theism 
was the anti-dogmatic cast of his own mind, and his acceptance of the limitations of all 
human minds, considering their lowly origins”,212 which can be considered to be an 
affirmation of the internal ‘logic’ of his ideas but obviously on a very local and contextually 
defined level. 
 Alvar Ellegard talks in inevitabilist terms about Darwinism on a larger level, 
saying that once certain empiricist methodological principles were established, “the 
Darwinian theory could hardly be resisted” – and that it was impossible to accept 
Darwinism and leave traditional religion intact.213 Supposedly inevitable clashes between 
science and religion are, by the way, not representative of the way of thinking about science 
and culture in the Journal.214 Particularly interesting in this respect is an article by Norton 
Garfinkle on the reception of the work of Erasmus Darwin in England, which he argues 
alters significantly after the French Revolution: the Revolution ends a period of tolerance in 
Britain, and indirectly leads to a new emphasis on Biblical literalism, and harsh criticism of 
scientific writings such as Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia, that are perceived as subversive of 
traditional religion.215 Like many articles, this relates science directly to social, political and 
cultural factors that are obviously contingent with respect to what would be its own internal 
development. 
 The clearest inevitabilist argument with respect to the content of science is 
Elizabeth Gasking’s ‘Why was Mendel’s Work Ignored?’. Gasking explains why it was no 
wonder that most biologists ignored Mendel in an intellectual climate that focused on 
processes of selection rather than of variation,216 and why those who did read it were, 
understandably, unconvinced after Mendel turned his attention to trying to experiment with 
Hieracium. Understandably, for “in retrospect, we can see why the work was so fruitless”: 
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the genus was “variable and atypical in its methods of reproduction”217 and the experiments 
on these plants therefore failed to reproduce the elegant fractions of his pea experiments. 
Mendel “could not recognize the deceptive character of his results, and must have been very 
disappointed at finding this apparent refutation of his earlier theories.”218 
 Gasking’s judgment is, in the end, mainly that of prematurity (she does not use the 
term): “science is organized knowledge, and no piece of work, however complete in itself, is 
valued until it can be fitted into the general corpus. Given the position in biology when 
Mendel wrote, it was perhaps inevitable that his discovery should not have been 
appreciated.”219 Mendel’s faith that his time would come was proven right in the end, when 
work on crytology and biometrics made it possible for Mendel’s theories to be understood – 
though “paradoxically it seems that, had Mendel’s work been lost forever, modern genetics 
would nevertheless be much the same today, and that the rediscovery of his monograph 
had at most the effect of aiding and speeding up the birth of the subject.”220 
 We recognize this as far from a paradoxical claim. Rather, it is a coherent 
affirmation of nature-based inevitabilism: it is the way inheritance generally works in plants 
that made Mendel right. We saw this confirmed by the claim that it was the fact that he 
happened to stumble upon an exceptional and non-representative case that delayed the 
acceptance of his main findings. We can recognize this fact from a present-day perspective 
that has inherited a biology that eventually embraced Mendel’s findings. That Mendel’s 
laws would eventually be accepted anyway is in harmony with the implied claim that his 
ideas were premature – the assertion of prematurity, after all, can only be made if the later 
or final state of the system in which the premature findings is inevitable to such a degree 
that there is no plausible historical development of science in which the ‘premature’ 
findings never find a home.221 
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Can we draw some general conclusions from all this? One is that though few 
articles make explicit statements about contingency or inevitability, we have accumulated 
some indirect evidence that the founder of the Journal and many of its contributors thought 
that the development of science is, on a longer time-scale, not contingent. It is less clear what 
they consider to be the chief explanation for the degree of inevitability that science has, and 
on the basis of what we have discussed, it is unlikely that the answers would be strongly 
idealist. The most clearly inevitabilist articles were inevitabilist about a specific theory based 
on specific evidence from nature. 
 Another thing that these articles teach us is that questions of contingency and 
inevitability can arise on any scale and with regard to many questions: very often, we are 
not simply contingentists or inevitabilists with regard to science as a whole, but with regard 
to the question whether, for instance, Mendel’s theories would eventually come to be 
accepted, or whether 19th-century evolutionary theories would inevitably clash with 
religious beliefs. It is possible to be an inevitabilist about either of these questions while 
being a contingentist about the other, which makes it problematic to treat the articles to the 
Journal as evidence for the same debate.  
 This also brings to light another corollary of the way in which we defined 
contingentism and inevitabilism in chapter 2, namely that the question of the degree of 
contingency is always posed against implicit or explicit historical background knowledge 
and, in principle, temporally delineated. It is: given that these facts were in place at time t1, 
was this aspect of the outcome at t2 inevitable or does it obtain only under some of the 
historical paths that were possible from t1? This question can be posed on any scale, with 
any level of detail of background knowledge and with respect to any aspect of any outcome. 
 A global inevitabilist thesis would be that at some time in the past, most or all our 
current scientific beliefs were already almost inevitable, in the sense that from that point 
there are very few historical paths leading to 21st-century scientific beliefs being radically 
different from the actual ones. Most professions of inevitability in the Journal of the History of 
Ideas are locally defined – they suggest that in a certain context, it was inevitable that a 
certain finding would impact scientific ideas in a certain way. 
 The question remains meaningful whether we can find a global inevitabilism about 
the content of science based on idealism, and what that would look like.  
 
4.3.2 Alexandre Koyré’s Intellectualist Inevitabilism 
The historian of science whose work comes closest to this position is Alexandre Koyré, 
whose perspective on the history of science has been characterized as idealist,222 as 
Platonist,223 and as Hegelian;224 but we need to be careful with these characterizations, since, 
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as Yehuda Elkana has put it, “neither Koyré, nor Plato for that matter, fit the caricature of a 
historian of disembodied ideas.”225 
 One corollary to Koyré’s ‘Platonic’ tendencies is that it is sometimes hard to be 
certain, not about what is being said – Koyré is never obscure when it comes to the content 
of thought – but who exactly is saying it and how seriously we are to take it. Koyré writes 
not without humor and irony, and though he is often quick to point out where his early 
modern natural philosophers make mistakes, he is also very good in thinking along with 
them and pushing their thought just a bit further towards what he considers to be its 
unavoidable implication. So when he says that ‘good physics is done a priori’, what exactly is 
the status of that remark? Is he Galileo’s mouthpiece or is Galileo his?226  
In general, however, Koyré leaves little to guess about the direction in which his 
work points; and that is in the direction that scientific accomplishment needs to be 
understood as an accomplishment of the human mind – and an historical accomplishment at 
that, since “modern science did not spring perfect and complete, as Athena from the head of 
Zeus, from the minds of Galileo and Descartes.”227  
The scientific revolution was not just a matter of ‘discovery’; the scientists that 
accomplished it “had, to begin with, to reshape and re-form our intellect itself.”228 For us, 
standing on the other side of this effort, it is hard to see; Galilean motion seems so ‘natural’ 
to us that “we even believe we have derived it from experience and observation”, which 
obviously we have not.229 We need to overcome the self-evidence of our current notions 
when doing history; not those notions themselves – Koyré will be the last to forego the 
privilege of telling past natural philosophers, on the basis of his own understanding, where 
they erred230 – but their supposed ‘naturalness’. We need to see that our having this 
understanding is the result of history.231 History shows us: 
 
how difficult it was even for such revolutionary minds as Galileo and Newton to free 
themselves from the conjoint influence of tradition and common sense, to draw – and to 
accept – the inevitable consequences of their own fundamental concepts.232 
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understand Stump’s (2001, 245, 258) thesis that Koyré should be classified as ‘Hegelian’.  
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Modern science is not natural, but it is inevitable. The key to interpreting Koyré is seeing 
that he opposes reason to nature; the rise of modern science is the victory of thought over 
experience and imagination. Thought could not have reached any other conclusions than it 
did, but it is not natural to think, or to let one’s opinions be guided by thought alone. Koyré 
shows how the revolutionary scientists of the early modern period gradually succeeded in 
doing this. 
 To flesh out this interpretation, we look at what Koyré has to say about the role of 
observation in science. He distinguishes between observation and experimentation, because 
“simple observation, the observation of common sense” was only an obstacle to modern 
physics.233 Experiment – “the methodical interrogation of nature”234 – did play a positive role, 
but this implies a language in which nature can be interrogated, and this language “could not 
be determined by the experience which its use was to make possible. It had to come from 
other sources.”235 
 Even when conceding a positive role for experiment, Koyré is always happier 
when he can diminish its extent. When he notes that “none of the numerical data invoked by 
Galileo [in the Discorsi] relates to measurements actually made”, he makes sure that the 
reader understands the compliment: “I do not reproach him on this account; on the contrary, 
I should like to claim for him the glory and merit of having known how to dispense with 
experiments.”236 Nonetheless, he goes on to list the essential functions that experiment does 
fulfill. 
 Only experiment, he says, can provide numerical data that complete our 
knowledge of nature. Only experiment can select the right means to a certain purpose. Only 
experiment can ensure that “matters take place in tangible reality, in hoc vero aere, very 
nearly as they do in the Archimedean world of reified geometry on which our deductions 
are grounded”, though in the case of fundamental laws of nature pure reason suffices in 
principle.237 The function to which he devotes the most attention is: 
 
pedagogic […] it was experiment that pointed out the inadequacy of Aristotelian doctrine 
with respect to reality, and which, as much as its inherent contradictions, convinced Simplicio 
that it was wrong. […] No doubt, the arguments and ‘experiments’ adduced by Galileo are 
sufficient for enlightened minds free from prejudice, as represented by Sagredo. But what 
about the others? For them, something more is required, namely, a real experiment.238 
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This may be an instance of Platonic irony, and it is ambiguous to which extent this is Koyré 
talking or his Galileo; but the gist is that experiment does not get to the core of science, and 
that it serves mainly as a teaching tool for the mind.  
 In fact, Galileo’s Salviati is “so good a midwife of the brain” that he can even teach 
Simplicio without experiment, like Socrates did the slave boy in Plato’s Meno, for “men are 
already in possession of the true principles of the nature of the physical world even in 
advance of any experiment. Men know the truth, though they may not be aware of this.”239 
Koyré’s commitment to this Galilean view remains unwavering when he discusses other 
heroes of the scientific revolution. Copernicus, too, meditates and makes calculations rather 
than observations; his superiority is mathematical, though of course “the Sun, Moon and 
planets are real objects”.240 
 The ability of human reason to access scientific truths without experience means 
that the world needs to be of such a structure that thinking about it can give us gradually 
more insight into it. We can see this in recent discussion in philosophy of science concerning 
the meaning of thought experiments; James Robert Brown has asserted the existence of 
‘Platonic thought experiments’, which generate a theory which is better than its predecessor 
without being based on new evidence or logically derived from old evidence. Galileo’s 
thought experiment concerning the rate of fall of bodies of different weights meets these 
criteria.241 Thought experiments enable us to grasp relations between universals, of which 
natural laws are instances.242 This means, Brown maintains, that thought experiments can 
and do transcend empirical knowledge by giving us a priori knowledge of nature – of the 
real phenomena, rather than the appearances.243 
According to James W. McAllister, thought experiments are valuable only under 
the assumption that reality consists of universal and stable phenomena – an assumption to 
which Galileo did and Aristotelians did not adhere.244 Brown’s view is an instance of such a 
metaphysics, which is more explicit about it than Koyré but which matches his 
interpretation of Galileo’s thought experiments. Brown too prefers to see Galileo as a 
rationalist rather than the brilliant experimenter that he is according to Stillman Drake.245 
Koyré himself has dealt with “the use and abuse of imaginary experiment” in an 
article on Galileo’s treatise ‘De motu gravium’, where he tries to “describe and justify 
Galileo’s use of the method of imaginary experiment concurrently with, and even in 
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241 Brown (1991, 99-101). 
242 Brown (1991, 118). 
243 Brown (2004) in controversy with Norton (2004). Cf. Brown (2013) 62-65. 
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preference to, real experiment”,246 adding in a footnote that thought experiment “plays a 
part intermediate between pure thought and tangible experiment”.247 It could go wrong, 
however, and sometimes it did, even in the case of Galileo; but that was only because of its 
inherent risk to “go to the extreme in putting ideas into concrete form”.248 To Koyré’s taste, 
even thought experiments can be too close to experience! In that case they cease to teach us 
something about the real world; Koyré gives an example where Galileo’s Salviati makes a 
mistaken prediction about what happens when water and wine react, a mistake that he 
diagnoses as resulting from Galileo’s taking the liberty to imagine on the basis of confused 
experience.249 Scientific genius, we know by now, consists precisely in replacing imagining 
with reasoning, for “it is […], pure unadulterated thought, and not experience or sense-
perception, as until then, that gives the basis for the ‘new science’ of Galileo Galilei.”250 Here 
too he concludes: “Good physics is made a priori. As I have already said, it must at all costs 
avoid the temptation and fault of extreme concretism, and must not allow imagination to 
take the place of theory.”251 
Where can we place Koyré on the spectrum of contingentism and inevitabilism, 
and how does this relate to his views about how the world constrains scientific theory 
development? In Koyré’s metaphysics, access to real nature is realized progressively, in a 
historical process in which the mind errs a lot – immersed as it is in the world of becoming 
and experience. The development of science is inevitable, but the world does not exercise a 
causal influence upon our beliefs; rather, it possesses a structure that we progressively 
manage to grasp rationally. If we think, we can come to but one conclusion. 
There is a tension between the fact that Copernicus, Galileo, or Newton could not 
have come up with different systems that were equally true – for their systems are no 
speculations about possible worlds, but hook on to the one real world – and their creative 
genius; the “power and boldness” of Copernicus’ mind, for instance.252 But the aim of 
history of science is not just to affirm the teleology of history on the macro-scale, but also to 
understand its contingencies on the micro-scale. We are in a complicated hermeneutical 
position in this respect: on the one hand, we have better knowledge now of the same 
universal relations that our forefathers were looking for, and this knowledge genuinely 
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enlightens their endeavours precisely because they were looking for those relations. On the 
other hand, the self-evidence with which we hold these notions obscures the enormity of 
their task, and thus our understanding of the historicity of the human achievement. 
For the goal is ever and always to understand; to understand why the geniuses and 
less-than-geniuses of the scientific revolution thought and imagined as they did.253 The 
depth of the docta ignorantia of Cusanus; the vitalistic and magical optimism of Bruno – these 
persons, in Koyré’s historiography, are in no sense passive tools of some inner logic, and in 
this respect he does not fit the caricature of a historian of disembodied ideas.254 But he is 
consistent to the borders of caricature in the extent to which he discards every hint that what 
his subjects think and believe can be systematically understood by reference to anything else 
than the workings of their own mind and its (admittedly fallible) pondering of reality.255  
In The Astronomical Revolution, Koyré characteristically uses one of the heroes 
himself as his mouthpiece, in this case Copernicus: 
 
Were we to persist in trying to make him understand that […] we are trying to explain his 
work and genius by his ‘nationality’ and his ‘race’, he would probably become annoyed […] 
he would say that all historical, Marxist or sociological conceptions by which man, or a work, 
of genius may be ‘explained’ by heredity, race, class, position, background and a particular 
moment in history, could only have been invented and maintained by barbarians completely 
devoid of philosophical upbringing.256 
 
This statement is a point of metaphysics – as we have seen, it fits within Koyré’s Platonist-
inevitabilist framework where contingencies cannot sustain genuine truths, and necessary 
steps in the history of thought cannot have trivial material causes257 – but in its emotional 
charge and its political-ideological implications, it is also a question of hermeneutics: it is a 
plea to take seriously the conscious intentions and motives of the actors that we seek to 
understand, especially if they are of such individuality and genius that not to do so would 
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be a barbaric injustice to them. “The social structure of England in the seventeenth century 
cannot explain Newton, any more than the Russia of Nicholas I can throw light on the work 
of Lobachevsky, or the Germany of Wilhelm II enable us to understand Einstein. To look for 
explanations along these lines is an entirely futile enterprise.”258 Futile, and an affront.259 In 
the next section, we will have a look at some of the barbarians who had the audacity to try 
this. 
 
4.4 The Final Stage of Society 
4.4.1 Some Preliminary Considerations on Marxism 
Finally, we will discuss some Marxist perspectives on the determining factors in the history 
of science. More than most philosophies of history, classical Marxism is characterized by the 
assertion of inevitability. 
Marxism famously sees as the driving force of history the circumstances and ways 
of production: there is an internal, progressive dialectic in the collective relations between 
man and the world. Understandably then, science plays an important role in Marxist 
thought: it is science through which we come to grips with the world with which we have to 
work. As such – and we will see this view in practice shortly – science is inextricably 
intertwined with modes of production, and is therefore of world-historical significance. 
However, this does not decide the question precisely what its role is: we can imagine science 
to be part of a superstructure, following modes of production, perhaps even directly 
reflecting the interests of the dominant classes; we can also imagine science, in giving us 
progressively more access to and insight into the objective natural world outside of class 
interest and struggle, to exercise an emancipatory force and thereby further the progress of 
history towards its final state.260 
 The tension between these two interpretations is genuine, but a skilled dialectician 
will be able to resolve it in advance, by noting that when historical necessity is fulfilled, class 
interest and objectivity will coincide, and claiming that there is, in the end, no discrepancy 
between the emancipatory and instrumental faces of science. There is no contradiction 
between driving social and historical progress and being driven by it; between providing 
objective access to an outside world and being determined by forces within human society. 
Sheehan has aptly summarized the meaning of Marxism for science studies in general, in a 
way that also applies to our current purpose: “Marxism has made the strongest claims of 
any intellectual tradition before or since about the socio-historical character of science, yet 
always affirmed its cognitive achievements.”261 The special attractiveness of Marxist theory 
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is that it seems to do both these things, not by designing a compromise between them, but 
by doing both completely and at once. 
 Marxism and history of science intersected with world history in a poignant way in 
July 1931, when a Soviet delegation under the leadership of the revolutionary theorist 
Nikolai Bukharin – by then expelled from the highest party positions but still a figure of 
authority – joined the ‘second international congress of the history of science and technology’ 
in London.262 In his entourage, Bukharin brought the physicist Boris Hessen, who was to 
deliver one of the most famous papers in the history of science studies. 
Bukharin’s own paper deals directly with the relation between history and the 
external world in science, approaching from a Marxist perspective the idea that “‘I’ have 
been ‘given’ only ‘my’ own ‘sensations’”.263 In every individual experience, he says, “there 
are included beforehand society, external nature and history – i.e., social history.”264 
Moreover, the external world relates to society not as simply ‘given’, but as “the object of 
active influence on the part of social, historically developing man.”265 Science is simply “the 
continuation of practice […] by other means.”266  
According to Bukharin, this does not conflict with the idea that in this active 
relation with the external world, a picture of the world is attained that is “much more 
adequate to reality than all its predecessors, and therefore so fruitful for practice”.267 He 
supplements his “practical criterion of truth” with a correspondentist one;268 science is 
historical, but it also becomes more adequate to how nature objectively is. This is consistent 
with other writings of Bukharin: elsewhere, he explains that the all-pervasive state power of 
the proletariat does not mean that objective laws disappear under revolutionary 
voluntarism. Nature “always remains a realm of necessity.”269 Scientific Marxism recognizes 
this necessity; “science itself would be objectless if there were not objective laws”.270 
 This also suggests how the relativity of cognitive activity to class structures – easy 
to uphold when it concerns bourgeois science – behaves under pressure: is science still class-
relative under proletarian rule? The answer can be: yes, being does not stop determining 
consciousness. Or: no, because in this case the objective laws are visible, underneath which 
there is nothing left to discover. But then, knowledge of these objective laws becomes an 
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instrument of freedom only under the right social circumstances – suggesting a synthesis of 
these two answers. Access to the objective state of affairs and the liberating status of science 
go hand in hand. 
 In a more radical development of Marxist holism, we might expect nature ‘itself’ – 
objective nature – to develop historically through the same dialectical mechanisms as society 
does; however, we do not see Bukharin claim this. In general, we will see that even though 
Marxist theoreticians are generally prepared to say that nature does not present itself to us 
in any other way than in relation to production, they are not prepared to identify the way in 
which it presents itself with the way it objectively is. This is understandable, when we 
realize that doing so would mean that the findings of bourgeois science would not be biased, 
but would rather correspond to the objective world of bourgeois society. Better to say that 
the validity of science depends still on the world, and that the dialectical historical process 
simply actualizes the one right perspective upon this world (namely by the class that is 
destined to inherit it).  
  
4.4.2 Boris Hessen and the Inevitability of Newtonianism 
The Hessen paper about the ‘social and economic roots of Newton’s Principia’ starts by 
presenting the perspective Hessen wants to discredit: “just think”, he quotes Whitehead 
about Galileo and Newton, “what the course of human history would have been if these two 
men had not appeared in the world.”271 Hessen says this quote shows a failure to get behind 
ideology, and a misleading individualism, which a Marxist perspective removes. 
Admittedly, Hessen does not underline his opposition to the contingency implied by 
Whitehead’s words, though he does emphasize the determined nature of the Marxist 
dialectical process.272  
 All ideas can be understood in relation to material productive forces. Only the 
proletariat, which in the end will rule, “is free from a limited understanding of the historical 
process and produces a true, genuine history of nature and society”.273 This does not mean 
that its science becomes disconnected from its material bases – on the contrary, class 
societies are misguided about nature and history precisely because their “dominant ideas 
are separated from the relations of production.”274 Science remains material in nature and 
integrated in society, even and especially in the inevitable classless society.  
 But how does this integration work? Hessen’s paper provides a consistent picture. 
He talks about the specific technical problems that arise with the disintegration of the feudal 
economy and the development of merchant capital, overseas trading and large-scale 
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industry: for instance, questions of how to increase the tonnage and stability of ships, and 
how to determine their position at sea. After presenting these problems, Hessen says: “let us 
consider what physical premises are necessary in order to solve these technical problems.”275 
His discussion clearly and consistently implies that there are optimal technical solutions to 
the problems that arise from the circumstances of production in a given society; but what 
these solutions are is decided by nature. We understand the interest of early modern science 
in problems concerning the free fall of bodies, hydro- and aerostatics and celestial mechanics 
because the actual solutions to the economic problems of the age are to be found there: “the 
physical problems presented by the development of transport, industry and mining […] are 
all purely mechanical problems.”276 It does not suffice to say that they are interpreted as such by 
the dominant classes; that would leave a gap in the explanation.277 Rather, Hessen considers 
the capitalists of the age to be instrumentally rational given the real nature of their problems. 
 In order to understand their work, we do not need the scientists we study to 
discern, let alone identify explicitly, the motives for their own scientific endeavours. 
Relating objective class interests to what nature objectively looks like is enough. That “it 
would be futile to seek in [the Principia] an exposition by Newton himself of the connection 
between the problems that he sets and solves and the technical demands from which they 
arose” does not mean that this connection does not exist.278 It means only that we need to 
supplement our interpretation of the Principia with what we know of this material basis, to 
see how “the ‘terrestrial core’ of the Principia consists precisely of the technical problems 
that we have analyzed above”.279 It is our own knowledge of the real, mechanical nature of 
these technical problems that allows us to make this connection. 
Not even Newton’s alchemy escapes Hessen’s search for a ‘terrestrial core’; this too 
was “closely bound up with the production of necessities, and the aura of mystery 
surrounding the alchemists should not conceal from us the real nature of their research”.280 
Here Hessen’s Marxist hunches converge in an interesting way with the findings of recent 
historiography (see section 8.6.4). Something similar is the case for Hessen’s judgment of the 
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relation between Newton’s scientific work and his religious beliefs – Hessen finds that 
“Newton’s theological views were by no means a mere appendage to his system.”281 They 
were rather, in reinforcing the bourgeois view that matter could never move itself 
(depriving matter of “that inalienable property without which the structure and origin of 
the world cannot be explained by material causes”)282 a scientifically relevant brake on the 
inevitable development of science. And a necessary one at that, since in the bourgeois 
society that had just arisen in England, the time was not ripe for the principle of the ‘self-
movement of matter’ that would come to characterize modern physics.283  
For if Newton could not yet arrive at the truth of the law of energy conservation, 
this was “not because he lacked genius”,284 but because this could happen only when the 
development of the steam engine raised the problem of translating one kind of motion into 
another, leading to the discovery that all forces could be transformed into each other and 
helping physics towards “the inevitable conclusion that the end result was the eternal 
circulation of moving matter.”285  
In the end, Hessen’s paper is not about Newton, but about the inevitable progress 
of science and its relation to the inevitable progress of society; it simply zooms in on 
Newton to make the case for a Marxist reading of the history of science in what would likely 
be the most difficult place to make it. But what, in this revisionist picture, determines the 
content of scientific theories, and how? 
Here we must conclude that for Hessen, nature decides what science must look like 
in order to respond to societal needs. Though nature is itself a product of its own historical 
development,286 the symmetry with society ends here: there is no hint that the way in which 
nature itself develops responds, dialectically or not, to societal development. It is society and, 
in its superstructure, science that develop dialectically. Both society and nature are present 
in nature, evidently; but for Hessen – much like Merton – society provides the questions to 
which science finds the answers in nature. It cannot find complete and unbiased answers 
until it attains the perspective of the proletariat, but to the extent that it does find these, it is 
by seeing nature as it really is. Of course, the mechanism through which it succeeds in doing 
so is a logic of development within the material relations to nature; but in these relations, 
nature remains forever the object – it is man who proceeds from being an object to becoming 
a subject as well.287 
Hessen’s thesis stands out as an early and elegant way to look at science as 
importantly social in nature. Even if it does not provide a genuinely innovative perspective 
on the relation between science and nature, it provides an awe-inspiringly innovative 
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perspective on the relations between science and society; even if inextricably entangled with 
an indigestible Marxist doctrine, it stands as a voice in favor of contextualizing science. 
 
4.4.2 John Desmond Bernal and Objective Science-Not-From-the-Skies 
Similar compliments can be given to John Bernal.288 Many of the remarks he makes in his 
history of science are an inversion of the intellectualism and universalism of Sarton (see 
section 1.3): Bernal attacks the idea of a “pure science”,289 and says that it “would be very 
wide of the mark to assume that mankind has in the past acted as one intellectual unit”.290 
Science has rather always been guided by particular economic interests, driven by “the very 
process by which men made their living – the productive process by which they got food, 
clothing and shelter.”291 Realizing this, we see that science can be understood without 
idealism, mysticism, or “‘know nothing’ words such as ‘inspiration’ or ‘genius’”.292 Bernal 
repeats Engels’ complaint that “it has become the custom in Germany to write the history of 
the sciences as if they had fallen from the skies”.293 
 Bernal’s focus on social factors, combined with his Marxist notion of production as 
the fundamental social activity leads to a view of science in which ‘nature’ plays a role only 
by its relevance for human production – it is an object of practice, rather than knowledge. 
Bernal quotes Marx: “one basis for life and another for science is a priori a lie. Nature as it 
develops through human history – in the genesis of human society – is the real nature 
(known to) of man.”294 
 The point is taken that sustained scientific interest can never be directed towards 
something abstracted from human productive interests;295 however, even if nature comes 
into the picture only as something that pertains to struggles concerning the organization of 
production, it matters a lot in that role, for science is essentially “ordered technique”, and 
the technical level of production in any period sets a limit to the possible forms of social 
organization.296 Science pushes these limits outwards, but what the technical possibilities 
that science can discover are, is determined by nature. For instance, when discussing 19th-
century developments in electricity and magnetism, Bernal says that:  
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It is interesting to reflect on the sequence of apparently accidental discoveries that led to this 
stage of knowledge. At first sight it seems to reinforce the idea that science is entirely 
unpredictable and depends entirely on purely chance discoveries. Actually, now that we 
know the character of some of the relations between different aspects of Nature, we can see 
that it must have been extremely difficult in the long run not to have hit upon them in one 
way, if not in another.297 
 
This is a rather pure doctrine of inevitabilism with regard to the content of science, and the 
inevitability is decreed not by the logic of society, but by what nature is really like.298 
 In the same context, Bernal says that: “it was these physical discoveries that were to 
give a new impetus to mathematics and to wean it from the now sterile adherence to the 
Newtonian tradition.”299 Bernal contrasts tradition and innovation, where innovation comes 
from physical discoveries that are, from the actor’s perspective if not in retrospect, 
‘accidental’. Nature’s role in the history of science stands in an important respect outside the 
logic of history, to the extent that history refers to the explanatory importance of what has 
happened before; the ‘weight of the past’. 
In Bernal’s Marxist perspective, how science functions in society is determined by 
the logic of this society, but in the end, science involves knowledge about nature that is to a 
high extent independent, at least in the sense of: independent of knowledge about society. 
(This is evident from the fact that in Bernal’s vision for a better future, this future needs to 
possess “the greatest knowledge of Nature and society”,300 which are, apparently, two 
separate things to acquire knowledge of.301) This knowledge drives social change without in 
turn being driven by it – it is all base and little superstructure.302 So, if we want a complete 
understanding of science in history, it is not enough to understand past societies; we need to 
see that certain relations in nature made it “extremely difficult” in the long run not to have 
hit upon them. 
Bernal’s model of science in history, though considering science as a genuinely 
social phenomenon, does not make the move into the sociologism of saying that what is said 
about nature is a result only of society. In this Bernal differs from the representatives of the 
Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge that we will discuss in the next 
chapter: they explicitly say that what is believed about nature is first and foremost (and 
perhaps – but this is the point at issue – exclusively) the result of the structure of society. 
Rather, Bernal, even from his Marxist vantage point, supports and underlines the intuition 
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that if we are inevitabilists about science, we need to believe that science has a special 
relation to nature. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
From our discussions in this chapter we can draw the following conclusions and insights: 
1) Historical inevitabilism about the content of science grounded in the way the world 
is turns out to be hard to maintain without further qualifications. If we add 
normative accounts of scientific rationality, the ‘normative inevitabilism’ that may 
result from this does not amount to historical inevitabilism.  
2) We have seen especially in our dealings with the Journal of the History of Ideas 
articles that it is worthwhile to distinguish between global and local inevitabilism 
and contingentism. Whereas our considerations in the first half of this chapter 
discredit the idea of a global nature-based inevitabilism with regard to the content 
of science, it leaves open the possibility that there are contextually defined and 
temporally limited cases where the cards were dealt in such a way that a particular 
outcome was more or less inevitable. 
3) At the outset of this chapter, we left open the possibility of something other than 
nature grounding scientific inevitabilism. However, in practice, both the Marxist 
positions and Koyré’s idealism ground their inevitabilism in the end in a special 
relation between science and the world. The different positions distinguish 
themselves mainly by their characterization of the mechanisms through which this 
special relation is reached (different in particular in their relations to society) and 
the kinds of obstacles that need to be overcome in order to reach it. 
4) With regard to historical understanding, most of the authors we dealt with in this 
chapter are presentists, in the sense that they believe that our own scientific 
knowledge can shed light upon earlier science. This presentism seems strongly 
associated with their inevitabilism about the content of science: it is because we 
know what past scientists were looking for that our knowledge of the final results 
helps in understanding their efforts.  
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Chapter 5: Leaving Nature Out 
 
5.1 The ‘No Nature’-principle 
The main problem in this thesis concerns the role that nature can play in the historical 
explanation of scientific development, and how this role relates to the contextual cultural 
and societal factors that historians are comfortable dealing with. In the previous chapter, we 
looked at different cases that could be made for scientific inevitabilism, where historical 
contingencies do not make a difference to what the final stage of science can and will be. We 
saw that such inevitabilism is in practice grounded in the idea that the world on its own 
decides what science looks like. 
 In this chapter, we will look at the other extreme: at positions that have in common 
that they, at least ostensibly, deny nature a role in the explanation of the historical 
development of science. Even this careful formulation can, without further qualifications, be 
misleading, for none of the arguments that we will consider in this chapter depends on 
skepticism about the existence of an external world that does things to our senses. The 
world is out there, and its existence as such is independent of what we think about it. 
However, history of science is not about this world; it is about the history of scientific beliefs 
and related phenomena; and some scholars would argue that if we want to explain scientific 
thinking about the world, we do best not to refer to this world. 
 To avoid tiresome repetition, I will abbreviate this to what I dub the ‘No Nature’ 
principle, or NN: 
 
NN: The principle that explanations of scientific development should not rely on nature 
as an explanans. 
 
NN can be embraced on different grounds, though the thinkers dealt with in this chapter 
have in common that they identify legitimate explanatory factors in scientific belief 
formation as social factors. Apart from these commonalities, there are still interesting 
differences between the realism of David Bloor, the methodological relativism of Harry 
Collins, and the constructivism of Karin Knorr-Cetina. 
 The idea that science should be regarded as a product of society rather than as of 
nature has inspired a lot of interesting historical work in many subfields of history of science. 
Klaus Danziger’s famous history of the origins of psychology proceeds from the idea that 
psychological knowledge is socially constructed.303 Andrew Pickering, in his history of high 
energy physics, argues that “the world of HEP was socially produced”,304 and that since 
consensus about the reality of particular theoretical constructs in physics is the outcome of a 
historical process, “recourse to the reality of natural phenomena and theoretical entities is 
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self-defeating”.305 Pickering says that as a historian, he wants to escape from “the 
retrospective idiom of the scientist” which refers to “the state of nature”, and refer rather to 
the cultural context in which judgments are made.306 
 In the remaining part of this chapter, we will evaluate possible strategies for 
supporting NN that have been put forward by different thinkers, especially from the Strong 
Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). These arguments are: 
 
A1: Nature underdetermines the content of scientific theories. 
A2: Nature is common to all of us and therefore ‘drops out’ of explanations. 
A3: Neither external reality nor individual minds provide us with the categories we 
employ to study nature, and therefore real explanatory power resides in society. 
A4: If historians of science rely on knowledge of nature in their explanations of 
knowledge of nature rather than on their autonomous competence and expertise, 
their explanations are circular. 
A5: Nature is the result of social constructions, not their cause. 
 
All of these arguments can be found in the works of more than one author, but I have 
chosen to use David Bloor’s work as a window upon the first three, Harry Collins’ for the 
fourth, and Karin Knorr-Cetina’s for the fifth.  
 
5.2 David Bloor’s Realism 
5.2.1 Introduction 
David Bloor has, at first sight, explicitly and consistently embraced NN. He has, for example, 
said that “there is […] no need to try to explain stability by appealing to truth or reality”;307 
that explanations need to be impartial and ‘symmetrical’ with respect to the truth or falsity 
of the opinions they seek to explain;308 and that the electron itself ‘drops out’ of explanations 
of belief in the electron.309 
 On the other hand, however, Bloor has always insisted that the role of observation 
in scientific belief-formation needs to be taken into account,310 that the study of knowledge 
ought to have a “plausible and substantial picture of the role of sensory experience”,311 and 
that it ought to treat this sensory experience as reliable: “materialism and the reliability of 
sense experience are […] presupposed by the sociology of knowledge and no retreat from 
these assumptions is permissible.”.312 Where does this sense experience come from? Bloor 
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says that it is in line with his ‘Strong Programme’ in the sociology of scientific knowledge to 
assume that “we exist within a common external environment that has a determinate 
structure”.313 
 On this matter, then, Bloor’s ideas are rather commonsensical: nature exists, and its 
presence is felt reliably by our senses. But why, then, is the way nature is not actually a part 
of the explanation of the way science is? 
 Bloor has answered this question in multiple ways: first, by insisting that nature as 
accessed by sense experience underdetermines theories about nature; and second, by 
suggesting that, precisely because our natural environment is something that we all share, it 
drops out of the explanation of differences in scientific belief. I will show that the first 
argument does not support NN, and that the second is simply invalid. A third line of 
response open to Bloor, however, is to say that our categories are completely social and 
exhaustively explained by social factors, but that societies themselves are part of natural 
reality and that “society enables us rather than disables us; that we know reality through it, 
not in spite of it”.314 
 
5.2.2 The First Argument: Underdetermination 
As said, Bloor claims that it is no problem for him to say that reality comes into the story 
through sensory experience. “But the important point”, he continues, “is that reality, so 
experienced, under-determines what the scientists say or think about it.”315 This is why we 
should look rather at social factors like tradition, authority, paradigms, and interests. 
 Underdetermination of theory by data as a general principle is an ambiguous 
concept. We have seen in the previous chapter that though it is hard to maintain that reality 
on its own determines what can be said about it, rationalists may maintain that there is a 
model of rationality that, in conjunction with relevant data, allows us to decide between 
theories. The case for underdetermination then depends on the permissiveness of this model 
of rationality. As Larry Laudan has argued, it may be the case that multiple theories are 
empirically equivalent in the sense that they entail the same data, but it may be possible to 
formulate a rational ampliative logic that allows us to say which theories are better 
supported by the data.316 It is one thing to say that creationism with divinely planted fossils 
is empirically equivalent to Darwinian evolution, and quite another thing to say that 
creationism and Darwinism have equal support.317 
 That the case for underdetermination is always relative to a specific model of 
rationality sits rather uneasy with the famous symmetry thesis, which prescribes (among 
other things) that the explanation of scientific belief should be independent of the rationality 
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of the studied schools, persons, or decisions.318 However, it may be that the 
underdetermination argument mainly serves to show the insufficiency of rationalist 
accounts of scientific development, and can be dispensed with once these have been refuted.  
 I take it that Bloor wants to argue that no model of rationality succeeds in avoiding 
the problem of underdetermination; reality in combination with any model of rationality 
underdetermines what scientists say or think about reality. I also think that this is a strong 
case: indeed, scientific theory formation is, in practice, not an algorithmic process.319 Even 
though I am slightly more hesitant than Bloor in excluding even the conceptual possibility 
of an ideal model of rationality that completely determines theory choice given certain input, 
this is, in the current context, a moot point. After all, if we would discover such a model, it 
would not be of help in our causal explanation of past science (see the argument in sections 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3).  
 What can be of explanatory value is human dispositions in the past, some of which 
may, pragmatically speaking, be called rational; but Bloor is certainly right if he maintains 
that reality in combination with common dispositions underdetermines theory choice. We 
should not believe, he argues, that some belief systems depend on a systematic disturbing of 
our natural reasoning capacities; rather, “the empirical evidence suggests that all 
institutionalized systems of belief are compatible with plausible models of natural 
rationality”.320 Or elsewhere: “the historical literature on scientific controversy typically 
shows neither side compromising on what we may assume to be their natural reasoning 
propensities.”321 Comparing British and German communities of experts on aerodynamics, 
Bloor concludes that “British and German experts did not diverge because their basic 
cognitive faculties differed or because their personalities were different or because one 
group engaged with the material world while the other turned its back on it.”322 
 Indeed. However, it is unclear how these plausible formulations of the 
underdetermination problem could support NN. After all, the question here is not whether 
under some relevant model of rationality, the same evidence lends equal support to more 
than one theory, but the entirely different question whether under some relevant model of 
rationality, all conceivable alternative evidence would have lent the same support to the 
same theories.323 The question is counterfactual: if the actual evidence supports a certain set 
of theories to a certain extent, but other evidence would not, then the fact that we have this 
evidence matters to the explanation of theory choice even if it does not determine which of 
these theories is chosen. 
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 An argument for NN based on the underdetermination thesis would need to 
maintain that on any model of rationality, it holds for all theories that for any evidence, 
these theories and at least some of their alternatives are supported equally well. I know of 
no defenses of this thesis. We do not need to be inevitabilists about the content of science – 
not even normative inevitabilists in the sense of section 4.2.3 – in order to believe that 
evidence from nature influences our beliefs about nature.  
 
5.2.3 The Second Argument: Nature Dropping Out 
Given his repeated insistence that sociological approaches to science need to be in harmony 
with the assumption of a common structured external environment that impinges on our 
senses, Bloor would probably grant this point. The implied suggestion of this insistence, 
after all, is that this environment cannot be ‘thought away’ without consequence. Bloor has 
explicitly stated that non-social nature plays a role in belief formation.324 Bloor would then 
go on, however, by saying that this does not undermine NN, because even though non-
social nature plays a role in belief formation, this does not mean that it should play a role in 
the explanation of belief formation (which is what NN is about). That it does not, according 
to Bloor, is precisely for the reason that he is speaking of a common external environment. 
 Bloor has made this point in an argument against Bruno Latour: 
 
If we believe, as most of us do believe, that Millikan got it basically right, it will follow that 
we also believe that electrons, as part of the world Millikan described, did play a causal role 
in making him believe in, and talk about, electrons. But then we have to remember that (on 
such a scenario) electrons will also have played their part in making sure that Millikan’s 
contemporary and opponent, Felix Ehrenhaft, didn’t believe in electrons. Once we realise this, 
then there is a sense in which the electron ‘itself’ drops out of the story because it is a 
common factor behind two different responses, and it is the cause of the difference that 
interests us.325 
 
The argument is not that nature isn’t there or that it is idle, but that the relations between 
different societies and nature are symmetrical, and that the symmetry-breaking factors 
reside in these societies, not in nature. The existence of a heliocentric solar system does not 
explain the triumph of heliocentrism, precisely because this solar system was there when 
geocentrism reigned as well. 
 The problem is that Bloor’s reasoning fails to take into account those cases in which 
differences between societies lead to differences in their relation to nature – for this remains 
possible even if we grant to Bloor that “all cultures are equally near to nature”.326 It may rain 
for both of us, yet I may get wet and you may not, because you happen to have brought an 
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umbrella. The difference between us is that you have brought an umbrella and I have not, 
but this does not mean that it wasn’t the rain that got me wet. 
 Nick Tosh and Tim Lewens have independently made this point against Bloor. 
Tosh gives the example of bacteria which are exposed to heat, some of which have a thick 
cell wall and some of which a thin one. If some bacteria die and some don’t, the crucial 
variable may turn out to be the thickness of the cell wall, but the heating does not become 
irrelevant, and the crucial variable is crucial precisely because it determines the nature of 
interaction with a common external factor.327  
Lewens uses the example of Jim who meets Bigfoot in a cave and John who does 
not: Bigfoot does play a role in Jim’s belief in Bigfoot, but not in John’s lack of belief in 
Bigfoot. By analogy, Lewens says that:  
 
in many cases, if we want to explain contrasts in belief, it will be appropriate to look to what 
parts of the world the different scientists are exposed to, and sometimes it will be appropriate 
to say that a salient difference is that scientist A is affected by an object that is part of the 
content of A’s belief that P, while scientist B, who believes not-P, is not affected by that object, 
or has a very different kind of encounter with the object.328 
 
Bloor himself has not responded to Tosh and Lewens, but Jeff Kochan has objected that their 
arguments fail to take account of the contrastive nature of explanation.329 For instance, that 
Jim believes that Bigfoot is in the cave rather than his mother is not explained by the simple 
fact that Bigfoot is in the cave; it is explained by the fact that Bigfoot is in the cave rather 
than Jim’s mother. Similarly, the question is not why Millikan believed in electrons 
simpliciter, but why he believed in electrons rather than in sub-electrons. 
 The point about the contrastive nature of explanation is well taken. However, it 
does not support Bloor’s argument. If it would, it should be based on an example building 
on common external factors and contrasting social factors. If I want to explain why I got wet 
and you did not rather than the other way round, the answer cannot be simply: “because it 
rained”. In this case, the answer is: “because I refused to bring an umbrella and you did not.” 
Similarly, if I want to explain why a certain belief was held by one person or society but not 
another, the answer cannot be only a factor that is common to both. Thus, when I want to 
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explain why Millikan believed in electrons and Ehrenhaft did not rather than the other way 
round, the answer cannot be: “because there are electrons”. 
 But as Kochan’s own example suffices to show, we can ask interesting explanatory 
questions about beliefs that are contrastive but whose foils have nothing to do with social 
circumstances. If I ask why I got wet rather than not wet, the answer “because it rained 
rather than not rained” is a valid answer, while this same answer is not a valid answer to the 
question why you stayed dry rather than getting wet. “Why did Millikan believe in 
electrons rather than sub-electrons” is precisely such a question, and the answer might well 
be: “because the universe contains electrons rather than sub-electrons”. There is no reason 
why either the rain or the electrons would ‘drop out’ of every story, as NN would require.  
 
5.2.4 The Third Argument: The Social Determination of Classification 
Bloor’s third argument for NN builds on a Durkheimian view of the relation between 
society and nature, which can be summarized in the claim that the classification of things 
reproduces the classification of men.330 
 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, in their text on ‘primitive forms of 
classification’, emphasize that our categories are not handed to us by the world itself or by 
natural mental necessity. Therefore, we must ask ourselves what leads people to arrange 
their ideas in the way they do.331 In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim also 
emphasizes the insufficiency of classical empiricism and Kantian apriorism: “the categories 
of human thought are never fixed in a definite form; they are ceaselessly made, unmade, 
and remade”.332 In line with Durkheim’s conclusions, Bloor wants to demonstrate that if our 
categories come neither from the world nor from reason, they come from society. 
 He justifies this by making use of Mary Hesse’s reception of the work of Duhem 
and Quine. He claims that “knowledge is organic, and the organization of the whole takes 
precedence over the parts, overseeing their adjustment and correction”, and that “the 
organization of the classificatory system is not, and cannot be, determined by the way the 
world is.”333 The first of these claims corresponds roughly to Quine’s unmasking of the 
second dogma in his ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, and his insistence that our statements 
are not confronted with the tribunal of sense experience individually, but as a corporate 
body.334 
 According to Bloor, types in a classification are related by laws – “fire is hot”, 
“wood floats”. These laws can be thought of as the co-presence or co-absence of features of 
the world, but also as conventions which “belong more to the public domain than to the 
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psyche of the individual learner.”335 These laws form networks, and it is these networks that 
we bring to our experience. For instance, a system according to which animals that suckle 
their young are mammals, mammals are a sub-group of land-animals, and everything in the 
sea is a fish, may be confronted with the existence of whales. Now, similarity relations in 
experience cannot decide for us how to modify our initial network.336 In principle, “all the 
elements of [a] network of classification are equally open to negotiation.”337 
 We can see the point: we can retain either of our previous laws by abandoning 
either of the others. An obvious objection is that the confrontation with young-suckling 
water animals itself is clearly something from the side of nature. It seems both Quine and 
Bloor have no trouble admitting this, and Quine even says in Word and Object that:  
 
we can investigate the world, and man as a part of it, and thus find out what cues he could 
have of what goes on around him. Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man’s net 
contribution as the difference. This difference marks the extent of man’s conceptual 
sovereignty – the domain within which he can revise his theory while saving the data.338 
 
In fact, this quote seems in outright contradiction to NN. Bloor, too, says that “the network 
is not a free-floating system of thought. Classificatory decisions are made with reference to 
the world and in the light of experience.”339 
 However, this relation to the world is not one of correspondence, but of adaptation, 
which is a looser relation: “we are used to the idea that there is more than one way of being 
adapted to the world.”340 Importantly, it is a relation that does not imply that belief is fixated 
by reality alone. Rather, the stability of a system of knowledge comes “entirely from the 
collective decisions of its creators and users.”341 Bloor follows Mary Douglas in believing 
that nature is always put to social use in attempts at control: the coherence of networks of 
laws derives from social interests.342 
 Nature disappears from this picture not because it does not matter, but because its 
structuring is subsumed completely by the structuring of the social world. Durkheim 
emphasizes that since society is part of nature, the fact that ideas are constructed out of 
social elements does not mean “that they are devoid of all objective value”, and in fact 
means rather the opposite.343 Bloor echoes this view when he says that “it is perfectly 
possible for systems of knowledge to reflect society and be addressed to the natural world at 
                                                     
335 Bloor (1982, 272). 
336 Bloor (1982, 273-274). 
337 Bloor (1982, 277). 
338 Quine (1960, 5). 
339 Bloor (1982, 278). 
340 Bloor (1982, 278). 
341 Bloor (1982, 279-280). 
342 See Woolgar (1981) for a criticism of interests as resources for sociological explanations of science.  
343 Durkheim (1912) 1995, 18-19. 
 
5.2 David Bloor’s Realism | 81 
the same time.”344 Though strictly speaking, nature enters the picture somewhere, the point of 
NN turns out not to be that nature does not matter, but that our understanding of it does not 
add any information to our explanations of why societies believe about nature what they do. 
 Bloor illustrates his view with an example that reminds strongly of Hessen’s 
interpretation of Newtonian mechanism (see section 4.4.2). In Robert Boyle’s time, Bloor 
says, matter represents the people and is therefore seen as inert and incapable of self-
organization, whereas the active principle and force that stands above matter represents the 
Anglican Church.345 Though discomfortingly simplistic, this example illustrates how Bloor 
believes interests determine the representation of nature.  
Particularly, it illustrates that it is current interests that determine this 
representation. This is to be expected, since if this requirement is relinquished, the current 
social order does not completely explain current science. But how plausible is this 
‘synchronic’ view of the relation between society and science? Cannot representations of 
nature manifest some degree of inertia relative to developments in those social interests, or 
be ‘transplanted’ in other societies of whose particular interests they are not a direct 
product?346 Ernan McMullin has argued against Bloor that “the spiral structure of the DNA 
molecule is not in any interesting sense a product of mid-twentieth-century British culture: 
it is a product rather of a centuries-long effort spanning many cultures of the most widely 
diverse sort”.347  
What is at stake here is not just the competition between social and rationalistic 
explanation, but also that between synchronic and diachronic explanation. One thing that 
distinguishes a historical from a sociological view of science is precisely the idea that the 
science of a certain time cannot be adequately understood if we take into consideration only 
this particular time and place.  
However, Bloor can offer theoretical support for his idea that society must always 
be directly involved in the determination of scientific practice, and that it is impossible even 
in theory to escape a synchronic logic of social interests. This support lies in his 
interpretation of Wittgensteinian meaning finitism.  
  
5.2.5 The Third Argument Continued: Meaning Finitism and Social Pattern Matching 
When does it mean to do something because a rule demands it? When we extend a series of 
multiples of 2 (‘2, 4, 6, 8 …’), what is it that compels us to fill in the right numbers – or what 
defines the right numbers anyway? The ‘finitism’ that Bloor embraces states that we are 
taught rules by means of a finite number of concrete cases, that our consciousness itself is 
finite, and that there is no way of overcoming the finite nature of our resulting 
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understanding.348 This means that what we have ‘in mind’ cannot suffice to decide what the 
rule demands in the infinite number of cases to which it could possibly be applied.  
 The rules ‘themselves’ do not compel us; “and yet we constantly speak as if we are 
compelled by some reality outside us.” This is indeed the case, but what compels us is 
society: “we are only compelled by rules in so far as we, collectively, compel one another.”349 
This may be puzzling: if nothing can bridge the gap between the finite nature of our rule-
following practices and the potentially infinite scope of our rule application, then why 
would society form the exception?350  
In fact, Bloor recognizes that society does not overcome meaning finitism, but as a 
partial answer to this objection may count the idea that correct rule-following is not merely 
enforced by society, but defined – and that in this regard, society is omnipotent, because it is 
unthinkable for any other entity to define correct rule-following. Being ‘wrong’ simply 
means being deviant.351  
This adds up to the case that society as a whole is always directly present 
whenever we follow a rule in science. Two main lines of opposition to Bloor’s argument 
from meaning finitism can be identified: one on the basis of an argument that there is no gap 
between rules and their application, and one concerning Bloor’s account of the relation 
between nature and social institutions. 
 As for the first objection, Michael Lynch has argued against Bloor that it does not 
do to isolate the formulation of the rule from the practice that is formulated by that rule; 
these things have an ‘internal’ relation, and there simply is no rule for counting by twos 
“aside from the organized practices that ‘extend’ it to new cases”.352 And without such a gap 
between rule and practice, there is no underdetermination that needs to be filled with social 
interests or other sociological categories.353  
 In Bloor’s eyes, this ignores the point of finitism, which is precisely that: 
 
each application of a rule is in principle problematic. […] In principle each application of a 
rule is negotiable, and the negotiation (or lack of it) is intelligible in terms of the dispositions 
and interests of the rule followers themselves.354 
 
It is not entirely clear that we need to go along with Bloor’s opinion that new applications 
are always problematic. From an everyday perspective, for instance, counting is not a matter 
of problematic negotiation.355 Moreover, our practice will always correspond to the same 
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rule if the formulation and the application of the rule are not distinct. Nonetheless, even if 
we identify rules as practices, this simply shifts the problem to the question of what sustains 
these practices in our community. In this respect at least, Bloor’s attempt to get ‘beyond’ the 
rules to the social interests that constitute or sustain them, seems legitimate. We can ask the 
question in virtue of what (kind of) thing rules in science are what they are.356 
 A second objection against Bloor’s arguments is based on the role that society plays 
in his account, and its implausible relation to nature. The previous section should have 
immunized us to a too simplistic reading of Bloor in which the power of society, because it 
is complete, is also arbitrary. Bloor is a realist about ‘natural kinds’, things that “have an 
existence independent of our regard”.357 Trees, pebbles and molecules are different in this 
respect from coins and monarchs, which Bloor sees as ‘social kinds’ in the sense that they 
exist in virtue of individual dispositions and relations that refer to each other, and that from 
the perspective of society as a whole are aptly called ‘self-referring’. 
 Now, why would we, in the study of knowledge of natural kinds, pay attention 
only to its self-referential component and not to its representational aspects?358 The reason is 
that only the former can deliver measures of normativity. If we had only individual ‘pattern-
matching’ processes – that applied the label ‘dog’ to dogs, for example, on the basis of 
resemblance to internal (psychological) patterns – there would be no meaning to claims that 
this pattern-matching had been done rightly or wrongly. With only external reality to keep 
the pattern-matching ‘machines’ on track, their results will inevitably diverge. (Given 
Bloor’s meaning finitism, we can understand this point.) Only when there are more of these 
pattern-matching ‘machines’ interacting can the social fact of consensus arise.359 It is this 
social fact that is of interest here. 
 Stephen Kemp has argued that Bloor’s solution is shaky: there are non-social 
criteria for pattern-matching, while communities can themselves be unstable and thereby 
fail to guarantee the stability of the pattern-matching process.360 Bloor agrees that the group 
as a whole is in the same position as the individual, but that it does provide norms to the 
individual that the process of pattern-matching does not generate on its own.361 
 This is all very well, but it does not add up to a defense of NN. Bloor could never 
maintain that social processes alone are enough to stabilize beliefs, and in fact, he has 
dropped enough hints that, in fact, he is not looking to defend this idea. If we want to 
explain that a bunch of interacting pattern-matching machines call something a ‘dog’ rather 
than a ‘cat’, we will – and this is an important insight for the determined defense of which 
Bloor deserves credit – we will need to refer to social processes and consensus formation, 
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because otherwise it is hard to explain why the pattern-matching machines operate with the 
same categories, given that things in nature do not come labeled, and given that the pattern-
matching machines do not contain those labels a priori; but, given that our pattern-matching 
machines have disciplined each other into ordering things into dogs and cats, the fact that 
they identify something as a dog rather than a cat must have something to do with what they 
have in front of them. In the end, our speech is held together not just by the social world but 
also by reality. 
There may be reasons to ignore this fact. That is, we may want to explain why 
something is called a ‘dog’, regardless of what it is. That, however, is Collins’ position, not 
Bloor’s; Bloor’s position turns out to be, in fact, not that “there is […] no need to try to 
explain stability by appealing to truth or reality”362 – his arguments do no work to prove 
that point, and in fact most of his statements go in another direction, in which an appeal to 
reality is always implicit, but is simply regarded as less interesting than the social processes 
that guide our relations to reality. To reiterate an earlier analogy: Bloor is careful not to 
claim that the rain doesn’t matter to our getting wet or not; rather, he tries to acknowledge 
the weather as summarily as possible, and then go on to study our umbrellas or other ways 
to cope with the weather. All the explanatory weight is then put on those umbrellas; the rain 
‘drops out’.  
 There is nothing against paying special attention to social processes, especially if 
this is seen as a necessary corrective to earlier approaches; but in the extent to which Bloor 
does this, it means that, as Kemp has also noticed, “Bloor cannot provide an adequate way 
of linking scientific concepts and the natural world”.363 Consider the case of someone trying 
to understand the usage of different kinds of umbrellas and jackets, not taking into account 
the fact that all these things have something to do with the rain. The awkwardness of Bloor’s 
position is that he notes the rain and is commonsensical enough to see (and repeatedly 
affirm) that of course the rain is there and that of course it matters, but that he still wants to 
avoid having the wetness of rain do any explanatory work.  
 
5.2.6 Bloor on the Hermeneutic Circle 
Seeing that Bloor’s arguments concerning meaning finitism do not in fact support NN also 
helps in clarifying what we observed earlier (section 5.2.4), namely that Bloor seems to 
assume that society always needs to be immediately present.  
 In some sense, this is an oversimplification of his position, since current social 
interests and the ways in which they manifest themselves in society could very well carry 
the weight of the past; Bloor considers historical institutions such as ‘convention’ and 
‘tradition’ to be relevant. However, what Bloor has in common with most of the 
inevitabilists discussed in chapter 4, such as Koyré or Bernal, is that he considers what is 
accumulated in tradition to be distinct from or even opposed to what comes from nature. 
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 To illustrate this point, let us consider Bloor’s 17th-century example again. If 
representations of nature in the 17th century depend on social interests in the distinction 
between an active spiritual elite and a passive population, these interests themselves may be 
a result of a particular historical path. However, there is no hint that in order to understand 
17th-century dealings with nature, we need to refer to, for instance, 16th-century dealings 
with nature ‘as such’. Thus, saying that our classifications are completely social, though 
correct in some senses, can work to downplay the fact that they stand in a line of attempts to 
understand the world. 16th-century natural philosophy was about something – though what 
it was about may have changed shape and will have been conceptualized in different ways 
between centuries. Whatever it was about may have influenced its content and development. 
Embracing NN means denying this in practice, and many of Bloor’s remarks are in this 
spirit.  
 A more promising perspective is also worth mentioning, however. In a book 
written together with Barry Barnes and John Henry, Bloor includes a chapter on 
‘interpretation’: studying Millikan’s oil-drop experiment, Barnes, Henry and Bloor invoke 
the notion of interpretation mediated by tradition in order to bridge the gap between 
experiment and theory.364 They characterize Millikan’s position as being in a ‘hermeneutic 
circle’: “his experimental data are his fragments. The whole document is the unknown 
reality that underlies and produces them.”365 
 Understandably, the authors employ this notion to focus on the local interpretive 
tradition that explains how Millikan selects and explains his results; they have a point to 
make against the idea that Millikan’s procedures can be explained by their own rationality 
or rightness.366 But their metaphor may well be used to make a further step, beyond their 
own argument that we should focus on the social aspects of scientific belief formation. After 
all, a hermeneutic circle crucially depends on a response from what you are trying to 
interpret: we are talking not just about society imposing categories on nature, but about 
nature ‘responding’ to society’s attempts to deal with it as well. 
 Indeed, how nature can respond is not independent of the ways in which society 
deals with it; but precisely for this reason – precisely because nature’s contribution is not 
uniform and independent – we ought to regard it as entangled in the history leading to the 
outcomes that we try to explain historically, not disconnected from it either in reality or in 
our explanations. Bloor, Barnes and Henry do not deny this,367 but their explicit call for 
attention to social factors rather than reality is not of much help in formulating an adequate 
formulation of this hermeneutical perspective.  
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5.3 Harry Collins’ Relativism 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Harry Collins has unambiguously endorsed NN. For example, he finds himself “refusing to 
put any demands at all upon reality to circumscribe possible individual belief”,368 and says 
that we must “treat the natural world as though it in no way constrains what is believed to 
be.”369 Some of his arguments for this position are the same as Bloor’s, which have already 
been discussed in the previous section; but others are related to Collins’ particular position 
in science studies debates.  
 Collins sometimes seems to take a constructivist view on (truth about) nature, 
where he says that the theory of relativity is true, “but it was a truth brought about by 
agreement to agree about new things. It was not a truth forced on us by the inexorable logic 
of a set of crucial experiments.”370 The idea that either truth is forced on us by experiments 
or reality does not matter at all would be a false dichotomy, to be sure; but we need to see 
this and similar statements of Collins within the context of a polemical argument against 
rationalism.371 The point is that there is no scientific method which unambiguously tells 
scientists what they ought to believe. 
 There are other ways in which Collins rhetorically tries to make room for social 
factors against what we have called nature-based inevitabilism: 
 
If the answer does not lie in recalcitrant Nature, and throughout this book we have suggested 
that Nature imposes much less of a constraint than we usually imagine, this leaves scientific 
culture. Science works the way it does, not because of any absolute constraint from Nature, 
but because we make our science the way that we do.372 
 
Collins’ notion of the ‘experimenter’s regress’ serves precisely this argument: by showing 
that theories and accepted experimental results consistently underdetermine each other, he 
makes room for social factors. This may be a point well worth making; however, we have 
already seen (section 5.2.2) that the argument from underdetermination does not support 
NN. Positively making room for social factors in a zero-sum game with natural factors can 
only go so far. 
 
5.3.2 The Fourth Argument, Step 1: Methodological Relativism 
However, Collins has another reason than underdetermination or the experimenter’s regress 
for looking at social factors alone, and that is methodological relativism. This is:  
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little more than the scientific prescription to investigate one cause at a time by holding 
everything else constant. In this case, where the science is contentious, we hold the science 
constant (treat it as a not-causally contributing variable), and concentrate on the social 
variables.373  
 
Or, even shorter, it comes down to: “deliberately averting the gaze from scientific arguments 
so as to investigate the social relations of the science more assiduously.”374 
  This point is not metaphysical but methodological: it is just good practice not to 
look at ‘scientific arguments’. One remark that we need to make here is that it would be 
somewhat disappointing if the scope of Collins’s ‘Empirical Programme Of Relativism’ 
(abbreviated to ‘EPOR’) indeed needs to draw on a consensus about what counts as 
‘scientific’. That it needs to do this is suggested by what Collins says are the ‘three stages’ of 
EPOR:375 first, “establishment of the extent to which experimental results allow 
‘interpretative flexibility’”;376 second, “analysis of the way the potentially ever-ramifying 
tree of scientific potential is closed down in particular cases by forces outside those that are 
normally considered ‘scientific’”; third, looking at “the way that wider social forces 
influence the mechanisms of closure”.377 Why the interest in whether forces are ‘normally’ 
considered scientific or not? Why is the part of the causal chain that EPOR allows us to look 
at determined by a contingent demarcation of what causes are scientific and what causes are 
unscientific?  
 Is this nitpicking? The controversy between SSK as represented by Bloor and Larry 
Laudan was precisely about the question whether it was acceptable to distinguish between 
rational and non-rational motives for scientific decisions, and deal with the non-rational 
motives in a different way than with the rational motives378 – Laudan would not equate this 
distinction with scientific versus non-scientific, of course, because he thought the 
demarcation problem to be a non-issue.379 If we take Collins’s words seriously, he needs to 
engage not just Laudan on the question whether it is meaningful to draw a distinction 
between scientific and non-scientific forces, but also Bloor on the question whether this 
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distinction could legitimately result in different research interests, the EPOR approach 
apparently applying to the non-scientific forces rather than the scientific ones.380 
 But perhaps Collins is not so much hinting at different approaches as at different 
areas of competence. That is, give the scientists what is theirs – nature – and the sociologists 
what is theirs – science as a social phenomenon. With regard to nature, Collins says that 
“outside of scientific Marxism, no social scientist would expect sociology to tell us the 
proper apperception of nature. When we talk of access to knowledge of nature we must 
mean access through the sciences.”381 Scientists are our authorities with respect to nature, 
then. Apart from experts on nature, however, we have experts on society; and science, as a 
part of society, falls in their domain – natural scientists do not study science; sociologists, 
anthropologists and historians do that, and since they are not the experts on nature, they 
should regard nature as invisible. “This means that when the scientist says ‘scallops’ we see 
only scientists saying scallops. We never see scallops scalloping, nor do we see scallops 
controlling what scientists say about them.”382 
 I think that this methodological relativism is the strongest argument for NN that 
does not depend on social constructivism, if we understand methodological relativism to 
mean this: refraining from claiming or assuming anything about nature not because it isn’t 
there or because it doesn’t make a difference, but because making claims or assumptions 
about nature is not within our competence as (in Collins’ case) sociologists or (in our case) 
historians.  
 Still, there are two major objections. First, it is not so clear that a demarcation of 
disciplinary competence can legitimately exclude certain causally relevant factors 
categorically from our historical accounts. Does not every historian use information from 
fields that are outside her specialist expertise? Cannot a social historian note a rise in wheat 
prices and give this fact a causally important place in her story about a revolution, even if 
the historical dynamics of wheat prices are strictly in the field of economists or economic 
historians? Surely, we do not expect this social historian to explain the social unrest she is 
writing about without at all referring to wheat prices, or as if the wheat prices in question are 
fictitious, on the basis of the fact that in her capacity she only sees people saying things about 
wheat prices. We have our experts on wheat prices in history, and our social historian is 
allowed to copy what those experts say, and make the connection between those wheat 
prices and the complaints and riots about wheat prices that she writes about.  
 Of course, not all historians would make the same choices about which parts of the 
causal network to include in their stories. Our social historian can choose among a 
multitude of possible stories to tell, among which are:  
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[1] “Wheat prices rose, then people started complaining about wheat prices, then they 
overthrew their local government.” 
[2] “People complained about wheat prices, then they overthrew their local government.” 
 
In the first case, a footnote to the relevant secondary literature on economic history will be in 
order, given that ex hypothesi, our social historian did not study the actual wheat prices 
herself. In the second case, such a reference is not necessary, but the story also provides less 
potentially relevant information. The point is: what is the difference between the first option 
above, and the historian of science who chooses to trace the explanations of what happens in 
science back to (among else) electrons or scallops?383 
 A second objection is that if we agree that science is genuinely about nature, it is 
not so clear that we can understand science coherently without at least an implicit reliance 
on its supposed relations to nature. In the next section, we will revisit an older case that is 
analogous to this one. 
 
5.3.3 Is Nature ‘Quite Another Matter’? Ernest Gellner on Social and Biological Kinship 
The question whether it is at all possible to study society while suspending beliefs about 
nature was a major issue in a short controversy in Philosophy of Science more than half a 
century ago. 
 In 1957, Ernest Gellner published a short paper on a proposal for unambiguous 
naming on the basis of biological kinship, in which he rather summarily noted that kinship 
structure could refer both to biological kinship, and to the correlation of social roles with 
biological kinship.384 This triggered an irritated response by social anthropologist Rodney 
Needham, summarized by the claim that “biology is one matter and descent is quite another, 
of a different order.”385 Biological relations were universal, but descent systems in societies 
could be structurally and conceptually very different from these relations. 
 Needham’s position bears an interesting resemblance to Collins’ in accepting the 
authority of science over natural kinship relations while claiming that this did not matter to 
our understanding of social claims about kinship relations. Collins, too, effectively says that 
nature is one matter and science quite another.  
 Gellner gave an extensive and biting response to Needham’s article, turning round 
precisely this claim that biology was one matter and descent quite another. “What, other 
than at least partial overlap with physical kinship, could conceivably lead a relationship to 
be classified as part of a ‘kinship structure’?”386 Theses about the relative importance of 
kinship relations in some types of societies would become vacuous if the identification of 
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these relations bore no relation to physical kinship. Of course, social genealogies or kinship 
beliefs could diverge from physical kinship relations, but without some regular relation to 
these they could not qualify as a descent system at all. 
 Translating again to the study of science, we can say with Gellner that something 
that does not have anything to do with nature cannot be recognized as natural science, and 
that therefore, if we genuinely drop all presuppositions about what nature looks like, we 
cannot recognize natural science in history. We recognize both Ptolemy’s Almagest and 
Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus as being (among other things) about our solar system and 
about the night sky. This does not entail that either of these texts simply represents the solar 
system or that it cannot diverge from our understanding of this solar system – in this sense, 
nature is indeed one matter and science quite another. But it does mean that we recognize 
what Ptolemy and Copernicus are writing about partly because of our own beliefs about the 
solar system and the night sky (and, in this case, because of a historical connection between 
us and the text, which Gellner – imagining the anthropologist to be in some situation of 
radical translation – can ignore here). 
 The controversy developed further when another social anthropologist, John 
Barnes, added a distinction between the pater – the social father – and the genitor – the 
person supposed to have conceived the child. The identification of the latter depended on 
theories of procreation which themselves differed between societies. The genetic father and 
the “culturally-defined physical father” were therefore also distinct, and the interesting 
disparities were between culturally defined physical kinship and social kinship, rather than 
genetic and social kinship.387  
Gellner was unconvinced (though on this particular point it seems he and Barnes 
talked past rather than disagreed with each other),388 and reiterated his point that we could 
not identify brothers in societies without presupposing our own biological notion of 
brotherhood. He generalized this to a point about the functions and interdependence of 
social institutions, which would become inexplicable if the relation to physical reality was 
lost: 
 
Physical reality (including biological aspects of man) provides the milieu, the obstacles as it 
were, within which social life goes on. […] Many anthropological explanations presuppose 
physical facts in this manner, by showing how a practice or institution operates in the 
physical world and helps solve a problem set by that world. […] The assumption of the 
validity of the Western view of nature may or may not be justified, and it may be a piece of 
arrogant hubris: this question I do not propose to discuss. What is certain is that as 
anthropology is actually practiced this assumption is in fact made, and must be made.389 
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This is as far as the analogy goes; Gellner does not extend his point to the study of scientific 
belief itself. Nonetheless, at first sight there seems to be no reason why Gellner’s general 
point – that if we study social institutions that regularly interact with natural relations, then 
suspending all our beliefs about these natural relations will render us less capable of 
understanding and even identifying those institutions – would not hold for science as well. 
  
5.3.4 The Fourth Argument, Step 2: The Circularity Argument 
To reiterate, we have collected two arguments against Collins’ methodological relativism: 
one is that there seems to be no general rule against using in our explanations knowledge 
that is strictly outside our field of expertise; the other is that it is a priori unlikely that we can 
understand science as a social institution without taking into account its relation to nature.  
However, these objections fail to take into account the complicating factor that in 
the case of history of science, what we try to explain is authoritative knowledge in our own 
society. In this specific case, matters look different, because assuming, even implicitly, the 
authority of science in explaining this same science seems circular, in a way that assuming 
external knowledge about wheat prices as a social historian (5.3.2) or assuming biological 
knowledge when studying kinship structures (5.3.3) is not. 
Indeed, Collins sees avoidance of circularity as a strong motive behind the ‘new 
way’ of looking at science that developed in the 1970s of which he was a part: 
 
One of the features of the ‘new way’ was that scientific conclusions were to be explained, and 
this meant they could not figure as explanations. The analyst had to ignore the scientific facts 
of the matter on pain of producing a circular argument: ‘This truth came to be established 
because it was true.’ Scientific truth had to drop out of the explanatory equation if the new 
way was to make sense.390 
 
The case for methodological relativism is especially strong in history of science, then, 
because of the problem of circularity. 
It may not be self-evident what precisely the vicious nature of this supposed 
circularity is. To the extent that it simply consists in believing that the explanans occurred 
because the explanandum occurred – that a bridge must have been defective because it 
collapsed, or that opium must have a virtus dormitiva because it makes us sleepy – it is 
certainly not vicious.391 For instance, we can believe that a comet passing earth explains 
some aspects of the historical fact that observers talked about a comet passing earth, even if 
these historical observers are our main source for this comet. What is special about the 
history of science is that the possibility is explicitly on the table that the very beliefs we 
assume when we causally relate a fact in a historical source to a fact in nature may be 
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historically contingent, in the sense that we could have held other causal beliefs, and that 
our actual beliefs depend precisely on what we try to explain. This is an interesting problem, 
which we will unpack in the remainder of this section. 
 Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that our own beliefs actually depend 
directly on the episode in the history of science we are writing the history of. We can also 
write an account of beliefs that are historically independent of our own. Even if we are 
writing the history of an episode in the history of science that is causally relevant to our own 
beliefs, our beliefs may be overdetermined in such a way that if that episode had not taken 
place, we would still have believed the same. (This is why we saw in section 3.4 that some 
scholars found it easier to condone Whiggish presentism on matters about which they were 
inevitabilists.) For example, the Galileo controversy may be a causally relevant part of the 
history of our beliefs about the solar system, but our rejection of geocentrism may have so 
many grounds, of which so many are independent of the outcome of the 17th-century 
controversy, that we can assume it without fear of circularity.  
 On the other hand, there may also be cases where our current beliefs can plausibly 
be regarded as a direct outcome of a particular controversy. In the relatively recent 
controversies of manageable size that Collins has studied, the historian of science may be 
regarded as being in this predicament. Even in that case, however, we should distinguish 
the issue of circularity from the much more straightforward issue of uncertainty. Perhaps 
we would like, as outsiders to the scientific controversy, to hedge our bets on the reliability 
of a tentative scientific consensus about, say, gravity waves, because we judge that this 
consensus is not yet robust enough. In that case, we ascribe to ourselves a kind of ‘meta-
expertise’ that allows us to make this kind of judgments. The point is that suspending our 
judgment about particular scientific claims will decrease our readiness to assume the 
reliability of these beliefs in our history-writing as well, independently of considerations 
about circularity (and independently of NN).  
 The influence of historical and sociological studies of science upon our ‘meta-
judgments’ is one way in which these studies are hermeneutically relevant. Their influence 
may consist, for instance, in increasing awareness of the many (kinds of) factors that are 
involved in the creation of scientific consensus: to a large extent, our awareness that 
scientific consensus is not the inevitable result of evidence and rationality is itself the result 
of historical knowledge. Thus, insights in the history of science may make us more skeptical 
of the objectivity of scientific results. In other cases, we may have been skeptics at the outset, 
but learn things about belief-forming processes in science that make us reconsider our 
skepticism. Generally speaking, we cannot know a priori how the next thing we learn about 
science in history will relate to our prejudices; and of course, this depends on what 
prejudices we hold as much as it does on the case we study.  
In this sense there is a hermeneutic circularity at play, a dialogical interaction 
between what we believe we know about science, and what we can learn from its history. 
But this interaction can take place only if our actual beliefs about science – for instance, that 
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it reliably teaches us things about the world – are part of it. As Philipp Pettit argued, the 
claims of the Strong Programme are much more exciting if we interpret them in a “non-
conservative” way, where the findings of the sociologist can be subversive to the beliefs she 
studies.392  
But to repeat: skeptical meta-judgments regarding the reliability of science 
resulting from historical or sociological knowledge have no relation to a general circularity 
argument. The circularity argument remains restricted to those cases in which what we 
believe depends crucially on the history we are studying: we need to believe that it was 
historically possible for this episode to end in such a way that we might have turned out 
believing something different. When we believe this to be the case depends precisely on our 
causal beliefs, including the role that objects of scientific interest have in determining the 
content of those beliefs.  
Two options remain open for the proponent of the argument from circularity, then: 
first, she can maintain in specific cases that our beliefs are path-dependent upon this 
particular case. Second, she can say that even if there are few monograph-sized episodes in 
the history of science that are crucial to our beliefs in this sense, the prescription of 
methodological relativism depends on contingentism not with respect to this local episode, 
but with respect to the history of science as a whole. Our beliefs about the electron may not 
depend crucially on Millikan’s oil drop experiment, or our beliefs about the solar system on 
Galileo’s Discorsi, but both do depend on ‘the whole’ of the history of science, and it is this 
whole that is the proper object of study of our discipline. If the discipline as a whole relies 
on the results of the history it seeks to explain, it commits an error of circularity. Since the 
object of history of natural science is the whole of past investigations of nature, and all our 
knowledge of nature depends on that whole (except if this knowledge is globally inevitable), 
we are to suspend all that knowledge when we study past science, which means that we 
should adhere to NN.  
This argument, while relying on global contingentism with regard to the content of 
natural scientific knowledge, relies on inevitabilism with regard to the boundaries between 
natural science and other authoritative knowledge, and the content of this other knowledge. 
After all, if our knowledge about society or culture depends as much on a previous history 
which is entangled with that of natural science, it is hard to see why we should not on the 
basis of this same argument suspend this knowledge as well. In the following chapters, we 
will encounter perspectives which undermine this inevitabilism.  
Maybe this takes too literally the logical structure of the case for methodological 
relativism, without looking at the agenda behind it: its attempt to break down undesirable 
relations of authority between scientists and the sociologists or historians who study science 
in history. The point seems to be that we would not do a good job studying critically the 
development of scientific theories if our study depended on those theories. All is well if the 
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arrows saying ‘A can speak authoritatively about B’ point from science to nature and from 
science studies to science; but if science studies need to presuppose something about nature, 
they need to presuppose something about a field over which science has the authority, and 
in that case science also has some authority over science studies.  
The circle, then, is that of science and science studies talking about each other 
(science studies about science directly, science about science studies through telling science 
studies what to suppose about nature). This is not a problem for science, which gets its 
indirect authority over science studies at no cost; but it is a problem for science studies, 
similar to that of political journalists who are dependent on politicians for their information 
on the society in which those politicians operate. Criticism requires some kind of 
independence.393 
Making room for criticism is a laudable agenda, but we need to consider the 
question (to which we will return later, see section 6.6) whether this agenda is indeed served 
best by methodological relativism and its adherence to NN.  
 
5.4 Karin Knorr-Cetina’s Constructivism 
5.4.1 The Fifth Argument: Science Constituting Natural Facts 
There is one way of arguing that science is about nature, but that nonetheless science studies’ 
authority over science subsumes the authority of science over nature: that is, if nature itself 
is a construction of science. This argument has been defended most clearly by Karin Knorr-
Cetina, who wants to demonstrate the “active constitution of facticity through science.”394 
 We can imagine this constructivism to be built upon some philosophical idealism 
of a more or less sophisticated kind – an a priori argument for the dependence of the 
physical upon (individual or collective) mental life. Knorr-Cetina does not take this route, 
and pleads rather for a ‘genetic approach’ based on “direct observation of the actual site of 
scientific work (frequently the scientific laboratory).”395 Hers is an “empirical, constructivist 
epistemology”.396 Indeed, the empirical aspects of Knorr-Cetina’s own studies are centered 
upon participant observation.397 Her constructivism is intertwined with her empiricism.  
 After all, the kinds of things that manifest themselves to the observer as relevant to 
the production of science are largely in the realm of locally situated decisions. The observer 
first sees things being regarded as open-ended, uncertain, and subjective. Then scientists do 
things and make decisions in specific local settings, and things end up being (regarded as) 
closed, secure, and objective. This transformation, then, seems to result from their 
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constructive operations.398 Non-constructivist accounts need to appeal to factors that fail to 
manifest themselves in the empirical world of the observer of science: 
 
Even the briefest participation in the world of scientific investigation suggests that the 
language of truth and hypothesis testing (and with it, the descriptivist model of enquiry) is 
ill-equipped to deal with laboratory work. Where in the laboratory, for example, do we find 
the ‘nature’ or ‘reality’ so critical to the descriptivist interpretation?399 
 
Scientists, Knorr-Cetina goes on to say, are not busy with truth but with making things work.  
 There are several things to note about this argument. First, what scientists talk 
about in the lab is not necessarily what science is about. This seems an obvious point, but it 
does lead to the question how we can derive from the fact that scientists in the laboratory 
don’t talk much about truth and faithful description that science is not about those things. A 
Marxist observer such as Hessen could perfectly harmonize his belief that science is at least 
partially about class interests with the observation that scientists do not talk about class 
interests in the laboratory, and that in general class interests are not manifestly visible in the 
laboratory. The point is not just that class interests could be somewhere else rather than in 
the laboratory and that therefore asking the rhetorical question ‘where in the laboratory’ we 
can find them may simply be looking in the wrong place (like asking ‘where in my 
computer’ we can find the internet); it is that they might actually be in the laboratory, but in 
another way than by being mentioned – in ways that you need to be attuned to in order to 
see them. 
 A second point is the choice of the ethnographer of science to restrict herself to 
what is observable to her in the laboratory. In that case, by definition, she does not have 
access to the things ‘behind’ the observable entities in the laboratory that scientists try to 
study – just like an ethnographer witnessing an evangelical church meeting can observe the 
behavior of the churchgoers, but not the entities that, according to the faithful, motivate that 
behavior. Two attitudes towards the status of this restriction are possible. First, that it is a 
local methodological decision, which does not touch upon the question which entities are 
really behind the behavior of the churchgoers or scientists. In this case, however, it is also 
impossible to conclude on empirical grounds that these entities do not play a role. The 
second possible attitude is to say that this restriction is a general imperative, and that we 
should refrain in all contexts from invoking entities not observable by witnesses 
participating in this local context. But in that case, the ethnographer’s account competes 
with ‘believer’s accounts’ concerning what entities count as manifestly present in the local 
context. Where Knorr-Cetina may consider the question where in the laboratory we find 
‘nature’ to have an obvious answer (‘nowhere’), the scientist might consider the opposite 
answer to be just as obvious.  
                                                     
398 Knorr-Cetina (1983a, 122). 
399 Knorr-Cetina (1981, 3). 
96 | Chapter 5: Leaving Nature Out 
  
5.4.2 Fabrication and Adaptation 
Nonetheless, if Knorr-Cetina can show that we can give a plausible account of what happens 
in science and how scientific facts and theories get to be produced, without referring to 
‘nature’ or ‘reality’ (except possibly as something the production of which is also subsumed 
under this explanatory account), this is indeed a strong argument to say that notions of 
nature or reality are, if not meaningless, then at least dispensable when the goal is to explain 
what happens in science.  
In Knorr-Cetina’s argument, then, it is important that “models of success which do 
not require the basic assumptions of objectivism are both thinkable and plausible.”400 She 
gives two examples at this point: that of psychiatrists, who do not need to have descriptively 
adequate explanations of the disorders of their patients in order to be able to treat them 
effectively; and of a mouse which does not need to have an adequate representation of a cat 
in its mind in order to be able to run away from it. “Like the progress of evolution itself, the 
progress of science can be linked to mechanisms which do not assume that knowledge 
mimics nature.”401 
It is important to note here that anti-representationalism is not the same as 
constructivism. With this last quote, Knorr-Cetina is in the good company of Larry Laudan, 
for instance.402 But there are ways other than correspondence in which the content of science 
can be influenced by nature. Like Bloor, Knorr-Cetina explicitly draws on ‘adaptationist’ 
language taken from biological evolution.  
However, this analogy between the fabrication of scientific theories and biological 
evolution works against constructivism.403 Knorr-Cetina’s own analogy of the mouse fleeing 
from the cat already serves to illustrate this. She may be right to say that the mouse has no 
descriptively true theories about the cat or about its current situation in its mind, and yet it 
can behave adaptively and flee from danger. But this characterization of the situation makes 
sense only if the mouse has not ‘constructed’ the cat. In general, the idea that behavior is 
adaptive assumes that there is something that it is adapted to.  
 Is this too quick a dismissal? Is there not a constructivist reading possible of the 
behavior of the mouse? I think the most charitable way of phrasing such a reading would go 
like this: something is going on in the mouse that induces it to flee; that ‘something’ is not 
the cat. If we could enter into the mind of the mouse, then, what we would find there that 
prompted the fleeing would not be a cat but something of the mouse’s own making – much 
like when we enter the laboratory, the things that we find there that prompt scientists to say 
certain things are not ‘nature itself’ but things of their own fabrication.  
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 Still, however, this is not enough to dodge the question: whether if there hadn’t 
been a cat, the mouse would still have fled. If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then the cat 
is causally relevant to the mouse’s fleeing. Even if we can at first sight ignore this fact by 
zooming in just on the mouse, in the end, if we want to understand the difference between a 
fleeing and a resting mouse, we will need to account for external influences. Talking in 
terms of adaption rather than correspondence does not take this away.  
 None of this is to say that it may not happen that two systems – be they mice or 
laboratories – have (for all relevant purposes) identical relations to their environment and 
that they nonetheless respond differently: the presence or absence of the cat may indeed 
underdetermine the behavior of the mouse. Still, especially if we take the evolutionary 
metaphor seriously, the environment may make a crucial difference – though I should add 
that it does not follow from this point that we can fall back to explanations like: “scientist X 
believed theory A because theory A is true.”404 After all, one important point that Knorr-
Cetina has made and that should stay with us for the rest of this study, is that scientists 
make decisions in local contexts – it is not helpful to picture them as being confronted by 
‘nature as such’, let alone with ‘truth’; rather, they deal with rocks, microscopes, other 
scientists, bureaucrats, et cetera.  
 For the same reasons, by the way, they are not confronted by ‘society as such’ – 
SSK-representatives (and especially Bloor) as well as Marxists should pause to consider the 
question how their broader social interests do explanatory work given that they are not 
concrete things that scientists encounter in their daily work – any more than natural laws or 
valid proofs. Indeed, Knorr-Cetina’s sensitivity to the local and the concrete hints at a 
perspective on the study of science that dispenses not just with ‘elevator-words’405 like truth 
and rationality, but also with both Nature and Society as explanatory categories. This is a 
perspective that differs fundamentally from the focus of the current chapter – which is about 
dismissing Nature as an explanatory category for the greater honor and glory of Society – 
and that we will address in the following chapter. 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
We have discussed the following arguments for NN, and can summarize our reasons for 
rejecting them as follows.  
 
A1: Nature underdetermines the content of scientific theories. We have noted that the 
affirmation of underdetermination is not a denial of causal relevance. 
A2: Nature is common to all of us and therefore ‘drops out’ of explanations. We have noted 
that because different actors can have different relations to nature, this argument 
gives no compelling reason not to refer to nature. 
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A3: Neither external reality nor individual minds provide us with the categories we employ to 
study nature, and therefore real explanatory power resides in society. We have noted that 
social institutions are not wholly self-referential. The importance of society does 
not imply that nothing outside it matters to our explanations.  
A4: If historians of science rely on knowledge of nature in their explanations of knowledge of 
nature rather than on their autonomous competence and expertise, their explanations are 
circular. We have seen that in the end, this argument applies only where our 
current scientific knowledge depends on precisely the history that we study, and 
that in this case it also depends on inevitabilism with regard to the delineation of 
scientific knowledge. This is not a definitive rejection of A4, and we will return to 
the problem of circularity in later chapters. 
A5: Nature is the result of social constructions, not its cause. When we looked at an 
advocate of this argument, it soon turned out that it could be made to look coherent 
only if it meant something other than that scientists autonomously created their 
own environment. In a more complex alternative, then, nature cannot be regarded 
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Chapter 6: Bruno Latour and the Co-Fabrication of 
Nature and Society 
 
6.1 Another Kind of Constructivism 
The perspectives in the previous chapter had in common that they explicitly transferred 
explanatory power from nature to society; they were aimed at showing what nature could 
or should not explain in the history of science, and why society should fill the gap. We have 
seen that arguments for this failed. However, it is also possible to reject the very assumption 
of a zero-sum game between natural and social explanation. Bruno Latour has argued 
particularly strongly against the idea that the world is divided into nature and society, or 
that there is an interesting debate to be had about the extent to which explanatory power 
resides on either side of that distinction. 
 In his case, and that of similar approaches such as Andrew Pickering’s, it is still 
strictly true that nature does not play a role in our explanations of scientific development – 
the position that we abbreviated to NN in the previous chapter. From some perspectives, 
then, constructivism in Latour’s sense may be indistinguishable from Bloor’s or Collins’ 
sociologism.406 However, Latour’s position is rather different. Rather than saying that what 
nature does not explain society does, he argues that nature does not explain because it, 
together with society, is the result of what happens in history of science. 
 This is still a kind of constructivism, and one that I should perhaps at the outset 
confess to be unsympathetic to. I believe, for instance, that there was an external world 
already before the history of science, and that it is possible, both in theory and in practice, to 
distinguish between those aspects of the world with which humans have had something to 
do, and those aspects that exist independently of what humans have done. However, while 
being able to retreat to these fortresses of common sense may give me (and my fellow 
intuitive realists) some comfort, it is not so obvious that Latour needs to conquer these 
fortresses. He might just be able to march around them, in which case we will need to 
confront him on more interesting and challenging grounds, and can only hope to succeed in 
extending the safety of our fortress to those outside fields – much like Latour’s laboratory 
scientists do with their favorite places. 
 
6.2 Kayaking over Bridging 
6.2.1 Two Banks, One River 
A metaphor that Latour has used multiple times for what has happened in science studies so 
far is that of a river with the ‘social’ on one bank and the ‘natural’ on the other.407 Too much 
of the debate, in his opinion, has been spilt on choosing between the two banks, or trying to 
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bridge the two banks. Latour describes his position as one not of bridge-building but 
kayaking with the flow of the river.  
 For what kind of mistakes and solutions is this a metaphor? Latour applies his 
point not just to explanations in history of science, but to all cases in which attempts are 
made to identify what is due to nature and what to society. For example, the distinction 
between “guns kill people” and “people kill people” contrasts a materialistic interpretation 
with a sociological one, but both assume that it is clear what is due to people and what is due 
to guns.408 Now, Latour’s point is not just that both guns and people contribute something to 
the outcome, because that would suggest that we could still speak of them as different kinds 
of entities that subsequently come together. That is why ‘bridging’ the two banks is a 
metaphor for what he rejects: the bridge, after all, still departs from both banks, and 
therefore assumes the very division that it seeks to overcome. As Latour says elsewhere:  
 
To distinguish a priori ‘material’ and ‘social’ ties before linking them together again makes 
about as much sense as to account for the dynamic of a battle by imagining a group of 
soldiers and officers stark naked with a huge heap of paraphernalia – tanks, rifles, paperwork, 
uniforms – and then claim that ‘of course there exist[s] some (dialectical) relation between the 
two’. One should retort adamantly ‘No!’ There exists no relation whatsoever between ‘the 
material’ and ‘the social world’, because it is this very division which is a complete artifact.409  
 
The satire works, but we should subject it to some closer scrutiny: why should we say ‘No!’ 
to this? Why couldn’t we think of a battle in terms of people and their materials? That is 
because with that division comes a whole range of associations and expectations about what 
people and objects can and cannot do: that agency,410 intentions,411 and speech412 are 
exclusively human properties;413 that the role of material things is restricted to that of a 
blind force, being a building block that merely supports human ingenuity or exercises a 
‘resistance’414 (and finally, as Latour jokingly adds mainly against David Bloor: proving that 
you are not an idealist).415 Some entities have come to be defined as animal or material, 
others as free; some as conscious, others as mechanical.416 
 These definitions and expectations are not inevitably chiseled into the eternal fabric 
of the universe; they are the result of a history, the marks of a specifically modern 
‘Constitution’ which separates the power to represent things from the power to represent 
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subjects – science from politics.417 (That this Constitution is a historical artefact can be seen 
from the fact that non-Western cultures have never found use for adopting nature as a 
category.418) Latour considers this Constitution to be unfair in multiple ways, and one of 
those ways is that it is unfair to objects. These objects have been wrongly portrayed as 
simply matters of fact, whereas in fact they are “much more interesting, variegated, 
uncertain, complicated, far reaching, heterogeneous, risky, historical, local, material and 
networky than the pathetic version offered for too long by philosophers. Rocks are not 
simply there to be kicked at, desks to be thumped at.”419 
 
6.2.2 Behind the Two Cultures 
Latour’s main objective is, then, to return objects to what he thinks is their proper place: not 
a separate category outside society (that can then be made to relate to society), but an integral 
part of collectives that also contain humans. “You discriminate between the human and the 
inhuman. I do not hold this bias but see only actors”.420 This brings him in conflict with both 
sides of the ‘two cultures’ divide, which in a Latourian diagnosis is a direct reflection of the 
modern Constitution in its complete separation of talking about things from talking about 
humans: scientists want to be free from the suggestion that what they say about nonhuman 
objects has anything to do with human subjectivity or politics; humanists want to protect 
humanity from objectification. Science studies, according to Latour, undermines those 
demarcations. “We tell the scientists that the more connected a science is to the rest of the 
collective, the better it is, the more accurate, the more verifiable, the more solid […] But 
against the other camp, we tell the humanists that the more nonhumans share existence with 
humans, the more humane a collective becomes – and this too runs against what they have 
been trained for years to believe.”421 
Latour takes some time to explain to the humanists that they need not worry: when 
action is redistributed among all parts of the collective rather than reduced to a small 
number of those (i.e. humans), a new form of humanity is gained;422 and when humanists 
“add interpretation of machines to interpretation of texts, their culture will not fall to pieces; 
instead, it will take on added density”.423 Indeed, in my opinion this call for an 
interpretation of the role of material objects in science studies is a great step forward from 
the categorical neglect of them that we have seen advocated in theory in the previous 
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chapter – from the insistence, for example, that we ought not talk about scallops because 
they are not accessible to us (see section 5.3.2). However, are the fears of Latour’s humanist 
opponents not justified; do we not pay for this step forward by taking two steps back, if we 
have to talk about objects as though they share in human intentionality, and to talk about 
humans as though they are simply another part of a network of objects? 
 To be sure, the commonsensical observation that viruses don’t talk to us has not 
escaped Latour’s notice.424 The point is “not to say that scallops have voting power and will 
exercise it, or that door closers are entitled to social benefits and burial rites, but that a 
common vocabulary and a common ontology should be created by crisscrossing the divide 
by borrowing terms from one end to depict the other.”425 ‘Crisscrossing the divide’ looks a 
bit like ‘bridging’, but Latour’s desire not to separate propositions into two ontological 
realms is something that he states on multiple occasions,426 and elsewhere he says that if we 
refuse to distinguish human from natural societies, this does not mean naturalizing human 
societies.427 “Here we begin to see the advantage of kayaking over bridging: naturalization is 
what happens when you try to transport, to transfer the ‘senseless hurrying of matter’ from 
the nature bank to the social or human side. That is when you treat the human with the 
strange notion of primary qualities handed down to you by the already bifurcated nature.”428 
It should be clear that when Latour declares human societies to be nothing special, nothing 
worthy or requiring of ontological distinction, he does so not from a perspective of scientism 
or reductionism: human intentions are not ‘actually only’ brain states or chemical reactions, 
or anything else that is already described by the vocabulary of one or more of the natural 
sciences. Rather, we should find a language in which to talk about all these things. 
 
6.2.3 Initial Problems 
But could this satisfy the humanist historian? Or better: can it be done at all – can a common 
vocabulary be developed that describes the contributions of both humans and nonhumans 
to collectives without a severe loss of information or clarity? I tend to see Latour’s 
commonsensical admission that scallops don’t have voting power as a hint that the answer 
to that question is negative: voting is something that humans do and that scallops don’t. At 
least, that is the way we usually talk about it, and if we want to flatten out this distinction, 
we will either have to make a case that scallops do vote, or a case that humans do not vote, or 
re-describe what scallops and humans do in terms other than voting.429 
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 Latour takes one or more of these strategies at different locations: when he says 
that “in the course of [an] experiment Pasteur and the ferment mutually exchange and 
enhance their properties, Pasteur helping the ferment show its mettle, the ferment ‘helping’ 
Pasteur win one of his many medals”,430 the symmetry in word-choice is intended to show 
that the type of activity attributed to the human actor (Pasteur) can equally well (except for 
the scare quotes) be attributed to the non-human actor (the ferment). Elsewhere, he explains 
a general claim that “speech is no longer a specifically human property, or at least humans 
are no longer its sole masters”.431 What he means is that who speaks in the laboratory is not 
simply the scientist herself – that would be the kind of object-free speech that Latour likes to 
accuse SSK of seeing everywhere – nor simply ‘the facts’; rather, something more complex is 
happening, namely “that lab coats have invented speech prostheses that allow nonhumans to 
participate in the discussions of humans, when humans become perplexed about the participation of 
new entities in collective life.”432  
This is a re-description in which neither humans nor non-humans can speak ‘on 
their own’, and this seems to be more illustrative of the nature of the move that Latour 
wants to make than his attempts to show that what non-humans do can be described in the 
same terms as what humans do (which more often than not require more than a little bit of 
goodwill to swallow): a move that consists in re-describing all activity in such a way that it is 
distributed over all the involved actors. “Purposeful action and intentionality may not be 
properties of objects, but they are not properties of humans either. They are the properties of 
institutions, of apparatuses […]”.433 This is a kind of social holism that brings to mind 
Bloor’s insistence that there are social phenomena – like norms – that by definition cannot be 
localized in individuals;434 but if it is a social holism, it is a social holism with things. Things, 
after all, are to be involved in proper social science, because there is no ‘social stuff’ with 
which they are to be contrasted;435 they can (and have) become part of societies. “Humans, for 
millions of years, have extended their social relations to other actants with which, with 
whom, they have swapped many properties, and with which, with whom, they form 
collectives”.436 
 As an argument about the almost inextricably complex interplay of human and 
non-human causal contributions to developments and outcomes, Latour’s point is well 
taken: indeed, it is impossible to find a human action that does not in some way, however 
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trivially (because obviously), relate to non-human factors. Moreover, even if Latour may not 
have done full justice to SSK perspectives in suggesting that they deny this, I think that his 
point, that because of this near inextricability it is a bad idea to insist on an exclusive focus 
on human factors in science studies (e.g. because only those really matter (Bloor, Knorr-
Cetina) or because that is the only terrain we are competent to say something about 
(Collins)), is to be applauded: history does not allow itself to be split into two domains that 
can be understood in isolation.437 For the history of science, this means that there is not a 
history of thinking about nature that can be understood in isolation from the history of nature. 
If anything, that should be the takeaway of this entire thesis; and to a large extent, Latour 
proves a valuable ally to this cause, in his many examples of how in all circumstances, a 
specific outcome is the result of the influence of many different kinds of entities of which we 
cannot without consequence ‘think away’ the nonhuman ones. 
 However, this is not a sufficient reason to collapse all conceptual distinctions between 
human and nonhuman entities, or to claim of specific kinds of actions that they are 
distributed over different entities in different ways than we usually think. Different things 
happen in different parts of the world at different times, and the things that happen in 
scientists’ brains may best be described with words that we don’t need to describe what 
happens in the rocks they study.  
 This is a rather pragmatic rebuttal, a retreat into the fortress of common sense from 
which I can shout “we don’t have these words for nothing!”. Latour can answer this 
objection from several angles: by noting that it invokes an implicit distinction between 
epistemology and metaphysics (pleading, after all, for a distinction in thought that is not 
there in reality), as if these are separable domains; by noting that it fails to account for the 
constructed status and the historicity of our current ontology; and by noting that it fails to 
suspend our current ontology in order to look more openly to how actors make ontologies 
(and have made our own). These answers need to be dealt with. 
 
6.3 The Construction of Real Things 
6.3.1 Collapsing Nature and Its Representation 
One of the most intriguing aspects of Latour’s thought is his repeated insistence on the co-
production of nature and society.438 Already in Science in action, he summarizes this in two 
of his famous rules of method:  
 
3 Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature’s representation, not its 
consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a 
controversy has been settled. 
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4 Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Society’s stability, we cannot use Society 
to explain how and why a controversy has been settled. We should consider symmetrically 
the efforts to enroll human and non-human resources.439 
 
Both nature and society are the result of certain settlements, then, and not causes to which 
we can appeal. It will be noted that Latour slides from ‘Nature’s representation’ to ‘Nature’ 
here,440 in a way that seems to undermine the logic of his argument: if he does not hold his 
content terms stable, the conclusion certainly does not follow.  
 However, the confusion is not the result of a slip of the tongue or another kind of 
thoughtlessness: Latour believes that, indeed, it is not just representations of nature that are 
the result of a history, but nature itself – and not just in the sense that natural entities evolve 
over time.441 Latour is well aware that his position is counterintuitive, and therefore he 
emphasizes that he indeed means to defend this counterintuitive claim, by explicitly 
rejecting the intuitive alternative that banks on a distinction between one natural world and 
different historically developed representations of that world: 
 
There may be thousands of ways of imagining how kinships bring children into existence, but 
there is only, it is argued, one developmental physiology to explain how babies really grow in 
the womb. There may be thousands of way to design a bridge and to decorate its surface, but 
only one way for gravity to exert its forces. The first multiplicity is the domain of the social 
sciences; the second unity is the purview of natural scientists. […] This is just the solution that 
ANT [Actor-Network Theory] wishes to render untenable. With such a divide between one 
reality and many interpretations, the continuity and commensurability of what we call the 
associations would immediately disappear, since the multiple will run its troubled historical 
course while the unified reality will remain intact, untouched, and remote from any human 
history.442 
 
Elsewhere, Latour summarizes what is wrong with the position he tries to undermine in the 
slogan: “multiculturalism acquires its rights to multiplicity only because it is solidly 
propped up by mononaturalism.”443 It is this ‘mononaturalism’ that has to go, then; and the 
point is not just that what humans do to the world changes it, that human history influences 
the world – if that were the case, “the fact remains that there are two histories, or rather one 
history full of sound and fury that unfolds within a framework that itself has no history, or 
creates no history. Now, this good-sense conception is precisely what we are going to have 
to abandon.”444 No, there is actually a multiplicity of worlds, a ‘pluriverse’;445 and that 
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pluriverse does not consist of worlds that are ‘just there’, but of worlds that are the result of 
the actions of actors. How does this work?  
 
6.3.2 Science and Technology 
The way in which Latour makes this position work, is by attacking the distinction between 
the independence of reality and the work that is done to create that reality. We may, again, 
proceed from an intuitive trade-off between reality and construction, from the idea that we 
can distinguish between what is due to how the world is and what is due to the way in 
which human societies look at that world; under this light, if something is constructed(-by-
subjects) it becomes ipso facto less real (because grounded to a lesser extent in the way the 
world really is). This, however, assumes the clear distribution of different kinds of causal 
influence among different kinds of entities; and we previously saw that Latour was onto 
something at least in his insistence that those causal influences are not isolated enough to 
assume such clarity beforehand. 
 So why not, instead of assuming that the reality and constructedness that we 
ascribe to something are involved in some zero-sum game, assume that real things can be 
constructed? Is that not how we talk about buildings, for which it would hardly make sense 
to ask whether they are real or constructed? Then why couldn’t we do the same for science, 
where currently there “seems to be no plausible way to say that because something has been 
constructed and well-constructed it is thus solid, durable, independent, autonomous, and 
necessary”?446 
 Indeed, Latour likes to draw and emphasize analogies between science and 
technology, because the construction and reality of technological products are, like those of 
buildings, much more obviously complementary than they seem to be in science: “no one 
would dare assert that the Diesel engine ‘was always already there, even before it was 
discovered.’”447 The analogy is an interesting one, especially for historians: it suggests that 
history can produce solid and independent things whose solidity and independence does 
not derive from their history-transcendence, from the fact, that is, that they were ‘always 
already there’.  
 The big question, then, is: can we, in the case of scientific entities like in the case of 
Diesel engines, account for their solidity without assuming that they were already there 
before they were discovered? To sharpen the focus of this question once more: given the 
position that Latour has taken, we are not just talking about how historically developed 
scientific theories can become stable – we may agree that a theory like the second law of 
thermodynamics is probably there to stay, even if we also agree that it hasn’t always existed, 
and we may subsequently ask where it gets its stability. In that case, the answer to the latter 
question could still refer to stable structures in a history-transcending outside world, which 
is the very thing that Latour so urgently wants to dispense with. No, the question extends to 
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the entities described by those theories as well: so, can we explain why microbes or 
exoplanets themselves are stable elements of the furniture of our universe without 
presupposing that they were ‘already there’ before they were discovered? (The simple 
recognition that they were not ‘always’ already there, because they evolved over time, is not 
the point, as we have seen.) Or perhaps even more radically: can we explain this about 
whole time periods? “The billions of years since the Big Bang date from the 1950s; the pre-
Cambrian era dates from the mid-nineteenth century; as for the particles that make up the 
universe, they were all born in the twentieth century.”448 
 
6.3.3 Adding Actors 
For all these things, Latour advocates the notion of a ‘relative existence’: “an existence that is 
no longer framed by the choice between never and nowhere on the one hand, and always 
and everywhere on the other.”449 He demands a ‘generalized historicity’. No-one, he argues, 
will ask the question “Where was Pasteur before 1822?”450 – well then, why do we ask this 
about the microbes that he discovered? According to Latour, this question is just as 
meaningless.451 This seems like a disingenuous analogy: surely, those questions are not the 
same? Surely we can all agree that Pasteur as a human individual came into being only in a 
specific year and did not exist before that, in the same way that we can agree that the 
individual microbes that we find under our microscope in 21st-century laboratories did not 
exist in ancient Egypt; but that in both cases, other individual humans and other individual 
microbes did exist before – e.g. in ancient Egypt?  
 But if Latour’s analogy fails, it is just one rhetorical strategy that turns out not to 
work. Latour is trying to get across an intuition in which the application of any concept in 
times or places other than where it has been developed becomes something problematic – 
not necessarily impossible, but problematic; and one way in which he tries to get this across 
is in trying to establish analogies between material objects and concepts. Just like we don’t 
expect humans or machine-guns to time travel and do something before they actually exist, 
we shouldn’t simply expect concepts to aid us at such a temporal distance.452 The second 
aspect of the analogy, then, is the interchangeability – in Latour’s thinking – of microbes and 
the concept of microbes; these are not different entities, one being a natural kind in the 
universe and the other being a nineteenth-century interpretation of that stable thing in 
nature. No, it is microbes themselves that come into being in the nineteenth century.  
 For the point is that entities, and classes of entities, can pass from nonexistence to 
existence through fabrication. “It is possible to go from a nonexistent entity to a generic class 
by passing through stages in which the entity is made of floating sense data, taken as a 
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name of action, and then, finally, turned into a plantlike and organized being with a place 
within a well-established taxonomy.”453 This whole process is the result not of discovery, 
then, but of work being done: “let us say that in his laboratory in Lille Pasteur is designing an 
actor.”454 
 This, of course, Pasteur is not doing on his own – we can predict now that Latour 
will be consistent in his insistence on not giving all agency to one type of actor (in this case 
the human scientist). In fact, Latour emphasizes that even among the human actors, Pasteur 
is not the autonomous innovator from whom scientific change simply emanates;455 what 
happens is that Pasteur and other agents translate their own and each other’s interests in 
such ways as to forge alliances.456 Networks are being built and in the specific network in 
which Pasteur moves, he adds a new agent: 
 
Pasteur adds to all the forces that composed French society at the time a new force for which 
he is the only credible spokesman – the microbe. […] If you reveal microbes as essential actors 
in all social relations, then you need to make room for them, and for the people who show 
them and can eliminate them. Indeed the more you want to get rid of the microbes, the more 
room you should grant Pasteurians. This is not false consciousness, this is not looking for 
biased world views, this is just what the Pasteurians did and the way they were seen by all the 
other actors of the time.457 
 
Here we seem to approach an answer to our question: what happens when new entities are 
discovered is not that they are being created as if by divine decree, nor that they were 
already always there, but that they are made in being added to a network.  
 
6.4 The Inexplicable Development of Networks 
6.4.1 Which Napoleon? 
The question now – and, in my view, the question on which the plausibility of Latour’s 
entire program hinges – is whether this adding of entities can be shown to be non-arbitrary 
in a way that doesn’t silently assume something about extra-historical nature, about how 
things were and are outside the network before and independently of how the network came to 
be modified. Is there any way in which we can understand that it is microbes that Pasteur 
adds to the 19th-century French network, rather than anything else?458 
One way to see that this is not arbitrary is that there were alternatives that did not 
make it – like Pouchet’s defense of spontaneous generation. Are the different fates of 
Pasteur’s and Pouchet’s propositions to be explained by something else than the existence 
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(rather than non-existence) of microbes? Yes, because those fates are the fates of the entire 
networks with which they are connected; and those networks hardly overlap.459 Especially 
not since apparently identical elements between them are, on a second look, not identical: 
Pouchet and Pasteur both write to Napoleon III for support, but Pouchet wants this support 
in the form of an endorsement of spontaneous generation; Pasteur in the form of money. 
They write to different emperors, then, who have different relations to the demarcation 
between science and politics.460 Pasteur’s Napoleon III respects the modern Constitution; 
Pouchet’s doesn’t. 
Latour’s remark that the two gentlemen did not write to the same emperor has 
prompted a sarcastic response from Nick Tosh, who noted that if we wanted to understand 
what Pasteur and Pouchet were thinking and doing, it might make sense to remember that 
they probably had different beliefs about Napoleon III, but that otherwise, “the man whom 
we call Napoleon III was an everyday, macroscopic object who did little to excite the 
retrospective attentions of philosophers of science”.461 This is an important point: it 
highlights the fact that Latour’s radical metaphysics, if we went along with it, would have 
consequences not just for the scientific entities in our historical accounts, but for all entities. 
There is, after all, no reason for Latour to say that the existence of microbes needs to be 
regarded as relative to a network, but that Napoleon III is an unproblematic object. And 
indeed, if we take him seriously, he seems to be consistent and does say the same about 
Napoleon III.  
In that case, however, deciding for a non-relative existence of Napoleon III will 
already be a sin against Latour’s metaphysics. We do not need to be anachronistic historians 
of science who believe that there were microbes before Pasteur; the simple belief that 
Napoleon III existed independently of either Pasteur’s or Pouchet’s network would suffice 
to fail at doing science studies right. If good practice in general history and good practice in 
history of science are indeed so similar, perhaps this analogy works rather the other way 
round: the fact that most of their colleagues in general history unproblematically use 
Napoleon III in their accounts should serve as a sign to historians of science that, at least 
until the philosophers have settled the issue for all entities, they can unproblematically use 
microbes in theirs.  
 But suppose that general historians do not yet do Latourian actor-network 
metaphysics, but would want to do so; how would they need to proceed? To what would 
they ‘relativize’ Napoleon III’s existence? Isn’t there an infinite number of networks from 
which they can choose? And aren’t many of those networks independent of both Pasteur and 
Pouchet up until the point where they make contact – e.g. when the scientists write to their 
emperor? If so, isn’t the way Napoleon III is going to behave when his network and those of 
Pasteur and Pouchet extend in such a way as to partially overlap, determined in large part 
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by his previous movements in all the other networks of which he is a part? And isn’t, then, 
the capacity of the Pasteurian network to fabricate its own Napoleon III very limited in the 
face of all those other networks?  
 Perhaps this is underestimating the absolute primacy of the one particular network 
that we study – for instance, that of Pasteur. When we are genuinely ‘in’ Pasteur’s network, 
after all, there is no meaningful speech possible about networks independent of him. The 
idea just suggested, of having a bird’s eye perspective on a multitude of networks, may be 
regarded by Latour as begging the question, if the right way to proceed is simply to 
immerse yourself in one network and follow the actants that make up that network. We may 
encounter a Napoleon III in the Pasteurian network, and he may do some work in there; and 
if we start all over again and immerse ourselves in Pouchet’s network, we may again 
encounter an actant called Napoleon III; but there is no way to identify these two Napoleons, 
since they more or less literally operate in different worlds. 
 This reply, admirably consistent though it would be, would worsen two problems 
for Latour: one is that the features of the Napoleon III to whom Pasteur writes are not 
completely determined by the prior Pasteurian network. The other is that if the two 
networks are so thoroughly incommensurable that we cannot identify their Napoleon IIIs as 
the same entity, then any attempt to explain their different fates will beg the question how 
we could even conceive of comparing them.462 
Latour’s constructivism here is, I think, untenable, for a reason that is – after all and 
in spite of Latour’s attempts to keep it at an arm’s length – analogous to the reason why 
social constructivism fails: no more than physicists are able to single-handedly or 
collectively create quarks, is the specific Pasteurian network (both human and non-human 
actors included) strong enough to create its own French emperor in all relevant aspects, or to 
create microbes. Sufficient explanations for how this emperor or these micro-organisms 
behave are not to be found in the network: phrased differently, the entire network 
underdetermines who the emperor is or what microbes are. Where does the resistance to 
certain possible developments of networks take place, if the external world does not exercise 
an influence of its own and the internal structure of the network fails to determine its entire 
development? This is a question to which I believe Latour has, in the end, no answer.  
 
6.4.2 Tracing Networks 
Then again, perhaps Latour has no problem embracing a certain open-endedness of events 
in one network. And perhaps the point of limiting oneself to one locality lies precisely in 
taking seriously the actor’s perspective.463 We can write a separate history of Napoleon III 
and the networks in which he moves, but if we write a history of Pasteur’s networks, 
Napoleon III only enters the stage at a specific moment, and what we can assume and know 
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about who he is and how he reacts to letters will need to be restricted to what this specific 
Pasteurian actor-network allows us to trace. If we happen to know other things about 
Napoleon III from different studies, we need to suppress this knowledge, because it would 
detract from our purpose of seeing the internal consistency and stability of the Pasteurian 
network. Does following this maxim mean that we cannot talk about how things really are? 
No, and the reason why not should be obvious by now: what is real is a construction of this 
network. Latour has said that ANT’s main tenet is that “actors themselves make everything, 
including their own frames, their own theories, their own metaphysics, even their own 
ontologies.”464 
 If we write one story about microbes (if they have left behind traces)465 and a 
separate story about Napoleon III, we do not just provide different interpretations of the 
same reality that can be made to match later; in tracing Pasteur’s movements, we follow the 
construction of ontologies that are different from (and often incommensurable with)466 the 
ontologies of other networks. And we need to take seriously those local ontologies. 
 But how do we demarcate networks? How do we know that Napoleon III or 
microbes are not part of Pasteur’s network at a given time? Isn’t it up to our arbitrary 
judgment how we cut up or unite different parts of history? No, because the network can be 
located only where it has left traces: we cannot arbitrarily say that we are studying the 
network of ‘all of history’ or of ‘the universe’, because that universalizes the local rather 
than extending it.  
 For that is how scientific theories increase their reach: by extending the networks of 
which they are part. Again, technology provides the paradigm. “Is a railroad local or global? 
Neither.467 It is local at all points, since you always find sleepers and railroad workers, and 
you have stations and automatic ticket machines scattered along the way. Yet it is global, 
since it takes you from Madrid to Berlin or from Brest to Vladivostok.”468 This is the same 
for scientific theories. “No one has ever observed a fact, a theory or a machine that could 
survive outside of the networks that gave birth to them.”469 It is not just that theories are 
produced locally and then applied with more or less success outside (the laboratory, the local 
network); no, their application is synonymous with an extension of the local network to a 
bigger local network.470 
 There is no ‘outside’ to the ‘inside’, then,471 and we can see this best by studying 
the movements on a micro-level: in the case of Pasteur, “if you watch carefully the prior 
displacement of the laboratory to capture farmers’ interests, then to learn from veterinary 
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sciences, then to transform the farm back into the guise of a laboratory, it is still interesting, 
extraordinarily clever and ingenious, but it is not a miracle.”472 These are all concrete 
interactions: there is no miraculous action at a distance, which is about the only thing that 
Latourian metaphysics, in its Cartesian predilection for matter in motion, categorically 
forbids. Concretely, this otherwise open-ended metaphysics, in which every event in the 
history of science has to be understood in terms of things (of whatever kind) circulating in 
networks (made up of whichever entities), underlines and supports the call for an exclusive 
attention to actor’s categories: we can be confident that we will not need to look beyond what 
traces have been left behind within the network that we want to study, because what it 
hasn’t touched and what hasn’t touched it doesn’t exist to it; and we can be sure that we 
ought not look beyond the ontology created by the actors within the network, because that 
amounts to an invocation of non-existent entities and a betrayal of the actors. 
 And of course, this also excludes the ontology that we might bring to our 
investigation. 
 
Abandoning the fixed frame of reference offered by ether, as physicists did, appears in 
retrospect a rather simple affair when compared with what we will have to let go of if we 
want to leave the actors free to deploy the full incommensurability of their own world-
making activities. Be prepared to cast off agency, structure, psyche, time, and space along 
with every other philosophical and anthropological category, no matter how deeply rooted in 
common sense they may appear to be.473 
 
6.5 When Are Electrons and Microbes Anachronisms? 
6.5.1 Conceptual Anachronisms as Causal Anachronisms 
The discussion has been expanded, then, to the general question to what extent we are 
allowed to bring our own categories and our own opinions or knowledge about the world 
with us when we study past or other societies. Latour clearly does not simply reiterate old 
arguments against anachronism,474 but our considerations of ‘Whig history’, presentism, and 
anachronism in chapter 3 become relevant here. 
 One distinction we made there (section 3.3) was between ‘conceptual’ and ‘causal’ 
anachronisms: a conceptual anachronism consisted ‘merely’ in using current words and 
concepts in describing the past, where a causal anachronism consisted in asserting that 
something happened in the past that could not have happened – where ‘could not’, of 
course, still meant: could not according to us. This distinction, it seems, explains why we can 
legitimately say that there were electrons and microbes in Antiquity, while also upholding 
that saying that there were laboratories in Antiquity clearly constitutes a genuine error of 
anachronism (since not only did laboratories not exist, but their existence contradicts our 
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positive beliefs about what was possible and impossible in Antiquity). More subtly, it shed 
light upon why things become more complex when we debate the question whether it is 
viciously anachronistic to call Aristotle a biologist: for some things, the existence of certain 
concepts in a culture is among the conditions for their existence in that culture, and this is 
evidently true for certain social roles. Since ‘biologist’ has a lot of meanings – among which 
are someone who studies living things, or someone who has a PhD in a modern academic 
field – and there are no clear rules that decide which of these meanings are essential, it can 
be unclear whether calling Aristotle a biologist is only conceptually anachronistic (applying 
a concept to him by which he did not actually identify himself) or causally anachronistic 
(calling him something that he was not and that he could at the time not possible have been). 
 Now, how does this distinction relate to the questions we are presently dealing 
with? First, it brings the stakes into a clear focus: when we say (or silently assume) that there 
were electrons or microbes in the past, we do not need to be afraid to be accused just of 
conceptual anachronism: the easy counter-move there would be to profess that we are 
aware that ‘electrons’ here have a lot of cultural connotations that they did not have, say, in 
Antiquity, because the ancients did not have a concept of electrons. We mean ‘just’ the 
electrons themselves. 
 What we need to be afraid of, then, is the accusation of causal anachronism: the 
argument that the conditions for the existence of what we call electrons were not met in 
Antiquity. And we have also seen how such an argument might get off the ground: it might 
get off the ground by saying that among the conditions for existence of electrons is the 
existence of a concept of electrons – or better, that the two go hand in hand. This, indeed, 
seems to capture precisely what Latour is doing. Microbes, according to Latour, came into 
being in the 19th century because that is when they were added to our ontology: the histories 
and fates of the microbes themselves and of the concept of microbes are not different.475 
Latour rejects dualism of every flavour; we can expect that for him, conceptual anachronism 
merges completely with causal anachronism. And if every conceptual anachronism is a 
causal anachronism, then every anachronism is a vicious one. Which is precisely why we 
should only ever listen to the actors and study their networks. 
 How would this identification come about? One way to make sense of this is to say 
that ‘electron’ doesn’t refer to anything other than what happens when we do experiments 
with oil-drops and write down the results, or when we apply any of the other modern 
scientific procedures in which electrons play a role. Electrons, we can imagine Latour saying, 
are everywhere now, since we have added them to our ontology; but all the places where 
we do the work through which this addition has become possible are places that did not 
exist in Antiquity. If none of the things (and relations between things) that work to fabricate 
electrons existed in Antiquity, then what do we refer to when we talk about electrons in 
Antiquity?  
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6.5.2 Relativizing Relativized Existence 
Does this not bring us back to square one, to the same impasse with which we started, 
namely that there is no way to get around Latour’s insistence that things come to exist only 
when they are added to ontologies in local networks? No, for two reasons. 
 First, Latour’s own vocabulary provides a solution: not only electrons and 
microbes are recent addition to our ontology, after all, but so are time periods like ‘Antiquity’ 
or ‘ancient Egypt’: a case can be made that in the sense in which we understand these things, 
they have been constructed very recently – and, crucially, that the addition of electrons and 
microbes to our ontology has effected a new construction of Antiquity and ancient Egypt. 
Before microbes were fabricated, we lived in a world with an Antiquity that did not contain 
microbes; but after the fabrication of microbes, our ancient Egypt changed as well as our 
present, and in this new ancient Egypt, there may well be microbes. Taking Latour’s 
radicalism seriously, there is no point at which it stops, and its final implications turn out to 
be rather conservative. Rather than altering the way we look at the entities in our world and 
relativizing their existence, our whole world, including its past as we commonsensically 
tend to think of it, springs back into existence; the only thing that has changed is that it has 
been folded up, so to speak, in our own locality.  
 To clarify: Latour’s notion of relativized existence is radical only if it is selectively 
applied: for instance, if we implicitly still believe that there is a nineteenth century 
independent of our own local networks, with which we can make contact and in which we 
can trace the actors until we discover that at one point (t1) in this nineteenth century 
microbes were not among those actors, whereas at a later point (t2) they were. In fact, t1 and 
t2 are both constructions fabricated in the present – and the present, as we know, is a locality 
in which microbes are everywhere. There is no reason why t1 would be excluded from this 
present – unless, again, we believe that something happens between t1 and t2 that is 
independent of our locality but that still pertains to it. For electrons in Antiquity the same 
holds: unless we believe that Antiquity independently existed long before our present, we 
need to consider the possibility that the ways through which we have fabricated and are 
continuing to fabricate electrons in the present have enabled electrons to travel to Antiquity 
as well. 
 This argument should satisfy anyone who is convinced by Latour’s way of thinking 
about ontology; in fact, Latour applies it when he says that “just as historians are not forced 
to imagine one single nature about which Pasteur and Pouchet would make different 
‘interpretations,’ neither are they forced to imagine a single nineteenth century imposing its 
imprint on historical actors.”476 One way to answer the question what we refer to when we 
talk about electrons in Antiquity, then, is to say that we are talking about a recently 
fabricated Antiquity that contains our recently fabricated electrons.  
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Second, if we do not want to outflank Latour in his Latourianism, we do not need 
to. We have also seen in all our examples that we can differ about the question to which 
extent specific kinds are dependent upon the existence of specific concepts. And the 
recognition that it is our beliefs about the relations between concepts and reality that matter 
in history-writing, means that positions other than Latour’s have become possible: Latour’s 
approach is not the most general or neutral; it is one of a range of possibilities. 
 We have seen that when we use different concepts, we have different expectations 
regarding the conditions under which the phenomena described by those concepts can be 
realized. Now, we commit causal anachronism only when we assume the existence of 
phenomena in the past whose existence was impossible at the time because at that time 
specific necessary conditions for their existence were not met. Whether we believe this to be 
the case, then, depends on our expectations about these conditions and about the nature of 
these phenomena. Is what we mean by electrons exhaustively described by all the 
inscriptions of them in our own network? Possibly, but it is equally possible to mean 
something else; most scientists would claim that when they talk about electrons, they mean 
to refer to something in nature (whether or not they do so successfully). The dynamics of 
our own expectations, therefore, may just be more complex than the simple rule that the 
conditions for existence are always and always only met as soon as the related concept is 
added to our ontology. At the very least, this simple rule is just one end of the spectrum – 
the end taken by Latour.  
 Sure, there is room for more people at that end of the spectrum; perhaps Latour’s 
metaphysical position is convincing to some, in which case they are right to avoid assuming 
the existence of electrons, microbes and the pre-Cambrian before the 19th century (or at least: 
before some 19th centuries; as we have seen, it is rather unclear why this should hold for our 
own 19th century). But these Latourians will then have to answer the objection that 
historicists have always had to struggle with, and which I consider to be insurmountable, 
that approaching the past without any prior concepts is impossible. Though Latour tries to 
be as consistent as he can in letting the actors decide on their own ontologies (a most 
admirable example being that when he says that Pasteur extends a network that spreads 
laboratory products “all over France”, he adds that ‘all over France’ is itself “a construction 
made by statistics-gathering institutions”),477 in the end it is not the actors talking but Latour 
– even ‘actor’ or ‘actor-network’ is not necessarily an actors’ category, as both Latour himself 
and Nicholas Jardine have noticed.478 
 We always proceed from our own ontology. This we may modify and restrict for 
numerous reasons, including historical knowledge; but those reasons do not reduce to the 
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simple rule that we are completely undecided and should ask the actors as if we had no clue 
what the world looked like.479 In the end, this is nothing more than the pragmatic 
acknowledgment that we get our categories from multiple sources, not just from the ones 
we are looking at presently. Why should our study of 19th-century networks containing 
microbes refer only to concepts as defined by (and circulating in) the network we are 
studying? We don’t use one case study of a 17th-century painting to define colors, even 
though we are allowed to refer to colors when we describe a 17th-century painting; we don’t 
use one case study of ant societies to define insects, even though we are allowed to call the 
ants insects. Similarly, we don’t use one study of 19th-century scientists talking about 
microbes to define microbes. We could, of course – it is possible to say: whatever Pasteur is 
doing in his laboratory, that is what constitutes microbes – but that would amount to a 
redefinition of what we usually mean by microbes. Therefore, the description of how 
Pasteur fabricates his microbes would fail to be an answer to the question how we came to 
believe in the existence of what we usually call microbes. This is a good reason to avoid such 
a redefinition. And unless we demand a definition of microbes along these lines, there is no 
reason why our own definition of microbes – and to be sure: we don’t need something fixed 
and Platonic here; just think of something that covers ‘the practices that determine when to 
speak of microbes; the states of mind we are in when we read the word’, or whatever you 
think constitutes something like a definition – should be disqualified from being used in a 
study on 19th-century science only because it does not completely follow from the specific 
19th-century network.  
 The assumption here, which Latour would probably find far too modest and 
unexciting, is that as historians we do not have a monopoly on the creation of ontologies. I 
assume that by and large, historians use the concepts available in their culture: they do not 
have the goal of radically changing our perspective on the universe we live in, of rewriting 
from scratch the list of entities that populate that universe. They have the rather modest aim 
of understanding a bit of the past – for its own sake but not therefore (because that is an 
impossibility) on its own terms, using whatever current-day explanatory concepts they can 
use without anachronism as defined by the current usage of those concepts and our current 
ideas about the past.480  
This does not preclude the possibility that what they find in the sources modifies 
those concepts; it is important that it can, as will be discussed more extensively in chapter 8. 
It just means that their ontologies are not created merely by the historical sources that 
happen to form the basis of a particular historical study. They have been created by history, 
but this history is always larger than the aspects of it that are being investigated in one 
specific research project. Our concepts come with beliefs about the world and with 
expectations about which circumstances need to be met in order for the things that those 
concepts refer to, to exist. Those beliefs and expectations are usually not the result of one 
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specific case-study (which would be the only proxy to their arising from the past local 
networks themselves, which are by definition inaccessible), and there is no reason why they 
should be.  
 But – retracing our steps further – if Latour has to concede this much (which is 
simply that there needs to be no wholesale a priori rejection of our inherited ontology for the 
sake of exotic local ontologies), then there is more that has to give. For if we are allowed to 
bring our own concept of microbes to our history of the 19th century, rather than being stuck 
with ‘the things that are fabricated by Pasteur and added to the network’, then what our 
concept means may be something different from what we think Pasteur’s concept meant – 
even if this meaning, to paraphrase Putnam, was not just in Pasteur’s head, but was a 
property of (what we think were the relevant aspects of) the entire local network. That is, the 
history of microbes can, again, have a relation to the history of the concept of microbes other 
than of identity. The things that Latour glued together to look like one thing immediately 
fall apart again. 
 
6.6 Nature, Politics, and Critical Science Studies 
When we phrase it carefully, it seems so simple: what we mean by microbes now is 
something conceptually distinct from what we think went on in 19th-century laboratories, 
farms, and statistics-gathering institutions – even if (no, especially if) it is not separable from 
what goes on in 21st-century laboratories et cetera. In fact, this is something that would have 
required no explanation to David Bloor or Harry Collins, as we saw in the previous chapter: 
the distinctness of objects and beliefs informed their program of explaining beliefs 
independently of objects. 
 The major reason Latour has tried so hard to conflate these things and to 
deconstruct or hide the distinctions, is his aversion to the mutual isolation of subject and 
object in what he calls the modern Constitution, of which the separation of microbes and 
beliefs about microbes would be a clear example. I am sympathetic to his forceful and 
consistent insistence that objects and beliefs do not have segregated histories that can be 
understood separately (and the whole previous chapter was an argument to that effect), but 
I think that he goes too far, and that this is in part because of his assessment of the political 
implications of the modern Constitution. 
 This is that the separation of things and people in this Constitution serves to “use 
nature to abort politics.”481 By separating reality into two domains – nature and society – 
and decreeing that one of these domains should be one of certainty and unity, and the other 
one of disagreement, the open-endedness of politics becomes unduly restricted. This 
Constitution, essentially, gives an awesome power to those who can bridge the gap – or who 
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can, in another metaphor now, leave the cave of society to look at nature and return482 – 
because they are supposed to bring objectivity and unity to society.  
 
The subtlety of this organization rests entirely on the power given to those who can move back 
and forth between the houses. […] these few elects, as they themselves see it, are endowed with 
the most fabulous political capacity ever invented: They can make the mute world speak, tell the 
truth without being challenged, put an end to the interminable arguments through an incontestable 
form of authority that would stem from things.483 
  
It is scientists who claim the power to represent things – and it is in this sense that, for 
example, Latour wants to call Pasteur political: not that the content of his scientific beliefs 
somehow mirrors his orientation in the constellation of human political interests, not that he 
sought to get involved in elections and law-making and used his scientific work for that 
purpose; but that he put himself forward as a spokesman of forces that he had made visible 
(the microbes).484 Because the scientists speak for objects to which they have exclusive access 
and which are so construed as to be unable to speak in any other way than through the 
scientists,485 what they say acquires a disproportionate authority that serves to depoliticize 
science and immunize it from criticism. “Like all modernist myths, the aberrant opposition 
between mute nature and speaking facts was aimed at making the speech of scientists 
indisputable; thus, this speech passed through a mysterious operation resembling 
ventriloquism, to ‘I speak’ to ‘the facts speak for themselves’ to ‘all you have to do is shut 
up’”.486 
 This is an interesting perspective on the source of authority of the natural sciences 
in modern societies, and the political aim to draw science from a realm of immunity to 
criticism to one of pluralism and open-endedness is an understandable and, if I may say, 
sympathetic one. However, the question is whether the diagnosis is right and whether 
Latour’s metaphysical radicalism is a proportionate and effective antidote. The separation 
between science and politics is nowhere as strong as in Max Weber’s lectures on Science as a 
vocation and Politics as a vocation – in that sense, they are excellent examples of the modern 
Constitution. However, their separation here is one not between things and people, but 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’: science seeking to provide knowledge about what is the case, and 
politics deciding what, given this information, should happen.487 There is a plurality of 
possible answers to both questions, given that which questions science seeks to answer is 
decided by values that are, in the end, subjective; but true answers to the question what is 
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the case are indeed, in the end, logically in harmony because there is just one reality, 
whereas answers to the question what should happen can be in conflict, and are therefore 
the domain of power struggle – of politics. 
Latour should not forget that the social sciences, too, strive for objectivity: they 
seek to ‘represent’ people just like natural scientists seek to ‘represent’ things – and this goes 
to show the double meaning of ‘representing’:488 claiming to say true things about X is 
different from claiming to defend the interests of X – the second is clearly not implied by the 
first. Still, it is possible to say that, in practice if not in theory, reality, claims about what 
reality is like, and claims about what reality should be like, are interwoven in such 
complicated ways that it is misleading to subject them to completely different kinds of 
expertise in society, with completely independent sources of authority and mechanisms of 
control. Latour may be right to that extent. 
However, I do believe that he makes a severe misjudgment when he tries to put the 
blame on nature, on the idea of a shared external reality. “When the most frenetic of the 
ecologists cry out, quaking: ‘Nature is going to die,’ they do not know how right they are. 
Thank God, nature is going to die. Yes, the great Pan is dead. After the death of God and the 
death of man, nature, too, had to give up the ghost. It was time: we were about to be unable 
to engage in politics any more at all.”489 The reason why Latour cheers the death of nature, 
as we understand now, is because supposedly apolitical, it has inescapably served political 
goals – since of course the river is not separated in two banks, and the separation of science 
and politics is therefore inescapably something of a fiction: “never has anyone appealed to 
nature except to teach a political lesson.”490 
Different radical conclusions may be drawn from this: the modernist, Weberian one 
would be to say that, if this is the case, science and politics have not yet been separated 
enough; the other, Latourian one would be to say that the modern Constitution is dead and 
something completely different should come in its place. Any other normative conclusion 
could be built on the same insight, including the more moderate conclusion that things 
should go on roughly as they do now. An interesting question at this point is which move 
would be most conducive to the possibility to subject science to external criticism. This, after 
all, seems to be Latour’s main point in his rejection of nature: “if we have to give up nature, 
it is neither because of its reality nor because of its unity. It is solely because of the short-
circuits that it authorizes when it is used to bring about this unity once and for all, without 
due process, with no discussion, outside the political arenas, and when something then 
intervenes from the outside to interrupt – in the name of nature – the task of gradually 
composing the common world.”491 
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Latour’s program of studying ‘science in action’ and ‘following scientists and 
engineers through society’ comes down in the end to a prolonged attempt to deny scientists 
any shortcuts: to extract from them precisely what they actually do, without any myths or 
other embellishments. Latour’s is the laudable goal of a criticism of power: 
 
People who speak of nature as if it were an already constituted unity that would make it 
possible to throw back onto social representations everything that calls for disunion – such 
people exercise a kingly power, the most important of all, a power superior to all the purple 
mantles and all the gilded scepters of civil and military authorities. I ask no more of them 
than one minuscule concession: since you have granted yourself the power to define what 
unites us and what drives us apart, what is rational and what is irrational, show us also the 
proofs of your legitimacy, the traces of your election, the motivations for your choices, the 
institutions that permit you to exercise these functions, the cursus honorum through which you 
have had to make your way.492 
  
But is dispensing with nature in the sense defined in this passage a good way to increase the 
possibility for such criticism? I would say that it is precisely because of the intention to talk 
about a common world that communication, and therefore criticism, becomes possible.493  
If I say that the earth goes round the sun, and you say that the sun goes round the earth, the 
conclusion that apparently we live in two different solar systems is not one that fosters 
mutual criticism. Note that this is not an argument against the idea that we live in two 
different solar systems; only an argument to the effect that the assumption that we do is not 
a step towards a criticism of scientific authority. The ‘minuscule concession’ that Latour 
demands is a step towards that – an insistence on being able to retrace where my claim that 
the earth goes round the sun came from (and, possibly, to discard that claim depending on 
where it came from) – but this retracing becomes easier the more the worlds we live in 
overlap. 
 In that sense, the strategy that we saw Harry Collins take in the previous chapter – 
to look at what scientists claim to be talking about, and then proceed to show that the 
dynamics of scientific decision-making can often be understood in terms other than those 
that scientists claim are important – is much more critical than the strategy that Latour 
advocates: to criticize absolutely nothing because actors are supposed to build their own 
ontologies.494 Only when we agree (however tentatively and potentially subject to revisions 
based on new insights in either nature or history!) on what scientists are trying to do can we 
discuss questions as to whether what they do fails, succeeds or goes further than they claim 
to, if we are interested in such questions.  
 It may be that SSK and Latourian actor-network theory both fail in making 
historical knowledge about science a departure point for possible criticism. If SSK fails to do 
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so, it is because in refusing to refer to nature in what it says about science, it cannot account 
for those features of science that relate to nature. When it says: “you think you are talking 
about nature, but in fact what you do refers only to society”, it states not its conclusions but 
repeats its axioms – axioms that, moreover, cannot be plausibly upheld, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. Nonetheless, SSK provides the possibility of saying that what scientific 
actors want or claim to achieve is not actually what they are achieving – the claim that 
scientists’ actions are oriented only upon the social world rather than upon the natural 
world is already an attempt at criticism. Subsequent descriptions of the nature of this 
orientation upon the social world – e.g. based on furthering one’s own professional interest 
rather than on finding out truths – might constitute a further criticism. Latourian actor-
network theory fails in a more fundamental way, because it collapses the external in the 
internal; it conflates nature with what happens in local networks, and thereby takes away 
even the conceptual possibility that what is said about the world is not what is actually 
going on in the world. 
 
6.7 Science and the World 
This, in fact, is a repeatedly stated aim of Latour: to remove the problem of the relation 
between science and the world; to show that the way scientific thought relates to nature is 
not something magical or unreasonably effective, but a direct result of their co-creation. 
“Most of the difficulties associated with science and technology,” says Latour, “come from 
the idea that there is a time when innovations are in laboratories, and another time when 
they are tried out in a new set of conditions which invalidate or verify the efficacy of these 
innovations. This is the ‘adequatio rei et intellectus’ that fascinates epistemologists so 
much.”495  
 It is now clear where Latour thinks the fascination comes from, why according to 
him the explanandum does not exist, or at least not in such a radical form, and why it is 
important to make this point and to reinterpret the problem. The fascination results from the 
idea that something constructed by humans in society can ‘match’ something that has come 
to exist completely independently of those humans. This leaves the huge problem of 
understanding how the gap between subject and object has come to be bridged in such an 
effective way. Meanwhile, the experts whose job it is to bridge this gap derive a huge 
amount of authority from their success at doing so. All of this, however, makes sense only 
under the assumption of the ‘bifurcation of nature’:496 the idea that nature and ideas about 
nature exist separately, like the two banks of a river, and that their connections are 
problematic.  
 Latour thinks that we tend to see scientific theories as abstract objects floating 
above the (empirical or experimental) world. When they then turn out to be ‘applicable’ to 
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what happens below them, it seems to be miraculous. In fact, Latour says, they function in 
no more miraculous a way than any other centers or hubs within networks: “Miracle indeed 
to see a clover-leaf intersection fitting precisely with the freeways whose flow it 
redistributes!”497 It is, of course, not a miracle, because it is evident that freeways and their 
intersections are constructed to match each other. In the same way, microbes and the 
laboratory environment that identifies them are constructed in the same movement, and 
when Pasteur’s predictions ‘work’ outside the laboratory, this is the result of work done to 
extend the reach of the laboratory; “it is […] not a miracle.”498 
 Especially, it is not a miracle that takes place in the minds of the scientific genius: if 
there is this miraculous match between reality and theory, an unexplained adequatio rei et 
intellectus, it may seem like a good strategy to take a close look at the minds that have 
generated these adequate ideas. For Latour, this is looking at the wrong place, and he 
devotes one of his rules of method to this point: “before attributing any special quality to the 
mind or to the method of people, let us examine first the many ways through which 
inscriptions are gathered, combined, tied together and sent back. Only if there is something 
unexplained once the networks have been studied shall we start to speak of cognitive 
factors.”499 Latour’s move has, again, a bit of a Cartesian flavor to it: apparently we could try 
to explain science by the special intellectual capacities of some humans, but it is much better 
to explain it by the movement of things. 
 Thus, in this methodological materialism or monism, the dualist problem of the 
correspondence between intellect and world disappears. What are we to think of this 
position, in the light of the preceding discussion with Latour in this chapter? The most 
important conclusion would be that, in rescuing and affirming the possibility of divergence 
between what we think about microbes or elementary particles and how we think past 
scientists thought about these, or between how our network fabricates microbes or 
elementary particles and how our network fabricates past networks containing these, we 
have placed a wedge between Latour’s monism at an important point: the structure once 
again cracks neatly into its two constituent parts of (our views – always our views – of) the 
world and (our views of) its past representations. 
 What, then, remains of Latour’s glue- and patchwork? It is important to note that 
we did not place the wedge at the point that matters most to Latour: the conceptual split 
between nature and society. He can be satisfied to see – and we have learned this from him – 
that we have remained undecided about how much of our own representations of things is 
‘due to’ nature and how much is due to society. We need to think of our notion of microbes 
as neither culture-free nor nature-empty, and the same holds for past notions of microbes. 
We are even permitted to think of past microbes ‘themselves’ in ways other than as things 
on one side of a nature-society-divide – I say ‘permitted’, because this would be the point 
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where I might like to opt out and permit myself instead to say that microbes ‘themselves’ 
are natural and not part of human society.  
 But that is not the point now. The point is rather this: the relation between science 
and the world can, again, become a problem – a status that Latour would deny it. But this is 
not the problem of a pre-established harmony between nature and intellect, a problem to 
which there would indeed be no mundane answers; rather, it is the problem of how one 
conceptually delineated part of the world relates to another conceptually delineated part of 
that world. (The reason why these are two conceptually distinct parts of the world is not 
that they are substantially different, but ‘simply’ that we relate to them in different ways.)  
 Nor is this problem a problem of correspondence, mimesis or adequacy. Almost all 
the views we have come across in the last two chapters commit the straw-man fallacy of 
identifying the view that reality independently constrains views about itself with the idea 
that scientific theories correspond to the world, and reason from the untenability of 
correspondence to the omnipotence of society (in Bloor’s case) or to the untenability of a 
nature-science distinction (in Latour’s case).500 Once pointed out, it is easy to see that this 
reasoning fails, for the simple reason that science could have another relation to the world 
than one of ‘matching’ or ‘corresponding’.  
 What relation, then? Can we say things, in general, about ways in which the world 
can constrain science – exercise causal influence upon it? And can we do this while taking 
into account Latour’s lesson that we should not overlook the fact that ‘science’ and ‘nature’ 
are not causally isolated entities with one or two designated points where bridges between 
them may be built – while taking into account, in other words, that we have only 
conceptually distinguished them, and that in fact they are connected by causal interaction 
throughout history on an indefinite number and variety of occasions? 
 Perhaps a promising way to do this is by seeing science as adaptive to nature, in a 
way analogous to the adaptation of life to its natural environments. In that case, after all, 
there is no problem in saying that we can conceptually separate animals, for instance, and 
their natural environment; or in saying that these animals rarely ‘correspond to’ their 
environment simply by ‘representing’ or ‘mimicking’ it (instances of camouflage 
notwithstanding of course). Both these claims can be harmonized with the idea that 
environments underdetermine what animals live in them, and with the idea that there are 
indefinitely many local interactions between animals and their environment, rather than a 
bunch of animals on the one hand and an environment on the other which are subsequently 
‘bridged’.  
 Last but not least, there may be a hint here at how to solve the problem of their 
relation without resorting to miracles. After all, it may seem that animals are miraculously 
well attuned to their environment – just like it may seem that science is miraculously well 
attuned to nature (or that clover-leaf intersections would be miraculously well attuned to 
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freeways were we not allowed to assume intelligent design by humans here). But in the case 
of the biological world, we have access to theories that provide completely naturalistic 
explanations of this adaptation – explanations that have in common that they do not 
approach animals and their environment as having come to be independently and complete 
in their current shapes, but that the shape of animals (and of their environment) is the result 
of a historical evolutionary process.  
 In the next chapter, we will explore a family of approaches to the relation between 
science and the world that attempt to grasp this relation in a naturalistic, causal way.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
From our evaluation of Latour’s perspective on the study of science in history, we can draw 
the following conclusions:  
1) Latour has successfully undermined an essentialistic opposition between nature 
and society, where science belongs wholly to the social domain and its relation to 
nature corresponds to the bridging of an ontological gap. He has done so especially 
by appealing to the constant interactions between human and non-human entities 
in networks. 
2) Latour succeeds in showing that there are things that are fruitfully considered as 
both robust and a historical product – both ‘real’ and ‘fabricated’. This can be the 
case for the content of our science as well; its explanation is then properly historical. 
3) Latour’s conflation of the world with its representations does not hold up to 
scrutiny. This means, first, that it is still possible to talk about the relation between 
science and the world that it is about, and, second, that there is no reason to believe 
that our representations of the world are causally anachronistic with respect to 
periods in which they are unavailable. 
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Chapter 7: The Invisible Hand of Science 
 
7.1 A Naturalistic Perspective 
So far, we have looked at a few different ways in which to talk about the relation between 
science and the rest of the world: the first spanned chapters 4 and 5 and looked at what 
happens if we suppose that nature makes the final state of science inevitable (chapter 4) or, 
on the other hand, completely fails to play an explanatory role (chapter 5). Then, in chapter 
6, we looked at an attempt to create a vocabulary for talking about science without dividing 
up the world in natural and human elements with their corresponding features.  
 In this chapter, we will look at naturalistic accounts of how the world influences 
science, namely at invisible hands accounts, including most notably the evolutionary 
account of science provided by David Hull. We have already seen in previous chapters that 
it is conceivable for nature to play a causal role in the history of science even if there is no 
logic that completely and unequivocally determines how what is given to us by nature gets 
processed by science. A naturalistic account of the relation between science and the world 
may do justice to that observation, by foregoing reference to transcendental rationality, 
idealism or laws of history, and looking only at causal relations.  
 In doing this, naturalistic accounts may also succeed in closing the ontological gap 
that is created by the division between ‘what science studies’ and ‘what science is part of’: in 
the previous chapter, we by and large agreed with Latour that to artificially cut all the 
connections between ‘Nature’ and ‘Society’ belies the fact that these categories are the result 
of constructive work and artificially inflates the problem of the relation between science and 
the world, by suggesting that they are different kinds of things. We did not agree with 
Latour that by deconstructing the self-evidence of the boundary between nature and society 
the question about the relation between science and the world collapses entirely: we may 
still make a distinction between a natural phenomenon and what a scientist (or a discipline, 
or a culture) believes about that natural phenomenon, and we may ask the question how 
these two facts are related. The point is that in answering this question, we can assume that 
both facts are about objects in the world: both natural phenomena and scientific beliefs and 
practices are particular and concrete entities, which may have a causal relation to each other.  
 A naturalistic approach, then, may help in treating both science and the world as 
referring to entities that are in the same causal nexus. Hull calls his approach ‘naturalistic’ if 
“naturalism is the ‘view that theories come to be accepted (or not) through natural processes 
involving both individual judgment and social interaction’”.501 The intended message seems 
to be that what scientists do does not take place in complete independence of the world that 
their work is about; that the judgment they exercise and the interaction they engage in do 
not need to cross a broad river, a deep ontological gap, but that they are simply among the 
actions that take place in the world. Saying that individual and social actions are part of 
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nature is not the same as saying that they are the proper domain of the natural sciences; it 
can also simply be to counter the intuition that they are ‘made of radically different stuff’, 
and thereby to weaken the ‘bifurcation of nature’ that we saw Latour oppose in the previous 
chapter. What makes an approach naturalistic is then the notion that the social is a subset of 
the ‘natural’ in a broad sense of that word; not something different from it, but not 
necessarily indistinguishable from the rest of the natural either. 
 In this chapter, we will zoom in first on invisible hand accounts, and then on an 
invisible hand account that is also an evolutionary approach: the account of scientific 
development formulated by Hull. Of course, there are naturalistic approaches that are not 
invisible hand accounts, and there are invisible hand accounts of scientific development that 
are not evolutionary accounts – we will meet some examples of the latter. Also, it is well 
conceivable that there are evolutionary accounts that do not meet the criteria of invisible 
hand accounts. However, both invisible hand accounts and evolutionary accounts have 
properties that make them interesting from the perspective of a philosophy of history of 
science, and their combination in Hull’s account is therefore especially interesting, as we 
will see.  
 
7.2 Invisible Hand Accounts 
7.2.1 The Promise of Invisible Hands 
One type of approach that tries to link science to the world by processes that are ‘natural’ in 
the sense described above can be filed under the label of ‘invisible hand explanations’. 
 The promise of invisible hand explanations lies in the extent to which they might 
harmonize belief in the authority of scientific opinions about nature with an emphasis on the 
thoroughly social nature of science. One thing that SSK and similar approaches have been 
very good at is ‘unmasking’ scientific ideologies, and bringing the actors in science back to 
worldly proportions: it has shown time and again that the persons whose aggregate actions 
constitute science are not ascetics motivated purely by a desire to find out and preach the 
truth about nature – that, in fact, science is all too human, and that we had better approach it 
not as if it were something pure, but rather “as if it was produced by people” who were, 
among else, “struggling for credibility and authority.”502 Though we should not 
underestimate the extent to which previous generations of scholars in science studies were 
capable of apprehending this – was not Mertonian sociology doing precisely this? – this 
attitude is a genuine improvement over approaches that had to see scientists and science as 
disinterested and unattached to society,503 if only because a sustainable place in society for 
people who are genuinely (as opposed to mythically) detached from society is hard to find.  
 And so, to state it bluntly: if what scientists are systematically striving for is not 
finding out the truth about nature but pursuing their social interests, then perhaps science is 
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not about finding out the truth about nature after all, but about pursuing the social interests 
of the groups that do science. This blunt conclusion, however, is also rather cynical, to such 
an extent that it renders inexplicable the success of science in dealing with nature. SSK can 
set out to explain belief in the success of science, including our own belief, as a result of social 
processes; but because it leaves nature out and orients scientists upon society rather than 
nature, it has no way of making sense of the possibility that science is ‘actually’ successful in 
its attempts to investigate nature. Again, as has been emphasized already in chapter 5, this 
does not imply unbelief in the existence of an outside world, or idealism; it means rather 
that we are never in a position to link science to this outside world.  
 What invisible hand mechanisms may be able to do, now, under conditions that we 
will address shortly, is to recognize and affirm the demythologization of the people and 
institutions that make up and carry science – to say that scientists are fully the social beings 
that other people are, with the same drive for money and status as all of us (or at least 
within reasonable distance to the average on the same bell curve) – but to move back into 
the picture a notion of dealing with the world and even of success in dealing with the world 
for science as a whole, by presenting these not as matters of teleology and design, but as the 
emergent results of social structures in science. As Petri Ylikoski, one (critical) commentator, 
has summarized the reasoning behind invisible hand approaches to understanding science: 
 
one can say that scientists are humans without a great secret of success (that is to say without the 
Scientific Method). So we might have to get rid of some {of} our usual ideas about the nature 
of science. Are the ideas of objective knowledge and of the cognitive authority of science 
among these? The idea of the invisible hand is supposed to save us from throwing them away 
along with other things. It refers to a naturalistically acceptable process, in a way that a 
naturalistic philosopher of science can accept it.504 
 
An invisible hand process can be defined as a case in which the actions of individuals lead 
to a stable and understandable order that was not necessarily intended by them.  
 In this way, invisible hand explanations distinguish between immediate 
appearances – what people think they are doing, what they seem to encounter while they 
are doing these things – and the causal processes that actually lead to the results. For 
instance, people may all be interested in their own profit rather than in maximizing 
collective utility, and yet there may be mechanisms of which their own selfish actions are a 
part that ensure that the latter happens – mechanisms of which no individual needs to be 
aware and the working of which is not explained by individual intentions.  
 We can see how this is a promising answer to some of the arguments mentioned in 
the previous chapters (see, for instance, the section on Karin Knorr-Cetina) where it was said 
that scientists do not encounter nature in their everyday work in the laboratory, and are 
usually more occupied with ‘making things work’ in their dealings with all kinds of actors 
                                                     
504 Ylikoski (1995, 36). 
128 | Chapter 7: The Invisible Hand of Science 
and materials than with ‘nature’ or ‘truth’ (section 5.4.2). An invisible hand account may 
grant this, but add that it can replace this level of the immediate experience of the actors 
with a ‘deeper’ level, and provide us with mechanisms that ensure that the aggregate 
actions of these pragmatic individuals progressively lead to a better account of the natural 
world. 
 It may even be better to speak of three levels, since there is also a level at which 
scientists do see themselves as being occupied with realizing values like truth or objectivity. 
The point of ethnographers like Knorr-Cetina is that this is a misinterpretation of what 
‘really’ happens in the laboratory, where truth and objectivity seem to play no causal role. 
An invisible hand explanation counters this reading by one where what seems to happen in 
the laboratory is itself not what constitutes the real order behind the working of science.  
 
7.2.2 An Economic Account: Alvin Goldman 
Invisible hand accounts of science are associated with neoclassical economical language,505 
but they clearly do not overlap with laissez-faire economics.506 Alvin Goldman, for instance, 
who has developed theories that can excellently be classified as invisible hand mechanisms, 
has written rather critically about the extent to which pure market mechanisms favor 
epistemically desirable outcomes. We will look briefly at this argument in order to get a 
clearer and concrete picture of what invisible hand theories are and what they are not. 
Goldman, together with James Cox, investigates whether a free market for speech or ideas is 
the optimal solution for encouraging the production of true beliefs. The measure for truth 
possession, in their definition, is the number of true beliefs divided by the total number of 
beliefs. Under such premises, truth cannot be defined as the result of free competition;507 just 
like in other markets, the measure of the quality of the products needs to be independent in 
principle of market mechanisms. Like in other markets, economic theory does not imply that 
the products made under free competition are of the highest quality, but that they are 
produced most efficiently relative to production possibilities and consumer preferences. It 
does not categorically predict what these goods are.508 
A complicating factor in the case of truthful information is that perfect information 
is usually regarded as a condition for market functioning, not as a result. Even markets for 
regular commodities can fail under circumstances of imperfect information, Goldman and 
Cox explain. If markets are unregulated, the costs of checking the truthfulness of 
information lie with the consumers.509 
The most noteworthy aspect of this account is the strict requirement that truth be 
defined independently of the outcomes of the social and economic process. This is a major 
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point in Goldman’s ‘social epistemology’, and one that he sees as the main point of 
difference with the ‘social doxology’ of scholars like Shapin, who are, according to him, 
uninterested in truth.510 Goldman leaves no misunderstanding about his insistence that 
truth is about the world, that “only the world confers truth and falsity”.511 A large part of his 
Knowledge in a Social World is devoted to substantiating this realist claim.  
An article by Goldman and Moshe Shaked, which provides an economic model of 
scientific truth, is a good example of an exposition of invisible hand mechanisms and the 
extent to which they seem to need such a realist account of truth. The premise in this 
argument is that scientists try to maximize their individual expected utility, and that this 
utility is defined exclusively by professional success.512 Goldman and Shaked develop a 
rational choice model to formalize decisions of these credit-seeking agents about which 
experiments they are going to perform, given certain subjective probabilities regarding 
world states and given the subjective probabilities of other scientists, and assuming they try 
to maximize the expected credit they are going to get by modifying the subjective 
probabilities of others. They conclude that under most circumstances, the probability 
revisions will lead to more accurate beliefs; only if the initial subjective probabilities are 
absurdly inaccurate will the experiments lead to an increase of error.513 
Goldman and Shaked’s is effectively an invisible hand account, which sees 
scientists as credit-seeking and the amount of credit they receive as determined by their 
influence upon the beliefs of others. Their interests are socially defined. But their actions in 
pursuing these interests are not understandable unless some notion of accuracy is involved: 
scientists believe things about the world – that is, they are able to attribute more or less 
explicitly certain probabilities to statements about the world – and in their experiments, the 
world gives clues as to how accurate these probabilities are; moreover, scientists’ beliefs can 
be rationally adapted to these clues, so that the world plays (to the third-person spectator 
who knows what the world looks like and what the subjective probabilities of the scientists 
are) a predictable role in scientific belief formation, as scientific belief formation will 
respond predictably to the clues it received from its (no less predictable) investigations. 
Now, how we evaluate the effectiveness of this invisible hand account depends on 
what we believe it aims to achieve. To the extent that it is an account of how scientists can be 
motivated by aims other than an accurate description of reality while reality nonetheless has 
explanatory value with regard to the formation of scientific beliefs, it works. It does not try 
to give a radically new role to reality, let alone a new conceptualization of it; but that is not 
its point. Its point is to show how science can be successful in what it aims to achieve, even if 
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scientists are not structurally motivated by a desire to further science but rather by a desire 
to further their own professional interests.  
However, some of the criticisms raised by SSK against earlier rationalistic 
philosophies of science certainly apply to it.514 After all, is this not just correspondentism, 
together with some very doubtful suppositions about scientific rationality? Didn’t we 
already agree that evidence did not bear upon belief in an unequivocal way? What about the 
contingency of scientific concepts and categories? If we endorse Goldman’s account, are we 
not simply replacing an individualistic rationalism with an almost identical rationalism on a 
social level?  
These are questions that need to be addressed: they are important to assessing in 
what sense, and under what assumptions, invisible hand accounts provide an alternative to 
other perspectives such as SSK. We will now take a closer look, therefore, at the role of truth 
and correspondence in Goldman’s ‘veritistic’ social epistemology as described in his 
Knowledge in a social world.  
 According to Goldman, a correspondence theory of truth is indeed the most 
natural account of truth. Alternatives do not work: pragmatist or instrumentalist theories 
which define truth in terms of desirable outcomes run into problems regarding the fact that 
what is desirable differs by person; verificationist approaches, which identify the truth of a 
proposition with its justification, have the problem that exactly the same proposition can be 
true first and false later. Coherence theories run into similar problems.515  
 Another possibility are deflationist accounts of truth, which explain statements 
about truth as performative actions, or instruments of semantic ascent, or see ‘true’ as a 
predicate while denying it is a substantive property. What these theories have in common is 
that there is no metaphysical relation between a statement and the world that ‘makes’ a 
statement true, but that truth is just a useful linguistic instrument.516 Goldman, on the other 
hand, sees truth as something that requires truth makers. According to classical versions of 
correspondence theory, these truth makers lie in a structural isomorphism between fact and 
world, but Goldman claims that his theory doesn’t need this.517  
If he is right about this, then the correspondence on which Goldman’s invisible 
hand account rests may be able to avoid becoming a kind of ‘mirroring’, the kind of 
representationalism that SSK advocates often accuse their opponents of adhering to. 
Perhaps we can retain the realist intuition behind Goldman’s invisible hand account while 
providing a more subtle analysis of what the role of ‘reality’ in this account actually entails. 
In the following I provide an interpretation of Bernard Williams’ Truth and truthfulness, in 
which he does precisely that. 
 
                                                     
514 Cf. Kusch (2011). 
515 Goldman (1999, 41-48). 
516 Goldman (1999, 51-53). 
517 Goldman (1999, 59-62). 
 
7.2 Invisible Hand Accounts | 131 
7.2.3 Accuracy and the Resistance of the World: Bernard Williams 
Williams makes a broad philosophical argument for the idea that it is meaningful to want to 
find out the truth on an issue; if someone wants to do this, “we can say that this is 
equivalent to his wanting to get into the following condition: if P, to believe that P, and if 
not P, to believe that not P.”518 According to Williams (referring to Goldman), some methods 
of inquiry have the property of leading to true belief (are truth-acquiring), and some have 
not, and this is what is meant with accuracy.519 Williams goes on to say that it is important 
that there are external and internal obstacles to finding truths, and that this suggests a realist 
idea of truth, in the sense of “an independent order of things to which our thought is 
answerable. […] It has often been recognized that the idea of a reality independent of us can 
involve an implication of resistance, resistance to the will.”520 
 Williams goes on to observe that this idea of resistance has usually been related to 
physical objects (which can resist our movements), but that it seems to be that “any case of 
necessity will be an example of radical resistance to the will.”521 We cannot change truths 
about the past or about mathematics either; but Williams goes on to connect the notion of 
independent reality specifically to those states of affairs to which there is a conceivable 
alternative. This means that he can distinguish between the status of truths about, for 
instance, the past – of which we can wish that it had been different, but cannot begin to 
think that we can do anything that would make it different – and the status of mathematical 
truths – of which we cannot even conceive of what would be involved in other things being 
the case.522 The Pythagorean philosophers may have wished that the square root of two was 
not an irrational number, but only if they did not think in a determinate or focused way 
about what this desire involved.523 
 I should remark at this point that this difference as based on Williams’ terms may 
be less clear than he suggests: do we really know precisely what would be involved in other 
truths about the past (or about other parts of reality that are independent of our will)?524 But 
this does not undermine Williams’ larger point, that “it is the sense of conceivable 
alternative that is particularly associated with realism. Realism invokes the idea of an order 
of things that is independent of us, where that means, in particular, independent of our 
will.”525 Accuracy, as a virtue, is resistance to subversion of truths about this independent 
reality by the wish.  
Like the invisible hand theorists (to which Williams’ own genealogical account of 
the primary virtues of truthfulness bears some resemblance in its attempt to show how these 
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desirable features of thinking can be thought of as having emerged out of non-intentional 
processes, though it goes further than just being a functional account),526 Williams believes 
that if science possesses the virtue of accuracy, this does not mean that scientists themselves 
live up to a Platonic ideal of personal disinterestedness, or that abstract natural science itself 
liberates from interestedness by transcending human affairs.527 The crucial issue is the 
question whether the thing scientists are interested in – even if this is a socially constituted 
good like prestige or power – depends on their succeeding in finding truths about nature, 
“just as those who in the ancient world or in the Renaissance sought fame through writing 
notable verse recognized that they would not achieve it without the notable verse.”528 The 
virtue of accuracy would be undermined if scientific recognition were itself a function of an 
antecedent social position; but that this is the case the sociology of knowledge has failed to 
demonstrate, Williams says. 
 “Science is, in game-theoretical terms, not a two-party game: what confronts the 
inquirer is not a rival will, and that is the key to the sense of freedom that it can offer. To be 
free, in the most basic, traditional, intelligible sense, is not to be subject to another’s will. It 
does not consist of being free from all obstacles.”529 The world, in Williams’ account, does 
resist; but the status of this resistance in Williams’ thought is completely opposed to that in 
Latour’s, since the resistance of the world and the objects it contains cannot be thought of as 
agency without the dualism between science and the world breaking down and the game 
becoming a multi-party game again. 
 
7.2.4 The Limits of Normative Invisible Hands Accounts 
These invisible hand accounts are not a solution to the problems posed by SSK concerning 
the relation between nature and society, let alone to the challenge of ANT; rather than 
answering these problems, they have to ignore them and ‘revert’ to a dualism between 
society and nature. This is not necessarily a problem in itself: as we have repeatedly 
observed, invisible hand accounts are there to show how nature can figure in the 
explanations of science even if it does not figure in the intentions or the immediate 
experience of scientists. This means that they are allowed to be conservative or 
commonsensical about the nature of the external world.  
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Both Goldman’s and Williams’ invisible hand accounts need to employ a concept 
of accuracy – something which, if it is supposed to say something substantive about the 
relation between nature and beliefs about nature, is closely related to correspondence and 
will in that case need to answer a whole range of skeptical and pragmatist objections.530 If 
accuracy does not pertain to the relation between reality and belief but purely to a virtue 
within science, this problem does not arise, but it becomes less clear what the conditions for 
this virtue are and how we can recognize them. 
Goldman’s and Williams’ accounts are inevitabilist, in the sense that science 
converges to a more truthful account of what nature looks like. This holds especially for 
Goldman’s correspondentism, if interpreted descriptively: as the claim that beliefs about the 
world will converge to a more truthful account of it if science works by and large according 
to Goldman’s social epistemology, combined with the claim that science by and large works 
according to that epistemology. If this is the case, if we want to understand why scientists 
believe what they believe, we need to know only what the world they are studying looks 
like.  
However, this is the case only if Goldman provides an account of scientific 
rationality in which the normative and the descriptive coincide: otherwise his mechanisms 
either lose explanatory value, or they shed light only upon fictional, idealized developments 
in science.531 In fact, Goldman is clear about the fact that his project is a social epistemology.532 
It is not primarily an account of how actual science works; it is an account of how social 
belief-forming practices of a certain kind can lead to more accurate beliefs about an existing 
reality. Similarly, Williams is not providing a history of science; he is providing a genealogy 
of accuracy and sincerity as virtues of truthfulness, insisting that these virtues presuppose 
‘obstance’ by an independent reality.533 
 The existence of these plausible fictional accounts could strengthen belief that 
plausible actual accounts based on similar presuppositions might also be within reach. 
Moreover, these descriptive accounts need not necessarily be inevitabilist. We will look at 
one project that explicitly identifies as an invisible hand account,534 but aims at the 
explanation of scientific beliefs rather than at their justification,535 and does so under the 
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supposition that science is by and large very good at “realizing its manifest goals”.536 This is 
the project of David Hull, who has tried to look at scientific development as analogous to 
biological evolution, and subject to similar selective mechanisms.  
 
7.3 David Hull’s Evolutionary Invisible Hand Account 
7.3.1 Science as a Process 
As said, Hull’s project is to give an evolutionary account of scientific development, rather 
than an ‘evolutionary epistemology’.537 That it is an evolutionary account does not mean 
that it tries to extend a biological vocabulary to conceptual developments. 
Though Hull obviously proceeds from some presuppositions about the natural 
inclinations of humans as a species with regard to curiosity about their environment,538 he 
makes it clear that strictly biological accounts fail to explain the kind of conceptual 
developments that science exhibits: after all, our natural tendencies when it comes to, for 
example, classification of plants, are patently unscientific, and wrong.539 Hull, then, 
emphasizes that he does “not propose to extend a gene-based biological theory of evolution 
to include conceptual development in science. Instead, I provide a general analysis of 
selection processes which is intended to apply equally to both biological and conceptual 
change.”540 
 Thus, Hull sees selection processes as something that can be defined independent 
of the specific substrate on which they operate.541 The notion of a ‘gene’ is not just made into 
a metaphor which is subsequently applied to the notion of a scientific ‘concept’;542 rather, we 
could say that both are involved in instances of a ‘selection process’ that can be abstractly 
defined – there is a weak hint of idealism here in what is otherwise a thoroughly naturalistic 
metaphysics, which, as we will see shortly, dispenses with essentialism about science in a 
very useful way. 
 The abstract terms involved in selection processes are those of replicators and 
interactors – a replicator being “an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in 
successive replications”, an interactor being “an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole 
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with its environment in such a way that this causes replication to be differential.”543 A 
process that differentiates between the fates of different interactors in such a way as to 
differentiate between the replication of different replicators, is a selection process.544 
 Selection processes influence the temporal change of lineages, a lineage being “an 
entity that persists indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state as a result 
of replication.”545 Hull’s ‘lineage’ is a key concept to grasp, as it provides an excellent point 
of overlap between philosophy of biology and philosophy of history; it is through this 
concept that historical entities can become the center of scholarly attention. This is of 
immediate relevance to history of science in more than one way.  
 In Science as a process, Hull deals with the controversies concerning the applicability 
of the term ‘scientists’ before the modern period, judging that “the terminological 
convention being suggested by purists is so patently silly that it hardly warrants 
refutation.”546 The larger issue at stake here, however, Hull identifies as being the choice 
between calling everyone a scientist who performed activities that we would recognize as 
science, or treating terms as referring to particular times and places. This issue he rephrases 
in turn (the rephrasing effecting a slight change in content) as “similarity versus descent.”547 
Hull decides to look upon science as something general, and Western science as an instance 
of this.548 ‘Western science’ is a particular instance of science in a very general sense, and as 
such we do not need to specify its formal characteristics; we just need to be able to identify it 
as a lineage. For purposes of delineation, its uniqueness or its similarity to Chinese or Greek 
science is neither here nor there, just like the question whether whales look like fish is 
irrelevant if we want to define whales as a species in the sense of a lineage.  
 What is the relation between lineages and selection processes? It is not tautological: 
the shape of lineages can result from something other than selection processes. 
 
Lineages are historical entities formed by replication. Differential perpetuation caused by 
interaction is not necessary for something to count as a lineage. In fact, differential 
perpetuation itself, regardless of its causes, is not even necessary for something to count as a 
lineage. However, when the interplay between replication and interaction causes lineages to 
change through time, the result is evolution through selection.549 
  
This makes Hull’s thesis that science is a lineage that evolves through selection into a 
synthetic claim, rather than the analytic one that it could have been.550 It would have been 
an analytic claim if Hull had held, for instance, that in order for something to be part of 
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science at all, it needed to be subject to selection pressures. A definition of science in terms 
of ‘conjectures and refutations’, or something similar, could lead to the claim that science 
evolves through selection being analytic. But Hull has not defined science as a class in any 
but extremely broad terms; and the ‘lineage’ of Western science has not been defined 
formally, but pointed to. This lineage changes over time – scientists believe, write and do 
different things now than before – and since historical change may be the result of 
something other than the interplay between replication and interaction, the question 
whether Western science has evolved through selection remains open. 
 
7.3.2 Selection Pressures and the World 
Much will depend, then, on the mechanisms that Hull identifies behind this supposed 
selection process. What is the thing that is being replicated differentially, what are the 
interactors, and with what do they interact? 
 Hull answers all these questions: the replicators are “elements of the substantive 
content of science – beliefs about the goals of science, the proper ways to go about realizing 
these goals, problems and their possible solutions, modes of representation, accumulated 
data reports, and so on”.551 Conceptual replication is “a matter of ideas giving rise to ideas 
via physical vehicles, some of which also function as interactors. Replicators are generated, 
recombined, and tested by scientists interacting with the relevant portion of the natural 
world.”552 
 So to rephrase only slightly: the replicators are more or less abstract entities, which 
can exist in different physical vehicles; these physical vehicles, some of which are scientists, 
interact with the natural world, presumably in a differential way so as to cause differential 
proliferation of the scientific ‘ideas’. 
 Things are complicated because science is a social process; Hull’s account gets its 
subtlety from dealing with the social structure of the scientific process, analyzed through the 
concepts of credit, use, support and mutual testing.553 Scientists act the way they do, not 
because they get the rewards for adequate ideas about nature directly from nature itself; 
they do not physically die sooner (or fail to procreate) if their theories about nature are 
inadequate.554 Rather, what they strive for is recognition by other scientists;555 they are 
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differentially successful as scientists, in interacting with other scientists; and the extent of 
their success in this regard determines their ability to spread the ideas they hold.556 
 If the social (scientific) success of the scientists-interactors is dependent on the 
content of the replicators to which they are connected, the conditions for evolution through 
selection are realized. This is the case if science is organized in such a way that the goods 
that make scientists successful are in the end rewards for the content of the ideas that they 
hold. This is why it is crucial that scientists make use of each other’s ideas, and test them.557  
For this to be the case, it seems the community as a whole needs to interact with the 
natural world. At least Hull strongly believes that this is the case. Strictly, it is not necessary; 
it has been noted that Hull’s analysis is applicable to any community of experts in which 
these experts are simultaneously sellers and buyers of the goods they produce.558 These 
experts might be theologians just as well as physicists. In that case, the supposedly crucial 
role of the world drops out. It still makes sense to attribute differential success of theological 
opinions in the Middle Ages to the differential social success of the theologians carrying 
these opinions. But is it necessary to suppose that the successes of the interactors can be 
related to the content of the replicators; that the opinions of the more successful theologians 
bear a different relation to the Supreme Being than those of their less successful counterparts?  
It seems not. There may be a different ‘outside world’ against which these 
theological opinions were tested by peers, of course; the texts of the Bible and the Church 
Fathers, for instance. But perhaps not even this is necessary, and perhaps we can just say 
that the differential success of different theologians holding different opinions can be related 
rather to particular historical circumstances – social, political, cultural – to which these 
opinions were better suited than those of competing schools. This keeps the entities causally 
relevant to the selection processes in the realm of society; it would be the church-historical 
equivalent of SSK. Since the social, political and cultural circumstances would of course be 
somewhat less stable than the Deity about which the medieval theologians intended to write, 
we will not see these theologians converging to stable opinions and reaching stable goals, 
even though the evolution of the lineage(s) of theological thoughts involves differential 
replication through differentially successful social interaction. 
In order to follow Hull, similarly to Goldman and Williams, we need to believe 
already that it is possible for the success of scientists to depend on those features of the 
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substantive content of their theories which pertain to their relation to the natural world. 
Again, this is not necessarily a problem; we have established that the arguments that say we 
should completely omit the natural world from our account of science are unconvincing, 
and that it is very plausible that features of the natural world can be of explanatory value for 
the history of science. The question is where the natural world comes in and how its causal 
influence works. 
Hull gives an example of causal links between the non-conceptual, non-social, 
natural world on the one hand, and scientists on the other:  
 
because I see a ball accelerate as it rolls down an inclined plane, I come to hold beliefs about 
the motion of balls as they roll down inclined planes.559  
 
This is straightforward enough, if we don’t read the condition here as a sufficient condition, 
and make no trouble about the ‘seeing a ball accelerate’ being hardly ‘non-conceptual’. 
Observations can cause us to believe certain things, depending on how we are disposed to 
respond to these observations. Here I would like to call into mind what we discussed in 
chapter 3: that observations of nature can cause us to form certain beliefs is not the same as 
saying that nature on its own forces these beliefs upon us. After all, what kinds of beliefs we 
form when we see a ball roll down an inclined plane depends very much upon our previous 
beliefs, and upon our judgment of this observation, et cetera. From this quote, there is no 
reason to think that Hull does not realize this or that he disagrees; he is simply pointing out 
that there are obvious causal links between what we see and what we believe.  
However, he also speaks about the role of the world in a more inevitabilist register: 
he finds himself believing, not just that events in nature are partial causes of opinions in 
science, but also that science gets progressively better at what it tries to do, and that this is 
because the things it is looking for in nature actually exist.560 Laws of nature, for instance, 
are really there to be found: 
 
Conceptual evolution, especially in science, is both locally and globally progressive, not 
simply because scientists are conscious agents, not simply because they are striving to reach 
both local and global goals, but because these goals exist. If scientists did not strive to 
formulate laws of nature, they would discover them only by happy accident, but if these 
eternal, immutable regularities did not exist, any belief a scientist might have that he or she 
had discovered one would be illusory.561 
 
The claim about the role that nature plays in science according to this quotation, I hope it is 
clear, does not follow from that in the previous quotation, though it also does not contradict 
it. In the gap between the two lies the question how nature gets to be not just a cause of 
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beliefs, but also something that beliefs in some way converge toward. How precisely do we 
need to read this, and how does this come about? 
This puzzle, as Donald Campbell states it, is how it happens that “the beliefs of 
physicists come to fit the physical world they refer to”.562 Selection processes are an answer 
to this question, similar to the case in which we are puzzled by the whiteness of the polar 
bear which so well fits the whiteness of the surrounding terrain.563 If we are not convinced 
of, or interested in, a striking ‘match’ between science and its ‘surrounding terrain’, like SSK 
scholars; or if we think science and its environment have come to be in the same movement, 
so that their correspondence is not a puzzle, like Latour, then the reference to scientists 
interacting with the physical world in order to test the ideas-replicators of other scientists 
becomes uninformative, an answer to a non-existing question. 
Hull, like the other invisible hand theorists, believes that science is trying to do 
something and that it is successful at doing so. What is so appealing about Hull’s approach, 
however, is that he foregoes the rationalism inherent in, for instance, Goldman’s 
epistemology; he does not provide an account of what it is about the theories selected by 
science that made them fit for selection rather than their alternatives. Following Laudan,564 
Hull embraces the idea that it is not just scientific theories that change over time, but 
methodologies and goals as well – “the nature of science is constantly under negotiation”.565 
It is not that the theories possess some ahistorical value like truth; it is not even that the 
scientists holding some specific theories excel at some transcendent virtue like ‘accuracy’;566 
no, the way to speak about this is to say that scientists are trying to increase their 
‘conceptual fitness’, and this is a wholly contextual term, depending on what counts as 
‘fitting’ to the relevant communities, and what counts as a successful test. Hull affirms the 
primacy of the use scientists make of terms over the philosophical analysis of these terms.567 
Hull’s sympathetic mention of Laudan and his insistence that the ‘nature’ of 
science is dynamic and under constant negotiation suggest that he believes that the goals of 
science are themselves part of the evolutionary process, rather than something that remains 
stable throughout the scientific lineage. This is indeed more in tune with a naturalistic 
approach than retaining the notion that science has always had the same final goals – except 
of course if it be in the broad sense needed to identify a particular lineage of opinions as 
‘scientific’, which might involve a minimal requirement related to finding out things about 
nature. It is certainly not necessary for science to try to find eternal and immutable laws of 
nature; and if Hull (in the passage quoted above) really means to say that the progress of 
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science he seeks to explain is progress towards a stable goal, namely the discovery of eternal 
laws of nature, then this belief would be hard to square with a belief that the axiology of 
science is under constant negotiation.568  
This belief would also be just a bit too much like the belief that ‘current polar bears 
are better at fur colors than their ancestors’. Polar bears as a lineage don’t try to be white; 
they try to survive (– in fact, not even that claim is conceptually necessary; selection 
processes might explain the whiteness of the polar bear’s fur without any polar bear ever 
really trying anything). Similarly, we are supposed to believe that scientists don’t try to find 
eternal laws of nature; they try to increase their conceptual inclusive fitness (or at least, they 
fare better as scientists if that is what they do).569 No or very little explanatory value is 
supposed to lie in their intentions to solve problems.570 Under certain circumstances, 
convincing other scientists that you have found a law of nature, or testing or using claims by 
other scientists to this effect, may be the best strategy to increase your conceptual fitness. 
But these circumstances are not universally present: the beauty of Hull’s account is precisely 
that it is so permissive when it comes to strategies that scientists can employ, and that it can 
recognize that the aggregate effects of these strategies can be a ‘redirection’ of not just the 
theories, but also the goals of science.  
The ‘progress’ we are trying to explain, then – our observation that current science 
is so good at what it tries to do – is progress from our point of view; the point of view of the 
current aims and methods of science. This takes away some of the magic. If the substantial 
goals of science (as opposed to the attempt of scientists to increase conceptual inclusive 
fitness, which is potentially a general feature of scientists – or otherwise it is something that 
successful scientists turn out to have done571) have developed together with its other 
features, then these goals may be the result of strategic adaption to what is possible. In that 
case, we are like polar bears that realize how good we are at being as white as our 
environment, and who are puzzled by this fact. The solution to this puzzle is not the 
Latourian solution that our environment and ourselves result from the same process 
(because this is not the case); but part of the solution may lie in the realization that our 
valuing of being-white (which is a useful trait specifically in our snowy environment) is not 
causally independent of our being-white (which is the result of evolution through selection 
in our snowy environment).  
To say this more bluntly: that we find our science to be so good at doing what we 
expect of it is not only because it has found better ways to do the things we expect of it, but 
also because our culture has grown to expect of science the things it simultaneously found 
out how to do. This is one reason why we reformulated the question of contingentism and 
                                                     
568 On this issue, cf. also the very lucid treatment by Grantham (1994).  
569 Hull (1988b, 282). 
570 Hull (1988a, 123). 
571 Heyes (1988, 194) notes that Hull’s empirical claims suffer from a sampling problem, since most 
historical databases show only those scientists that succeeded in gaining recognition. 
 
7.3 David Hull’s Evolutionary Invisible Hand Account | 141 
inevitabilism at the beginning of this thesis (section 2.1), to free our questions about 
historical causality and path dependence from our criteria of success.  
This co-evolution of means and goals is a concept that will be especially appealing 
to historians who embrace the historicist intuition that scientists in different times and 
places are playing different ‘games’,572 with goals that cannot be easily translated into each 
other. It may be the case that the underlying aim of early modern natural philosophy was 
the understanding and praise of the Creator, whereas modern scientists qua scientists 
usually do not have this aim. However, the essential incomparability of scientific goals 
should not be a postulate of history of science. Goals (and scientists or science need not have 
had just one goal at any time) may have been stable for some time in some respects: the 
ancient Greeks have never tried to split the atom, for obvious reasons, so in that sense they 
were not engaged (as a scientific community) in an intentional activity identical to that of 
some modern research communities; but on another level of abstraction (‘trying to identify 
the fundamental elements of physical entities’) they may have been pursuing the same goal. 
The verdict of progress will differ according to the ways the goal can plausibly be phrased, 
and according to our measure of technical progress in the realization of those goals. We are 
never just better at ‘science’ than the Greeks, just like polar bears are not better at ‘fur colors’ 
than their ancestors; we always need to find a plausible way of interpreting the purpose of 
what went on, then and now. 
Much of what I have been saying here, including this last point, suffers from an 
equivocation of functionality and intentionality. The complex interplay we see developing 
here between individual intentions, the functioning and goals of science, and the blind 
forces of selection pressures, certainly merits further attention.  
 
7.3.3 Scientists as Agents 
If we are to provide an account of historical change in science in terms of evolution by 
selection, then we should be able to distinguish processes that cause mutations in replicators 
from processes that select these replicators.  
 Hull has emphasized that his account is not Lamarckian.573 This he has done in 
answer to objections to analogies between biological and conceptual evolution: it is 
intuitively plausible that conceptual change is a directed process, since it is carried out by 
intentional agents. A Darwinian process is, by definition, ‘blind’; usually this is taken to 
mean that genetic mutations are random. In a slightly less strict sense, it can be understood 
to mean that interactions with the environment do not influence the mutations of the 
replicators; their differential interaction with the environment (caused by differences in their 
corresponding replicators) only causes the differential proliferation of different replicators, 
and has nothing to do with the processes that lead to the differentiation of replicators itself. 
In biology, this means that those accounts fail to be Darwinian that fall short of ‘hard 
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heredity’: if acquired characteristics can be genetically passed on, then the independence of 
replicators and interactors gets compromised. 
 It seems that most of the things that happen in culture are the passing on of 
acquired characteristics, and this may seem like a complication for a Darwinian account of 
scientific development. However, this is not necessarily so. According to Hull, the 
intentional agents are not the replicators, but the interactors; scientists are not reproducing 
themselves, but they are, through their interactions with the social and natural environment, 
causing differential reproduction of replicators. The memes are replicators, analogous to 
genes in biological evolution.574 Just like the fact that some biological entities have intentions 
does not negate the Darwinian nature of biological evolution, the fact that scientists have 
intentions does not negate the Darwinian nature of cultural (scientific) evolution.  
 That is, as long as the evolution of scientific concepts is not directed in any sense by 
the actions of scientists.575 Peter Skagestad, an early critic of evolutionary epistemology 
(which is, again, not the project Hull is engaged in, but the criticism is relevant to his project 
as well), has attacked the application of a model of purely blind variation and selective 
retention to science held by Campbell (mentioned above in connection to the polar bear 
analogy).576 
 For this attack, it is not enough simply to say that scientists direct conceptual 
change because they base adaptations of previous theories on heuristic methods. This might 
provoke the reply that these heuristic principles are themselves the product of blind 
variation and selective retention, and that their existence and what it implies must be taken 
to be part of the already-acquired knowledge; any acquisition of knowledge that is really 
new might still be a result of blind variation.577 
 However, Skagestad adds to this that the accumulated tradition works to decrease 
the “range of permissible guesses”.578 This is a crucial point. “Prior adaptation in biological 
evolution raises the probability of further adaptation, while the prior guessing embodied in 
an intellectual tradition may as often lower the probability of further progress through a 
novel, correct guess.”579 
 It may be worth to drive this point home. After all, in one sense the possible further 
development of phenotypes in biology is limited by the previous evolutionary history of the 
organism, just like the possible development of an intellectual tradition is limited by its 
previous history: evolutionary change is path dependent in both cases. In biological 
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evolution, however, genetic mutations that are physically possible are not ruled out by the 
makeup of the phenotype such as it is as a result of prior adaptation. In cultural history, on 
the other hand, not all the changes that are conceptually possible are always equally 
‘culturally possible’: it may be possible for one scientist to replace a falsified heliocentric 
theory about the solar system by a geocentric one, while for another the only viable option is 
to replace it by another heliocentric hypothesis.580 
 The differential viability of heliocentric and geocentric hypotheses may simply 
mean that we should expect a differential proliferation (as scientists) of scientists holding 
heliocentric and geocentric theories in different ages, and that this differential proliferation 
will lead to a differential success of heliocentric and geocentric theories in different times. 
Moreover, Hull does not require that the social environment of scientists is only a proxy to 
nature; he allows for differential and culturally determined historical influences on theory 
selection.581 But the objection, as I interpret Skagestad and as I would maintain myself, is 
that the likeliness of a heliocentric theory being ‘altered’, in one generation, into a geocentric 
rather than a heliocentric theory is itself not stable, and dependent on a historical context – 
the same historical context with which the scientists-interactors are confronted. The same 
forces that would operate to influence the selective retention of proposed theories may be 
anticipated by the scientists, and influence the ways they develop and publish their 
theories.582  
Cecilia Heyes has called it problematic that in Hull’s account individual scientists 
have so much agency, since: “it would be unfortunate if an evolutionary analysis of 
scientific change were crucially dependent on our understanding the beliefs and 
motivations of individual scientists since […] the content of these states is very difficult to 
specify.”583 She proposes to drop the idea that scientists themselves function as interactors; 
rather, if they conform to certain specified cognitive characteristics, they can allow other 
entities (such as texts, diagrams, and gestures) to function as interactors.584 Needless to say, 
if scientists and their interactions with other scientists and with experiments influence not 
just the selective retention of theories but also the way in which they develop, then the role 
of individual scientists will become even greater, much to the dislike of those who find the 
understanding of their beliefs and motivations so cumbersome to deal with. It is my position 
that this understanding is, indeed, necessary.  
I agree with Hull, however, that scientists do not, on a large scale, foresee what 
history will do to the conceptual change they have carried.585 The reasons why a scientist 
develops and publishes a theory need not bear a clear and direct relation to the forces that 
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allow her to increase her conceptual inclusive fitness through this theory and thereby allow 
her theory to flourish. Mendel need not have anticipated the circumstances that led to the 
eventual success of his findings. Newtonian mechanics may owe its spread to its service to 
lot of purposes that Newton did neither intend nor consider desirable.586 I think it is, in 
general, a safe bet to say that no early modern scientist was consciously striving towards the 
current state of science – or laboring against it, for that matter. 
This is in line with the invisible hand motif running throughout this chapter: we 
are looking at mechanisms that potentially transcend the scope of individual intentions. 
There may be something understandable about the dynamics of theory acceptance and 
rejection in science that does not at any stage need to be traced to individual intentions. 
Nonetheless, I think it is important to have established – and the possibility that 
scientists anticipate at least some of the forces that influence the survival potential of 
themselves as scientists given their commitment to a certain theory, is only one way in 
which this may happen, albeit a conceptually important one – that there is something to be 
understood about the dynamics of conceptual change as well; and that these dynamics are 
historically conditioned in a way not captured by the notion of blind mutation.587 
 
7.4 Adaptation, Realism, and the Necessity of Understanding 
Hull’s proposal for an explanatory account of the development of the ‘lineage’ of Western 
science in terms of evolution by selection is very elegant and sympathetic. We ought to keep 
in mind that the goals in this process have evolved along with the means and that this 
evolution has therefore not necessarily been one of linear progress or convergence. If we do 
so, Hull’s account delivers all that it has promised: it explains scientific beliefs while 
undergirding the intuition that science is, by and large, good at realizing its manifest goals. 
The trick is that science is adaptive: that is has historically come to be structured in such a 
way that it evolves to accommodate new input from nature or changes in epistemic goals 
and methods.  
 We have also seen that Hull considers it essential to his invisible hand account that 
the things natural scientists are orienting their activities to – for instance, when they set out 
to discover laws of nature – actually exist. The question is to what extent we need to go 
along with this. For instance, do we need to be metaphysical realists when we say that 
science adapts to nature? This might seem to be so, since in this case we grant to nature a 
status independent of what science says about it – and is this not simply an instance of 
granting to the external world a status independent of what we think about it? 
In fact, we need to be realists in this case no more than we need to be realists when 
we say that animal species (or lineages) adapt to their environment: what we need to believe 
is that we can intelligibly and meaningfully speak of ‘natural entities’ as something distinct 
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from ‘things scientists say about nature’. It is possible to deny that we can do this, and in a 
simplification of Latour’s position, we could say that he comes close to denying this; but not 
denying this does not mean that we are holding the metaphysical position that the world 
exists completely independently from our minds, let alone that our minds somehow have 
access to this mind-independent world.  
 The analogy with biological adaptation illustrates this. The opinion that biological 
entities adapt to their environment is not restricted to metaphysical realists. The analogy is 
complicated, of course, by the fact that, contrary to the case of biological adaptation, in 
which we have access to descriptions of the environment independently of our access to 
descriptions of biological entities, we do not always have access to nature independently of 
the science that we study.588 Sometimes we do, but when we study the historical 
development of our own scientific opinions we do not.  
 Then still, the notion of an independent world can be something other than 
‘unnecessary metaphysics’; Philip Kitcher has characterized it as a result of extrapolation: 
“Our purchase on the idea that some objects are independent of some of us (although 
observed by others) suffices to make intelligible the thought that some objects are 
independent of all of us.”589 In our case, we can extrapolate to our awareness that some 
objects in nature exist independently of what other scientific cultures and traditions have 
said about them, to an awareness that some objects in nature exist independently of what 
any scientific tradition has said about them – including our own. When we say of successful 
ways of dealing with the world that they are approximately correct, Kitcher says, we do not 
make a jump from “things-as-they-appear-to-us” to “things-as-they-are-in-themselves”,590 
but from a situation we observe to a (possibly counterfactual) situation which we do not 
observe: we say that if we hadn’t been present to see this person or this culture dealing with 
a world that we observe to be independent of her, their actions would have been just as 
successful because the same causal relations apply. 
 Kitcher makes his move from success to accuracy based on his idea that “we rely 
on our common experience of likely success rates with accurate and inaccurate 
representations”.591 I am not sure that it is necessary or desirable to make this step in history 
of science: though accuracy may be a virtue or value central to current science, it is only 
indirectly relevant to history of science, as a potential aspect of the explanation of the 
historical development of scientific beliefs. And in history, as Laudan has argued,592 we have 
to recognize as successful at least some theories that we are also bound to call inaccurate – 
sometimes perhaps even less accurate (to our knowledge) than less successful theories. At 
the very least, the relation between accuracy (which I understand to mean a degree of 
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structural similarity between a scientific theory or model and the external world) and 
success is not linear.  
The reason I refer to Kitcher’s argument about the notion of an independent world 
is not because of his point about accuracy, but because it serves to show that the fact that we 
cannot think about ‘the external world as independent of how we think it is’ as something 
substantially different from ‘the external world as we think it is’ – it would be paradoxical to 
say that we believe these two things to have different properties (e.g. one containing laws of 
nature but not the other) – does not prevent us from conceiving of this external world as 
independent of what any third person thinks about it, and extrapolate to its independence of 
what we think about it. That is, the idea can make sense that our scientific culture has to 
some extent ‘adapted’ to a nature that is independent of it even if it is only known to us 
through it. 
Now, in a thoroughly Darwinistic world, the natural environment will be the main 
explanatory factor for the makeup of a species (conceived of as a lineage) at a certain time, in 
combination with the preceding temporal parts of this lineage: the lineage as it is will adapt 
to fit the environment in one of the optimal ways. We cannot simply translate this to say 
that nature as it is will be the main explanatory factor for the makeup of science; and not just 
because this would be Whiggish and circular. It is also not possible because ‘nature’ does 
not exhaust the ‘environment’ of science; or phrased more precisely, the set of things a 
scientific discipline seeks to describe does not exhaust the set of things that constitute the 
environment to which it adapts, since the environment with which it interacts also contains 
other people and objects. An evolutionary account of (a particular discipline in) science 
predicts that it will not converge to theories and models which fit the objects it studies best – 
if this would even mean anything – but that it will adapt to fit its environment as a whole 
best.593 An easy way to make sense of this is, if we follow Hull in identifying the substance 
of science as being primarily its conceptual content, the recognition that this content needs 
to be of such a nature as to be amenable to being handled by humans with the perceptual 
and cognitive capacities such as they are biologically given, in numbers such as the social 
and economic structure of a society can provide, and with the categories and prejudices that 
their culture has imprinted upon them. Even if we believe that a geocentric cosmology is 
‘less accurate’ than a heliocentric one – which would be the closest thing to ‘less well adapted 
to the actual state of the solar system’ – it can, at a certain time and place, be the doctrine best 
adapted to the historical context as a whole. The goal of history of science would be to 
describe this context in such a way that we can see how this is the case.  
We have also seen, in the previous section, that the mechanisms behind the 
evolution of scientific concepts necessarily fall short of pure Darwinism, because the 
likeliness of possible mutations within the pool of scientific entities is influenced by cultural 
and other historical factors, adding a stage to the process before the actual mutations go 
                                                     
593 Cf. Giere’s (2006) use of ‘fitness’ in his perspectivist account of science (esp. 71-72). 
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through the selection process through interaction with the environment. It is crucial to 
understand how this happens. 
These things together ensure that the thesis that science develops through the 
mechanism of evolution through selection, though it deals successfully with many problems 
regarding the relation between science and the world, cannot sidestep the demand for a 
more detailed understanding of the historical context by appealing to the environment from 
which the selective forces that work on science proceed.594 The word ‘understanding’ is, at 
this stage of the argument, not intended to be contrasted to the ‘explanatory’ activity of 
evolutionary mechanisms simply by means of a terminological divide; I do not want to 
suggest a fundamental distinction between these two aspects of the explanation without 
arguing for it, so until further notice, by ‘understanding’ the historical context I simply mean 
clarifying the explanatory function that this context serves. 
However, I do think that there is some crucial work to be done in exploring the 
relevance for history of science of ‘understanding’ with its further connotation of 
‘interpretation’; and that a philosophy of history of science, where history of science is the 
discipline engaged in understanding science by grasping it in its ‘environment’, cannot be 
complete without further reflection upon what it means to understand science in the world. 
This is the aim of the final chapter. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
From the preceding discussion, we can conclude: 
1) David Hull’s view of science as a lineage provides a historically fruitful alternative 
to a view of science as defined normatively or as a kind. 
2) A naturalistic view of science as evolving in continuous interaction with the world, 
where this interaction causes a differential proliferation of scientific theories and 
practices, provides a very plausible account of the role of the world in science that 
can in principle harmonize historical causal explanation of scientific developments 
with an explanation of why science seems successful. 
3) There is no reason why such an account would be globally inevitabilist, since the 
entities that science studies do not constitute the whole of its selective environment, 
and scientific goals, methods, instruments, and theories are also part of each other’s 
selective environment, which as a whole develops historically.  
Since the selective environment influences not only the selection but also 
the mutations in scientific goals, methods, instruments, and theories, the evolution 
of science is not properly Darwinian and an explanation of historical change in 
science requires an understanding of the whole local environment in which change 
comes to be proposed.  
                                                     
594 See also the criticism of evolutionary accounts by Jardine (2004, 272-273). 
148 | Chapter 7: The Invisible Hand of Science 
  
 
8.1 The Problem of Understanding | 149 
Chapter 8: An Exposition of Hermeneutic 
Philosophy of History of Science 
 
8.1 The Problem of Understanding 
The larger part of this thesis has been devoted to critical assessment of positions held by 
others with regard to the way in which nature plays a role in history of science. In the 
current chapter, I will develop my own position, which I would like to dub a ‘hermeneutic’ 
perspective on philosophy of history of science.  
 The crucial term, ‘hermeneutic’, has a notoriously complex meaning and history, 
and it is not because I seek to avoid doing justice to this complexity that I will begin by 
making a few simple statements about what I intend to convey by it. By hermeneutics I 
understand philosophical attempts to clarify what it is to understand something or 
someone.595 We have seen earlier (e.g. sections 4.2.2; 7.3.3) that historical accounts of science, 
even if their goals are explanatory, are likely to have a hermeneutic component in this sense: 
there is something to be understood. 
 This is also the case for historiography in general, but in history of science, there 
seems to be something special going on. First, the people whose activities and products we 
seek to interpret are dealing with nature in such a way that it is impossible to interpret them 
without involving in our interpretation some understanding of this ‘nature’ with which they 
are dealing. This in itself is not too peculiar, since there are no human actions that we 
understand in isolation from our understanding of (parts of) the non-human world. In this 
case, however, we also need to come to terms with the fact that our understanding of the 
natural world is indirectly what we try to understand, and that it is itself the result of a 
possibly contingent historical path. 
 I take this to imply that in principle, our understanding of science and nature can 
change in the process of history of science.596 The potential critical and corrective role that 
history of science can play with respect to science therefore does not follow from its 
independence of science, but is related precisely to its dependence on its history.  
 
8.2 Science and Tradition 
8.2.1 Tradition and Transcendence 
In the previous chapter, we have spoken about the possibility of looking at science as a 
lineage rather than a class or a kind; this was one of the things we took from David Hull’s 
evolutionary account. For historical purposes, science is identified not by a set of essential 
features, but by genealogical links between generations. According to Hull, as we have seen, 
this lineage involves an interplay between replication and interaction, which means that the 
                                                     
595 Cf. e.g. Bruns(1992, 1). 
596 Apel (1999). 
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lineage evolves over time. Already in the previous chapter, we compared this to the notion 
of a tradition, and in this section we will look deeper into what it would mean to see science 
in history as a tradition. 
 Tradition and science have been related on many occasions, and the notion of 
tradition has been used both in the singular and the plural, and on many scales. Alistair 
Crombie has talked about “styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition” – a 
singular tradition that starts in ancient Greece and is transmitted to early modern Europe.597 
Usually, identifying a Western tradition goes together with stating that this tradition 
instantiates a scientific rationality, thereby relating it to science as a kind again. This is the 
case, for instance, when Karl Popper identifies a rationalist tradition that leads from the 
Presocratics to present-day science, and is defined by its critical attitude rather than by its 
genealogy.598 On the other hand, there are diachronic theories about research programmes 
or research traditions by, for instance, Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan – though in Lakatos’ 
case, research programmes are essentially defined by their hard cores.  
On both scales and both in the singular and the plural, the relation between 
traditionality and ‘scientificity’ is often rather complicated. What is at stake here is the 
question whether the scientific tradition embodies something that is in principle history-
transcending. We saw this tension already when we discussed historians such as Koyré or 
Bernal, who oppose the weight of tradition rather sharply to what came to science from 
reason or nature and therefore from outside this tradition. Both find the genuinely scientific 
part of science to be non-traditional.  
One approach that largely drops the attempt to declare science history-
transcending, and in which being part of science therefore comes to be identified with 
membership of a tradition rather than with exhibiting universally defined qualities, is 
Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions, with its focus on the paradigms of “normal-
scientific traditions”. Scientists’ commitments to paradigms involves commitment to specific 
scientific laws, concepts and theories, and preferred types of instrumentation, as well as 
certain kinds of metaphysical attitudes.599 It is through being initiated in a scientific 
paradigm, or tradition, that one can start doing scientific work and contributing to scientific 
progress at all.600 This is the ‘essential tension’ between tradition and innovation, and it 
extends not just to normal science but even to revolutionary science: “work within a well-
defined and deeply ingrained tradition seems more productive of tradition-shattering 
novelties than work in which no similarly convergent standards are involved.”601 
Nonetheless, at the highest level of generality, Kuhn gives a minimal definition of 
what it is to be a scientist, which builds on ahistorical criteria that are already much more 
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demanding than David Hull’s – namely: trying to understand the world with increasing 
precision and through detailed study, and refining one’s theories or techniques in the face of 
apparent disorder.602 Normal-scientific traditions are different local and historical instances 
of this kind.603 Moreover, science progresses partly through moments of especially strong 
discontinuity which are explicitly opposed to the kind of traditionality involved in normal 
science. The break with the past in scientific revolutions may not be absolute, but it is 
momentous enough for Kuhn to say that “the proponents of competing paradigms practice 
their trades in different worlds.”604 
These cautious remarks by Kuhn raise the question to what extent and in what 
sense ‘the world’ itself is subject to historical change and constituted by the results of 
historical scientific activity. Ian Hacking, worrying about the ambiguity of Kuhn’s 
formulations in this respect, has proposed to resolve it by distinguishing between a “world 
of individuals” that does not change as a result of scientific revolutions on the one hand, and 
a “world of kinds” on the other – which is the world scientists actually work in and with, 
and which does change.605 The world stays the same; it is the way we carve it up that is 
subject to historical difference. 
To Kuhn, this feels too easy. He reminds Hacking that scientists in different 
paradigms do not just disagree about words, but about things as well; not just about how to 
classify phenomena, but also about causal expectations.606 This touches upon our own 
considerations later in this chapter: Kuhn rightly avoids any attempt to neatly split up our 
world into a neutral, necessarily inter-paradigmatically stable part and a paradigm-
dependent part, whether it is data versus theory or individuals versus kinds. In principle, 
every aspect of the world as known by science must be viewed as in some sense constituted 
by a scientific paradigm or tradition. However, there seems to be a tension between this 
principle and the seeming history-independence of the world. We will return to this 
question in section 8.5.2. 
In a different way than Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend is grappling with the relationship 
between tradition and other organizing categories in science as well. In Against Method, 
Feyerabend speaks about science as a unitary tradition held together by rationality, albeit in 
a negative tone, when he says that “it is thus possible to create a tradition that is held 
together by strict rules, and that is also successful to some extent. But is it desirable to 
support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else?”607 In Science in a Free Society, 
the hierarchy between rationality and tradition seems to be reversed: there Feyerabend aims 
to show “that rationality is one tradition among many rather than a standard to which 
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traditions must conform”.608 This still contains a suggestion that rationality is something 
special that can be found in one specific tradition – for which reason this tradition is, 
according to Feyerabend, worth rebelling against.609 Nonetheless, here we can see a clearly 
historical and ‘lineage-like’ account of scientific traditions.610 
We have also seen Bloor, together with Barnes and Henry, invoke the notion of a 
local interpretive tradition that informs the interpretation of Millikan’s oil-drop 
experiment.611 As we discussed in chapter 5, they regard this tradition as providing Millikan 
with inherited systems of classification. They explicitly contrast this tradition-boundedness 
of Millikan’s work with interpretations of it that put the explanatory weight upon his ‘being 
right’ or ‘being rational’. What these approaches have in common is that they look upon 
being part of science not as a result of the following of certain specific methodological 
requirements or rules, but more as some sort of membership. In the case of Kuhn and Bloor, 
this membership is seen primarily in a sociological way: for Kuhn, the choice between 
paradigms is a “choice between incompatible modes of community life.”612 
 Perhaps because of this association between the removal of the link between the 
scientific tradition and history-transcendence (in the form for instance of rationality) on the 
one hand and sociological accounts of traditionality on the other hand, such accounts are 
often perceived as undermining the status of the scientific tradition or of the research 
traditions they are dealing with, sometimes in spite of the intentions of their authors – Kuhn, 
of course, never meant to subvert science, and Bloor explicitly wanted his own programme 
to be scientific.613 Nevertheless, it seems that sociological discourse about what it is to be 
part of a tradition is often in competition with what it is for members to be part of a tradition. 
We have also seen that such discourse easily turns to the suggestion that science is 
determined by social forces rather than by the things it is about – hinting that these two 
explanatory factors (nature and society) are in competition. 
 
  
                                                     
608 Feyerabend (1978, 7). 
609 The main criticism of Feyerabend by Chalmers (1999) is that “individuals are born into a society that 
pre-exists them and which, in that sense, possesses characteristics they do not choose and cannot be in a 
position to choose.” (158). Chalmers thinks that Feyerabend needs to ignore this fact in his anarchism. 
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8.2.2 A Gadamerian Account of Tradition 
It is also possible to conceive of traditions in a slightly different sense, in which the 
competition between ‘social’ and ‘natural’ causes is less pronounced, but the other features 
of the abovementioned accounts of traditions remain: that they are individual lineages 
rather than kinds, that they provide a framework for scientific activity that does not make 
recourse to transcendental entities such as rationality, and that being part of a tradition 
consists in interacting with it rather than with sharing essential features with it. 
For instance, Patrick Heelan has written about the relation between “traditions of 
interpretation” from a hermeneutic perspective, where Kuhn-like discontinuities of meaning 
can take place within a tradition without involving the destruction of old meanings.614 In 
general, the hermeneutic philosophical tradition may have a perspective on the relation 
between traditionality and science on offer that overcomes a binary opposition between the 
two. 
The perspective outlined in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method is especially 
worthwhile in this respect. This work is meant to liberate the humanities from a natural-
scientific ideal of methodical objectivity, as well as from a subjectivist view of 
understanding, according to which historical interpretation simply entails reconstruction of 
the state of mind of the author. Understanding, says Gadamer, is “not a mysterious 
communion of souls, but participating in a shared meaning”.615 It has an element of 
Sachlichkeit, which literally translates as objectivity but is explicitly distinguished from it by 
Gadamer;616 rather than removing the subjects of understanding from the equation, it views 
them as being engaged with the same thing or the same question. 
Understanding always takes place from within a tradition. This is an element in 
Gadamer’s thought that has often been considered conservative or elitist,617 but in fact, 
Gadamer’s way of talking about tradition does not imply its identification with ‘high 
culture’. Rather, tradition signifies the sum of influences that the past holds over us, and 
that we cannot completely escape from. All understanding is historically conditioned, and 
historical awareness consists precisely in realizing and clarifying the working of history in 
ourselves.618 In this sense, our finite horizon and our position in history are precisely what 
makes understanding possible. This is one reason why Gadamer opposes the “enlightened 
prejudice against prejudice”:619 it is not by erasing one’s pre-understandings that 
communication and understanding with regard to another perspective become possible, but 
precisely by bringing them to the conversation. In short, historical understanding requires 
us to be aware of the historicity of our position, rather than neutralizing and transcending it. 
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Another reason for this is the possibility that there may be legitimate authority in 
tradition. This, too, looks suspiciously complacent at first sight, but Gadamer explicitly 
contrasts his own account of traditionality with a romantic anti-rationalism. The point is 
precisely that reason does not reside outside history but only within it – in the sense just 
mentioned, that all rational thinking is already dependent on what is historically given to it 
– and that therefore the whole contrast between rationality and history is misleading. In fact, 
we find within the tradition in which we stand things that still speak to us, and that are still 
applicable. 
These two elements may work to summarize our reception of Gadamer’s 
philosophy in a hermeneutic perspective on the history of science: the notion that past and 
present science are about something, and the notion of the positive contribution of 
traditionality and prejudice to understanding, both in science itself and in historiography of 
science.  
There are two main reasons why employing precisely Gadamer’s hermeneutics in 
reflections upon historiography of science may seem odd. First, as Nicholas Jardine has also 
noted,620 Gadamer’s view of understanding seems opposed to the ideal of knowing the past 
for its own sake and on its own terms, which in turn seems to be supposed in academic 
historiography. There is, indeed, a tension here, though Gadamer recognizes that, for 
instance, a legal scholar has a different intentional relation to a past law than a legal 
historian.621 That he seeks to get behind these differences and expose their common 
hermeneutical position – understanding law in history from within history – does not belie 
the possibility of historiography.622 
Second, Gadamer on multiple occasions explicitly excludes the natural sciences 
from his account of understanding. In natural science, he says, the relation between 
scientific progress and the historical moment in which this progress took place is of 
secondary importance, since the scientific method makes sure that science is determined by 
the object of its knowledge, not by its historical conditions.623 In this sense, Gadamer 
precisely does make the binary opposition between science and tradition that we seek to 
undermine here.624 
However, it is more likely that Gadamer buys into a positivist myth of the 
objectivity of natural science because it increases the rhetorical strength of his attempt to 
liberate the humanities of an ideal of method and objectivity that, he can say, is essentially 
alien to them precisely because its ideal of alienation does not fit the notion of 
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understanding from within history.625 His intervention, we should keep in mind, is aimed 
not at the natural sciences but at the humanities, and writing two years before Kuhn’s 
Structure, Gadamer can be forgiven for not anticipating the half century of historicizing 
science that came after Truth and Method. Moreover, he did retract his inevitabilist 
statements about natural science in the notes to a later edition.626 
If we are contingentists about science – that is, if we believe, unlike Gadamer in the 
first edition of Truth and Method, that history matters to scientific understanding as well, 
because the scientific method does not progressively transcend its tradition-boundedness in 
a movement towards objectivity – then there is no reason why a Gadamerian hermeneutics 
would not be applicable to the history and historiography of science.627 I have already hinted 
at what I believe this would entail: an insistence on both the situatedness of scientific and 
historical understanding, and on its Sachlichkeit – on the fact, that is, that historical 
understanding of science means understanding it to be about something.  
In the following sections, we will zoom in a bit more on the role hermeneutical 
perspectives upon science have been brought to play in the philosophy of science. This 
serves both to illustrate what the translation of hermeneutic discourse from the humanities 
to the sciences (in which Gadamer himself is not of much help) involves, and to prepare our 
own statement with regard to the historicity of historiography of science, and the role of the 
world in this historiography. 
 
8.3 Language and Lifeworld 
Robert Crease has summarized the contribution of hermeneutical philosophy as that of 
“supplying the philosophical foundation for reintroducing history and culture into the 
philosophy of the natural sciences.”628 He lists three organizing principles of a 
hermeneutical perspective on science, which are a good starting point for surveying the 
breadth and the internal tensions of this hermeneutic perspective. They are, first, the priority 
of meaning over technique: “science is wholly mischaracterized as solely consisting of praxes, 
of the application of techniques or calculational methods, because data, results, and 
laboratory events come into being by interpretation and will be mistakenly described if 
interpretation is poorly done.” Second, the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. 
“The framework of meaning in terms of which phenomena are interpreted is not comprised 
merely of tools, texts, and ideas, but involves a culturally and historically determined 
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engagement with the world which is prior to the subject and object separation.” Third, the 
priority of situation over abstract formalization.629 
 Let us start by noticing a certain tension between the first and the second. Whereas 
the ‘priority of meaning over technique’ targets practice as incomplete and requiring 
interpretation, the ‘primacy of the practical over the theoretical’ seems precisely to point out 
that meaning is subsumed wholly by the domain of practice. There is no downright 
contradiction here – it is conceivable and even probable that the ‘praxes’ mentioned in the 
first principle are construed in a different way from the ‘practical’ mentioned in the second, 
which turns out to be more a general ‘engagement with the world’ – but we do see a hint of 
a divergence here. At one extreme, hermeneutics may denote a kind of theoretical holism 
(we may think here of the idea that all statements, including observation statements, acquire 
their meaning from relations to networks of other statements), which according to Rouse 
points in the direction of analytic pragmatism. At the other extreme is a “Heideggerian 
hermeneutics of practice”.630 There seems to be a difference between a hermeneutics 
oriented more upon linguistic structures and one oriented more upon a pre-linguistic being-
in-the-world.631 
Patrick Heelan has explicitly applied to science the idea that all theoretical entities 
are not simply theory-laden but primarily praxis-laden: what a thing is, is derived from its 
meaning in human life – the lifeworld or the ‘manifest image of the world’.632 The role of the 
lifeworld is summarized by the idea that our primary relation to the world is not 
epistemological but ontological: we start not by knowing the world but by being in it, and 
knowing it makes sense only in relation to our being in the world.633 This premise leads to 
the realization that science as much as any other human activity is connected to life. In 
slightly elevated language, Heelan’s contribution has been summarized as “highlight[ing] 
the fore-structuring of scientific phenomena in the living-worldly horizons of laboratory 
everydayness.”634 
John Compton illustrates how we may imagine this fore-structuring. It is crucial, he 
says, that “we find ourselves within the natural world, we engage it in all manner of daily 
ways, we interact with others within it, long before we have ever heard of science.”635 
Compton encourages philosophy to invoke our prescientific understanding of nature, and to 
show how scientific concepts and practices “may be seen to refer back to the prescientifically 
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known natural world.”636 In the life-world, he explicates, we find an active interplay 
between our embodied selves and other bodily beings. This prescientific engagement 
underpins the criteria of explanatory validation in the sciences – principles like consistency 
and simplicity, Compton claims, are implicit in our perceptive and active encounters with 
the world.637  
I feel slightly uncomfortable with the substantive theory formulated here, which 
suggests that criteria for scientific theory choice reflect rather straightforwardly attitudes 
that apparently necessarily accompany our relation to the life-world. Taken to its extreme, 
such a theory would undermine the sense that precise practices within science are the result 
of historical development (and are therefore possibly contingent) rather than natural. 
Moreover, it seems that what we engage with ‘pre-scientifically’ is not just the natural world, 
but society and culture as well; and that isolating ‘nature’ from our life-world seems like an 
abstraction which – however justified it might be – assumes concepts whose availability and 
precise meaning are themselves a product of history.  
But after these critical remarks, Compton’s point that scientific activity is 
embedded in a lifeworld, which includes a pre-scientific engagement with natural objects, 
still stands:  
   
To say that natural science ultimately refers to and coheres with pre-scientifically experienced 
nature is not at all to say that its theoretical models must simply duplicate the everyday 
world; nor is it to say that these models may not specify space-time curvatures, discontinuous 
trajectories, causal indeterminacies, or contain some other unusual features. It is only to say 
that such ‘world-variations’ must have some limits and that theoretical models must share 
some structures with perceived realities if they are genuinely to be taken to specify aspects, 
parts, or structures of the natural world.638 
  
We may note that the primacy of the practical, in the sense of being in the world, converges 
rather nicely with more naturalistic perspectives, or even specifically with evolutionary 
perspectives, in which our knowledge, even systematic knowledge, evolves in causal contact 
with the world. (It also converges with the Marxist claim we saw Bernal make, that “one 
basis for life and another for science is a priori a lie”.) What the hermeneutic perspective 
adds is a layer of meaning; and with that, the idea that the development of knowledge is not 
only something that can be explained by the interactions between an individual and an 
environment, but something that can be understood through its relation with the life-world.  
 If we want to employ this ontology in a philosophy of science (or history of science), 
we need to ask how we conceptualize this life-world. McGuire and Tuchańska point out 
some different conceptualizations, by showing how Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein 
failed to thematize sociocultural relations ‘ontologically’; they credit Gadamer with 
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replacing “the Heideggerian concept of being-in-the-world with the idea of our being-in-
culture understood as constituted by language, tradition, and history.”639  
 McGuire and Tuchańska add that as far as they are concerned, we need to go 
beyond Gadamer’s ‘linguisticism’. It should be noted of course, that for Gadamer, having a 
language and having a world go hand in hand, and that to the extent that his hermeneutics 
is linguisticist, it is because worlds become understandable through language, not because 
language is content-free.640 Nonetheless, the tension between perspectives focusing on a 
linguistic fore-structuring of understanding versus those focusing on a non-linguistic 
experiential fore-structuring, which we see repeated here, does not need to be resolved 
completely. It is important to note that under both perspectives, life-world experiences and 
relations can change historically. This is easier to recognize when we regard being-in-the-
world as mediated by a tradition in a Gadamerian sense – for it is intuitively clear that 
human institutions such as language and sociocultural communities that constitute these 
traditions are historical – but it is no less the case for the relations between people and 
things, regardless of whether we regard these relations as mediated primarily by language. 
Importantly, there may be all kinds of feedback from science to the life-world – either 
through influences on language or through altering the relations between people or between 
people and things. It is the historical distance that results from this change that leads to a 
hermeneutical problem,641 and thus to the possibility and necessity of historiography.  
 
8.4 Traditionality, Contingency, and Nature 
8.4.1 Circling and Dialogue 
Joseph Kockelmans has looked at canonical figures in the scientific revolution, such as 
Kepler, Galileo and Newton. He concludes that though most of these figures have a 
reputation of rejecting all arguments that appeal to tradition and authority, in their research 
they relate their observations to “frameworks of meaning” that they have accepted 
independently of their scientific work, “determined in part by religious and metaphysical 
speculations.”642 According to Kockelmans, “even though this way of thinking is 
scientifically unacceptable, it nonetheless shows at the same time, that the discovery of the 
Kepler laws was the result of a work that was inherently hermeneutic in nature.”643 
 This shows us something about the difficulties in isolating the innovative aspects of 
a self-consciously hermeneutic perspective: often, the ‘hermeneutic nature’ of scientific 
research is presented in direct opposition to a rather simplistic rationalistic view of science, 
to which the hermeneutic perspective is presented as the only alternative.644 We have seen 
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that Koyré had no trouble identifying the philosophical metaphysics informing the thought 
of his heroes, or in showing to what extent their scientific work remained connected to 
traditional frameworks – only, he gave these traditional frameworks a less positive spin and 
talked about ‘inertia’ rather than the relating of observations to frameworks of meaning. Nor 
can SSK scholars be accused of thinking that scientists single-handedly construct their 
theories on the basis of observations, without any categories handed to them by structures 
preceding them. Sometimes, different alternative ways of looking at science in history are in 
dialogue only with one particular version of rationalism, rather than with each other. 
 Nonetheless, we find a different tone in Kockelmans than in SSK: 
 
The important thing to note here is that all scientific work is done within a hermeneutic circle, 
which no science can ever overcome. This, however, does not mean that scientists would be 
unable to make true statements about what is; yet it does mean that none of these statements 
will ever be absolute or eternal, definitive or comprehensive.645 
 
More than with, for instance, Bloor or Collins, we get the impression that the dialogue of 
scientists with the tradition that precedes them is not a deficiency; that it is not something 
that leaves a gap (a gap that needs to be closed by extra-scientific factors, according to 
Collins), but something that is connected to the very nature of science or of human activity 
in general.  
We find this intuition voiced explicitly by Martin Eger. In 1993, Eger wrote a series 
of programmatic articles presenting “the case for hermeneutics in the appropriation of 
natural science – that is, in every kind of presentation, study, and understanding of what a 
particular science is saying to us.”646 Eger’s argument in these articles is based among other 
things on supposed resemblances between developments in ‘historical-literary hermeneutics’ 
and philosophy of science – Eger notes that a cautious hermeneutic attitude can be 
harmonized with the Popperian idea of ‘prejudgment’ as a kind of probe. However, the role 
later thinkers ascribe to tacit preconceptions goes a bit further: “Polanyi, Kuhn, and others 
elevated the role of such preconceptions to a level of importance in science comparable to 
that given them by Heidegger in hermeneutics. On the one hand we cannot completely rise 
above such bias; on the other, because of its positive role, it is now clear that we cannot wish 
to do so.”647 
 The point of overlap between the development in philosophy of science and 
hermeneutic thought is that while in the classical understanding of the hermeneutic circle, 
the circling movements in the end necessarily converged towards a predetermined point, 
the twentieth century brought a more radical interpretation of hermeneutics: “a drastic 
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reinterpretation of interpretation as constructivist”.648 The circle ceases to converge.649 
Translating this metaphor into terms that we have discussed previously, we can say that 
literary hermeneutics moved from inevitabilism to contingentism: the number of possible 
end-points of interpretative activity was no longer one. An analogy can indeed be drawn 
between this and a denial of convergent realism in philosophy of science.650  
 Eger moves from this to the question about the role of interpretation in the 
understanding of science. He argues that even in the more radical hermeneutics of the 
twentieth century, interpretation is not invention – “there is something there to interpret”651 – 
and that the notion of interpretation can be applied to things as well. “’Things’ are, in this 
sense, not ‘dead’. They put forth, or present, or ‘have’ a meaning that is theirs, a part of their 
being (in relation to us).”652 I am in doubt about the extent to which we ought to embrace this 
formulation in its far-reaching symmetry between humans and non-humans, but here it may 
help to think of hermeneutic interpretation in part as a ‘speaking on behalf of’.653  
 Eger has written lucidly as well about the difference between a hermeneutic 
perspective and a constructivist perspective. In part, this difference is a difference in 
language: the language of constructivist sociologists, Eger says, features a lot of terms such 
as ‘deconstruction’ or ‘un-doing’ or the political metaphor of ‘negotiation’. This is what is 
presented as the alternative to objectivism; it is shown, for instance, that scientists ‘sacrifice’ 
crucial parts of a theory in their ‘negotiations’. However, we can talk as well about scientists 
‘playing’ or circling hermeneutically.654 In saying this, Eger is not just putting a more 
positive spin and redescribing the claims that sociologists like Harry Collins make in less 
derogatory terms; he is challenging the idea that, since science does not conform to a naïve 
objectivist image, there is a deficiency that needs to be repaired by extrascientific factors. 
Why, Eger asks, does Collins talk about an ‘experimenter’s regress’ rather than a 
‘hermeneutic circle’? It is because according to Collins such a circle is necessarily vicious, 
and there must be something that breaks it. However, from a hermeneutic perspective, 
circling is precisely what we would expect. Pointing out the feedback between scientists’ 
pre-understandings and their findings is not un-making science; it is illustrative of how 
scientific understanding properly works, namely by 
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precisely the dialogue between scientists and their tradition, their history. […] I would say 
that the interaction between current science and its tradition should certainly be one of the 
great themes of a hermeneutic approach to science.655 
 
Scientists are part of a tradition, and they understand the world proceeding from the 
horizon of this tradition. In this tradition, Eger distinguishes the language of the scientific 
discipline of which the scientist is part from the structure of the life-world. He complains 
about a contrast between the interpretation of the human world and that of nature, 
according to which the natural sciences would know only a single hermeneutic whereas 
scholars dealing with language would be concerned with a double hermeneutic (for 
example in Habermas’ thought): 
 
It is implied in all such treatments that whenever a natural scientist comes on the scene to 
work on a new project, he finds no pre-interpreted world, no language there already in being. 
What social philosophers have in mind, when contrasting natural and human sciences in this 
way, is an imaginary situation in which the physicist, say, always faces the phenomenon of 
nature ab novo and directly, unmediated by any symbol system other than that of the life-
world. But since the seventeenth century at least such a thing has rarely happened. Of course 
the scientist finds a language already in being - he or she finds the language of the particular 
science within which the new project belongs.656 
 
The embeddedness of the scientist in a tradition for Eger consists in her dialogue with the 
science already in existence. Eger is thinking here primarily of the results of scientific 
thought, but conceptualizations focusing more on material contexts already in existence, 
such as instruments and practices, are also conceivable.657 This in no way – and this is also 
an important difference from the SSK perspectives dealt with in chapter 5 – impinges on the 
extent to which science engages with the world. 
 However, in this hermeneutic perspective the world figures not as something to 
which science converges (as all perspectives we saw in chapter 4 imply), but as something 
with which it is as it were in dialogue. Natural objects are things the confrontation with 
which modifies our thoughts and actions; in that sense, they, as in the naturalist 
perspectives dealt with in chapter 7, play a causal role: they influence what happens in 
science without rendering developments in science inevitable in the sense that all possible 
histories of science that involve the same natural objects converge. Natural objects co-
determine the history of science, but the way in which they do so depends on previous 
interactions between people and objects; in the language of Latour’s Actor Network Theory 
as described in chapter 6, the way in which entities are ‘added’ to networks will depend on 
the relations already present in that network.  
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8.4.2 Contingency and the History of Science 
One potentially unsettling aspect of the tradition-boundedness of science is the possible 
contingency of the development of one’s tradition. We have seen in section 3.4 and chapter 4 
that many existing arguments in favor of presentism related to science assume that in the 
development of science, accidental features not pertaining to the object of research or the 
essence of the scientific project will be filtered out in due course; but we have also seen that, 
though a strong inevitabilism with regard to science is a conceivable option, it is hard to 
support by independent argument, and it is not the most attractive option for historians.  
 If we are contingentists about science to the extent that we believe that our current 
scientific beliefs could have been different, what would this entail? Richard Rorty is famous 
for voicing his pragmatist evaluation of contingency. He discusses 
 
a fundamental choice which confronts the reflective mind: that between accepting the 
contingent character of starting points, and attempting to evade this contingency. To accept 
the contingency of starting-points is to accept our inheritance from, and our conversation 
with, our fellow-humans as our only source of guidance. To attempt to evade this 
contingency is to hope to become a properly-programmed machine.658 
 
For Rorty, much like for Gadamer, our contingent historical starting points are not 
something to be transcended methodically, but something to be accepted or even embraced 
as a starting point for conversation. In ‘Science and solidarity’, he summarizes this as saying 
that we must be ‘ethnocentric’, by which he means “simply to work by our own lights. The 
defense of ethnocentrism is simply that there are no other lights to work by.”659 The desire 
for an ahistorical perspective disappears in the face of the idea that we are historical subjects 
engaged in conversation with other historical subjects. 
 Rorty’s emphasis on the priority of conversation with other people, which he 
associates with hermeneutics,660 sometimes makes him contrast the omnipresence of this 
conversation with the possibility of constraints posed by natural objects: “conformity to 
social norms is not good enough for the Platonist [who is the imagined opponent of the 
pragmatist in this paragraph]. He wants to be constrained not merely by the disciplines of 
the day, but by the ahistorical and nonhuman nature of reality itself.”661 Rorty’s pragmatism, 
on the other hand, is “the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquire save 
conversational ones – no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of 
the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our 
fellow-inquirers.”662 How are we to evaluate these statements, having argued in previous 
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chapters that it is very hard not to ascribe a role to nature – to a ‘nonhuman’ reality whose 
historicity may have a different character from that of humans – in science? 
 In fact, Rorty’s ideas do not amount to a conversation in which objects are 
uninvolved or completely powerless – though there is certainly no talk of ‘agency’ as we 
would find it in Latour or other Actor Network Theorists. Rorty’s point is only that there is 
nothing in natural objects that makes some state of science inevitable – we “drop the idea 
that inquiry is destined to converge to a single point”663 – and that there are no normative 
reasons why it should.664 There is no reason for Rorty to deny that in this hermeneuticist, 
conversational, and contingentist perspective on culture in general and scientific inquiry as 
a part of it, nature can still play a causal role665 – it is just not one with only one possible 
outcome.  
 As one of only a few thinkers who have applied hermeneutical ideas to our 
understanding of science, Rorty also applies these insights to the role of our current 
understanding of the world in history of science, in a paragraph that I endorse 
wholeheartedly: 
 
To say that the study of the history of science, like the study of the rest of history, must be 
hermeneutical, and to deny […] that there is something extra called ‘rational reconstruction’ 
which can legitimize current scientific practice, is still not to say that the atoms, wave packages, 
etc., discovered by the physical scientists are creations of the human spirit. To buy in on the 
normal science of one’s day in constructing the largest possible story to tell about the history 
of the race is not […] to say that physics is ‘objective’ in some way in which politics or poetry 
may not be.666 
 
8.5 The Hermeneutical Position of History of Science 
8.5.1 General Thesis 
We are now prepared for some general statements about the relation between the world, 
science, and history of science. 
 The world causally plays a role in science by what it does in response to what 
science does in attempts to understand and explain it. What it does, then, is historically 
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variable; it is not trivial that it responds to air-pumps in a different way than to particle 
accelerators, and that its responses are interpreted in a different way by 17th-century natural 
philosophers than by 21st-century particle physicists. Locally, the relation between science 
and nature is best conceived of as a network of human and non-human entities in a complex 
causal interaction (cf. Latour’s Actor Network-Theory as discussed in chapter 6).  
 Are we to understand and explain the diachronic development of this relation, we 
need to see that the responses of nature to scientific practice have a differentiating effect 
upon the proliferation of different scientific beliefs and practices. They have so only 
contextually, to be sure; the meaning of the response of air-pumps to experiments is not 
decided only by the objects themselves, but arises through the interpretive practices of the 
natural philosophical community, which are rooted themselves in a specific historical 
condition or life-world.  
Nonetheless, the behavior of air-pumps is part of the selective environment of the 
content of science in a certain time and place (cf. David Hull’s evolutionary perspective on 
scientific development as discussed in chapter 7). Theories, practices, instruments, and goals 
may change depending crucially on the feedback that previous dealings with nature receive 
from its selective environment – which comprises both natural and cultural objects. Based 
on this, science will look different in the next generation.  
This means that there is historical difference between interpretive practices, which 
is important to the position of history of science. First, there can in principle be no 
categorical answer to the question what causal role the world plays in the history of science, 
other than that this role is historically conditioned and that we ought therefore to reject a 
global inevitabilism (as in chapter 4) or a categorical exclusion of causal relevance of the 
world (as in chapter 5). Second, it means that understanding the historical context of science 
becomes essential to our understanding of the science itself; our knowledge of the world 
does not suffice, as Steven Weinberg believes, for the understanding of proper science. Our 
own interpretive practices, or our canons of rationality, do not automatically tell us how 
past science would have responded to nature; there is a hermeneutic distance to be bridged. 
In this enterprise, our own historical situation must be taken into account. 
Historiography does not transcend history any more than science does. We take up our 
hermeneutic and explanatory challenge at a point in history where science as well as the 
writing of its history have had a great many iterations of interaction with their objects. This 
history works on us, in a way that we can clarify partly through historical study, but that we 
can never transcend completely. This seems, apart from the most plausible, the most 
internally consistent position for history of science: it would be paradoxical to maintain 
inevitabilism with regard to the content of historiography of science but contingentism with 
regard to the content of science.  
We have seen that a denial of inevitabilism does not amount to a denial that science 
is about the world (or that history of science is about the history of science). In this respect, 
we appeal to Gadamer’s distinction between objectivity and Sachlichkeit: while denying that 
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science in history can be understood solely through its object, we maintain that it is vital to 
understanding it that it has an object – the world – and that we can understand science in 
part by understanding it as an effort to understand this world. 
That this is a diachronic effort, and that we resist inevitabilism, means that there is 
no reason – as the inevitabilists discussed in chapter 4 would say – to oppose the working of 
the world in science to its traditionality and historicity. Rather, science evolves in interaction 
with feedback from nature, and this means that later generations have absorbed previous 
interactions with nature. 
This is crucial to understanding our hermeneutic position: it means that the 
tradition in which we stand, the way in which history has determined our condition, is not 
‘pure culture’ as opposed to pure nature; it is not the product of free-floating human social 
interaction and cultural creativity, but the result of a long series of causal interactions 
between humans and nature. The influence of the world is causally integrated in the history 
of science; and precisely because the manner of its integration depends, at every moment, on 
a precise constellation of human and non-human factors (a fact that does not in any way 
negate the ascription of universal and timeless regularities to nature, or to human culture for 
that matter), its cumulative effect cannot be disentangled from this history.  
Trying to disentangle it nonetheless – for instance, notably, in the interest of 
creating a historiography that is independent of the science whose history it seeks to 
describe – would mean undoing in thought the entire chain of events leading from the past 
we want to describe up the present from which we set out to understand it. But this rests on 
a naïve ideal of historical understanding, and on precisely the same dehistoricized ideal of 
objectivity that such an endeavor would need to deny to the natural sciences.  
Rather, we proceed from the Gadamerian idea that understanding in history is 
more closely related to translation and application than to reconstruction. Saying that 
historiography is historical in this sense does not deny that it is meaningful for it to try and 
say true things about the past – any more than saying that science is historical means 
denying that it is meaningful for it to try and say true things about the natural world. On the 
contrary, we understand both activities as being about something, and this is precisely the 
role that their objects play in them. This summarizes the perspective outlined in this thesis: 
the world as we understand it is what we understand science as being about.  
 
8.5.2 The Limits of Historicity 
One puzzling aspect to this thesis is that by historicizing science and its historiography so 
thoroughly, it may seem that there we have made it impossible to talk about nature itself as 
something outside history. To what extent are we actually subsuming nature under history 
here?  
 As Hooykaas was aware, both human and natural history are unique and happen 
only once. In this sense, nature clearly is itself historical. However, this does not mean that 
we cannot ascribe law-like regularities to what happens in human history or in nature, nor 
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that we cannot, once we have identified them, project these regularities back upon the past – 
assuming that they were as true then as they are now. 
For instance, when we interpret what early modern thinkers had to say about the 
solar system, we imagine they were referring to (roughly) the same solar system that we 
inhabit; we also ascribe to this solar system and its workings a large amount of 
independence of what either early modern natural philosophers or our own astronomers 
have to say about this solar system. In this sense the solar system is ahistorical: it is 
something in nature that we need, nonetheless, in order to understand 16th-century 
pamphlets about comets and debates about Copernicanism. We cannot, in this sense, reduce 
nature to history: if we say that the solar system we know is itself a product of human 
history in the sense that it did not exist in the 16th century, we are removing important 
handles we have on understanding what was going on in the 16th century. We would still 
have the historical sources about the 16th century, to be sure, but these sources will 
significantly underdetermine any claims about what the universe was like in those days. 
On the other hand, there is also no escaping the fact that when we talk about our 
solar system or take our knowledge of it for granted when studying early modern debates, 
we do not have access to this solar system independently of the possibly historically 
contingent knowledge that is available to our culture about this solar system. This is not 
restricted just to its accidental features (like the precise size of the planets, the number of 
their moons or their orbital velocities), but it also concerns its existence and its being a solar 
system.  
This does not mean that the distinction between ‘what we believe about the solar 
system’ and ‘what is actually the case about the solar system’ collapses. With respect to any 
culture, we can see that there is a difference in meaning between ‘what this culture believes 
about the solar system’ and ‘what is actually the case about the solar system’. There is no 
reason why these two statements should become identical once we refer to our own culture. 
The only peculiar thing when it comes to beliefs that we hold about the solar system is that it 
would be paradoxical to say that we believe what is actually the case about the solar system 
to be something different from what we believe about the solar system (whereas it is not 
paradoxical to say that we believe what is actually the case about the solar system to be 
something different from what others believe about the solar system).  
We understand the difference between belief and truth and we can grasp, in this 
abstract sense, the possibility that our beliefs are not true. Or to rephrase this without using 
the word ‘truth’: we can understand that the solar system is something different from beliefs 
of others about the solar system, and in this abstract sense we can understand that the solar 
system is something different from our own beliefs about it. We also understand, in this 
same abstract sense, the possibility that we could have held other beliefs and that these beliefs 
could have had certain epistemic virtues to the same, or even to a higher degree than our 
actual beliefs. (There is a structural similarity between our historical contingentism and our 
belief in the history-independence of the natural world, in that both historically possible 
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alternatives to our own beliefs and the real world which our beliefs seek to trace are 
inaccessible to us.) We cannot, however, be completely certain and in total agreement about 
the superiority of a certain belief to our own, and still not assent to this other belief.  
In general, we cannot provide content to the notion of ‘a belief that we could 
equally well have held’ without this content immediately becoming an actual competitor to 
our currently held beliefs. If we say that a non-Darwinistic evolutionary biology could have 
developed, we cannot substantiate this claim by providing an actual non-Darwinistic 
evolutionary biology, since such a biology, if it were as plausible to us as a Darwinistic 
evolutionary biology, would function only as an actual competitor to Darwinistic 
evolutionary biology in the present. 
It is possible to claim that there is an alternative to our culture in which a 
Darwinistic evolutionary biology would never have developed, or would have had lost the 
competition to a non-Darwinistic competitor, and that it was historically possible for 
previous stages of our own culture to develop into such an alternative; and that in this sense, 
‘we’ (in a rather loose sense of the first person plural) could have held a non-Darwinistic 
evolutionary biology. In this case, however, we are speaking not of specific possible 
alternatives to scientific theories or schools within our current culture, but of possible 
alternatives to our current culture.  
To summarize: there are things about which we believe that their existence is 
independent of human history, but about which we also believe that there are beliefs about 
them that are impossible for us to hold, while historically possible alternatives to our culture 
could have held them.  
 
8.5.3 An Illustrative Example 
We will evaluate some illustrative examples from recent historiography later, but at this 
stage an idealized example may be clearer. How does a philosophy of history of science 
proceeding from these premises deal with the interpretation of past science and past 
scientific debates, e.g. the controversy between vacuism and plenism?  
Air-pumps and vacuums are a well-known example because of Shapin and 
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the air-pump.667 The following is a modelling, a simplification that 
does not do justice to the complexity of either historical reality or of Shapin and Schaffer’s 
account. The simplification is intended to make visible to what extent our own beliefs about 
nature and our beliefs concerning the historical contingency of those beliefs matter to our 
historical explanations. 
 My claims are the following.  
First, ‘truth’ as such is not a historical explanation: even though we would 
summarize our own beliefs in the proposition that a vacuum is possible, the victory of the 
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vacuists over the plenists was not because the vacuists held beliefs to which we would also 
assent. Our beliefs do not causally explain 17th-century beliefs. 
Second, we need to be aware that between the vacuists and the plenists, neither 
represents ‘21st-century science as it is in the actual world’ or its opposite – no more than any 
party in the 16th-century Reformation represented ‘Western modernity’ or its opposite. 
When we are interpreting scientific cultures that are genuinely in the past, they are different; 
they are primarily other cultures, the understanding of whose categories and beliefs requires 
translation.  
Third, there may still be a significant historical connection to our own culture: 
simplifying, the vacuists may have ‘won’ (just like the Reformers ‘won’ in certain parts of 
Europe) and our own scientific culture may be the result of a series of historical 
transformations that could take place only (or had a better chance of taking place) in an 
environment in which the vacuists won, rather than one in which the plenists won. In that 
case, in explaining who ‘won’, we are still – albeit partially and indirectly – explaining our 
own beliefs.  
Fourth, it may be that we believe the vacuists won partly because of the rhetorical 
significance, in the specific cultural circumstances (in which, for instance, specific work had 
to be done to develop and maintain the rhetorical force of witness accounts of certain 
events)668 of specific outcomes of trials in air-pumps. That there were air-pumps at all, and 
that trials held with the aid of these pumps bore this significance is a fact that is itself in 
need of historical explanation. This explanation proceeds in part through an understanding 
of contemporary beliefs; in Nicholas Jardine’s terms, we need to render the questions asked 
to nature, and the local reality to which they are connected, intelligible to our ‘scene of 
interpretation’.669 This requires something of a fusion of horizons; in particular, it requires 
showing how doing an experiment with air-pumps could be a meaningful way of posing a 
question to nature.  
Fifth, the actual outcomes of these trials may have been important here, and given 
our own beliefs about air-pumps, we believe that they will have behaved in a certain way. 
For example, we believe that birds would indeed have died when the air was removed from 
a vessel. (Incidentally, we ourselves may find this behavior to be better explicable by 
vacuist-like theories than by plenist-like theories; but our own explanations of why the birds 
died may differ from those of both the vacuists and the plenists in the 17th century.) 
Sixth, how the resulting observations influenced the fate of different scientific 
theories may not be immediately understandable except through familiarity with the life-
worlds of the natural philosophical community. As in step four, we need to explain what 
happens to scientific beliefs, practices, instruments, goals, etc. in part by understanding the 
meaning of the resulting findings. Again, this requires an awareness of continuities and 
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discontinuities between the respective worlds of the natural philosophers we study and 
ourselves.  
For though nature may come into the picture explicitly only when it is asked an 
explicit question through an experiment, science’s being-about-nature is implicitly supposed 
throughout: after all, that the experiment happens, and how its results are interpreted, 
depend not just on individual human fancy or the cultural accumulation thereof, but on an 
accumulation of earlier interactions between nature and cognitive and practical dealings with 
nature. For instance, the behavior of air-pumps resonates with ancient metaphysical debates 
about the possibility of a vacuum that have acquired a new meaning with Descartes’ 
mechanistic philosophy; but these natural philosophical debates themselves only make 
sense as attempts to deal cognitively with the world we live in.  
Of course, one metaphysical system may truthfully be said to be more ‘speculative’ 
than the other; but speculative natural philosophy does not take place – pardon the pun – in 
an experiential vacuum, and in this sense, Boyle’s air-pump trials stand in, and respond to, a 
tradition that concerns a world that we live in, too. 17th-century natural philosophy tries to 
make sense of rainbows, human memory, the movements of the planets, magnetic attraction, 
the circulation of the blood – and all these phenomena are presupposed, both in the 
formulation of new questions to nature, and in the interpretation of the answers. We can 
understand these questions and interpret the answers only because we are aware of these 
phenomena. We need to realize that when Boyle is talking about the spring of the air, he is 
not uttering a 21st-century scientific truth, but he is talking about the same world that we are 
familiar with, and the fact that he does so is vital to the possibility to render his doings – as 
well as their impact, which requires an understanding of his place in the history of science – 
explicable at all. 
 
8.6 Four Possible Objections 
8.6.1 Introduction 
I hope to have presented this account in such a way that it seems like a simple matter of 
common sense: we already believe certain things about nature and science, and when we 
study their history, we naturally bring those beliefs with us, there being no compelling 
reason why we should categorically subject these beliefs to a different treatment from any 
other beliefs that we hold. All of our suppositions about continuities and discontinuities 
between the past we study and the present we inhabit are relevant to our interpretation of 
this past and of our position in history; suppositions that pertain to the world that science is 
about are not excluded from this, and are indeed all the more vital to our interpretive efforts. 
Indeed, as far as I am concerned, there is nothing drastic about my proposal, and I believe 
that it fits better with what historians of science already do than most of the more radical 
approaches advocated by SSK and ANT.  
Nonetheless, I do not think there are no interesting or plausible objections to my 
account, inspired by SSK or ANT or by more general considerations. I will present the 
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objections I ‘fear’ the most here – as uttered by hypothetical critics – and then deal with 
them more extensively one by one.  
 
1) The paradoxical nature of saying that the truth about something in nature (e.g. the 
solar system) is something different from what ‘we’ believe about nature does not 
arise for me when I don’t identify with what my culture believes about nature. I 
can set out to explain what science believes about the solar system in a mode where 
I talk about this science – about what you call ‘our’ scientific culture – only in the 
third person.  
2) This relates to a broader objection: that your whole approach seems to imply a 
rather slavish following of the authority of the scientific tradition and of a scientific 
culture that you, apparently, see as a unity. This is a general problem with 
Gadamerian hermeneutics: that it fails to thematize the tensions and contradictions 
inherent in any tradition, overlooking these because it needs to ascribe to this 
tradition an amount of unity that it does not, in fact, possess. You fail to be critical, 
for the simple reason that the way you construct and conceptualize ‘the scientific 
tradition’ will render you incapable of making claims that significantly challenge 
the epistemic authority of this tradition. 
3) This also means that you could have spared yourself the complicated 6-step 
account just now, by admitting in step 1 that you do in fact mean that we hold our 
current opinions because they are the best – and that in any controversy that 
influenced the current situation, the best party won. Yes, you admit that things 
could have gone differently, but this denial of inevitabilism will not make your 
position any less Whiggish. If our current views about what nature is like decide 
what we believe nature contributed to the resolution of a controversy at a crucial 
point, this contribution will, unsurprisingly, turn out to be in favor of the ‘side’ that 
won. A synoptic explanation of any scientific development in your approach will 
always be: “because this was right/true/etc.” This is simply a very careful step back 
to the good old triumphalist historiography. 
4) Apart from uncritical and triumphalist, your history of science is also impotent and 
irrelevant: it can never find anything that significantly changes how we look at past 
or current science, because it is decided in advance that any finding will conform 
roughly to the existing interpretative structure, and that history of science, in your 
view, is simply the handmaiden of science. This severely limits not just the 
plausibility that you will see something new, but also the force that any historical 
finding can exert upon our notion of natural science: just like medieval philosophy 
would never draw conclusions that challenged Christian theology, and if it did that, 
theology would still trump philosophy, so your history of science will never find 
anything that challenges science, and if it did, then the ‘authority of the scientific 
tradition’ would still trump this finding.  
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8.6.2 Playing the Stranger 
My imaginary critic objected that: 
 
The paradoxical nature of saying that the truth about something in nature (e.g. the solar 
system) is something different from what ‘we’ believe about nature does not arise for me 
when I don’t identify with what my culture believes about nature. I can set out to explain 
what science believes about the solar system in a mode where I talk about this science – about 
what you call ‘our’ scientific culture – only in the third person. 
 
Obviously, it is possible in some sense to talk about your own culture as if it were another 
culture, to ‘play the stranger’ as Shapin and Schaffer have called it. But Shapin and Schaffer 
understood very well that it is not possible to be this stranger.670 There is an inescapability to 
our historical standpoint that cannot be wished away.  
 Of course, there are cultures about which we can talk in the third person, because 
they are not ours. It is important to remember, however, the possible arguments for omitting 
or ‘relativizing away’ our own knowledge of nature as dealt with in chapter 5. We dealt 
there with almost all reasons not to involve nature in our explanations of past science. The 
only one that we did not dismiss at that stage was the argument of circularity: the intuition 
that, if we use our own beliefs in the explanation of our own belief, there must be some sort 
of vicious circularity. The hermeneutic perspective outlined in this chapter does deal with 
this objection, by denying both the viciousness of this circularity and its escapability. Both in 
the case where we are studying another culture and in the case where we are studying our 
own (or its history), there is no reason why we should artificially suppress our own 
knowledge of the world, to the extent that our reason for doing so was the supposed 
circularity that would arise in this way.   
It remains possible, however, that a scholar simply disagrees with a scientific 
consensus: it is conceivable that the weight of scientific dealings with geology in the past 
century is very much in favor of the theory of continental drift, but that you, for whatever 
reasons, stand outside this consensus. What would that entail for your historiography? In 
that case, when you study the history of the debate about continental drift, your 
hermeneutic point of departure will be slightly different from that of the other historians. 
Your prejudgments about the truth of continental drift, however, are only one aspect of your 
many beliefs about what the world looks like, many of which you will still share with your 
peers.  
Your conversation with your fellow historians would become difficult only where 
your heterodox ideas about continental drift influence your opinions about what the 
scientists you are studying could potentially have encountered in their research. In this case, 
you may still agree with many of your orthodox colleagues on the nature of the available 
evidence during a given episode. You may even agree with them that given the available 
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evidence at a certain time, the development of a scientific consensus about continental drift 
is understandable and explicable (even if it does not convince you). There is no reason why 
your difference of opinion with your colleagues about the truth of the scientific theory 
whose history you are writing would matter more to the historiographical debate than other 
possible differences, for instance about the precise nature of power relations in the relevant 
scientific networks, or the relevant cultural context of the debate.  
The difference between you and your colleagues would come to weigh more 
heavily if your scientific opinions about the current scientific consensus were more 
unorthodox, and came to influence more your particular opinions about what past scientists 
could have seen and done. If you believe that the earth is flat and set out to write a history of 
the science of geology consistent with that opinion, it will turn out quickly that neither you 
nor your colleagues are methodological relativists about this theory. 
 
8.6.3 Following a Tradition 
The next question is whether these reflections on the inescapability of prejudice and 
tradition-boundedness imply an unquestioning acceptance of the authority of some 
scientific tradition. My imaginary opponent voiced this as his second objection: 
 
Your whole approach seems to imply a rather slavish following of the authority of the 
scientific tradition and of a scientific culture that you, apparently, see as a unity. This is a 
general problem with Gadamerian hermeneutics: that it fails to thematize the tensions and 
contradictions inherent in any tradition, overlooking these because it needs to ascribe to this 
tradition an amount of unity that it does not, in fact, possess. You fail to be critical, for the 
simple reason that the way you construct and conceptualize ‘the scientific tradition’ will 
render you incapable of making claims that significantly challenge the epistemic authority of 
this tradition. 
 
Indeed, the notion of traditionality seems to have overtones of complacency, and an attitude 
that embraces this ‘tradition’ seems much less exciting than an attitude which shows how it 
is an imagined tradition, resulting from selective canonizations of the past. Science is not 
simply one tradition.671 Terry Eagleton has objected to Gadamer that it assumes the existence 
of a single ‘mainstream’ tradition which is to be cherished, making history into a ‘club of the 
like-minded’: “tradition holds an authority to which we must submit: there is little 
possibility of critically challenging that authority, and no speculation that its influence may 
be anything but benevolent.”672 
 Luckily, this is a wholly unfair characterization of Gadamer’s project as well as of 
the current thesis. Certainly, genuine criticism of the tradition we find ourselves in is 
possible, but such criticism precisely requires elucidation of our historical condition. What it 
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means to criticize the tradition to which one’s understanding is simultaneously bound,673 as 
it happens, was also the subject of an exchange between Gadamer and Habermas in a 
volume about the relation between Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritiek, which I will review in 
the remainder of this section, to show how Gadamer dealt with Habermas’ demand for a 
more radical criticism than Gadamerian hermeneutics seemed to permit.674 
 Habermas’ point is that structures of prejudice made transparent cannot continue 
to function as prejudice as before; reflection could lead to rejecting the claims of traditions.675 
Consciousness, though situated within the contingent structure of traditions, should not let 
itself be reduced to ‘sublimating’ all social processes into cultural tradition.676 After all, there 
are social processes that are not embedded in normative structures but that do co-determine 
the shape of traditions; language as tradition also becomes a medium of power and 
violence.677 It is not enough to understand everything as covered by tradition, then.678 
 I can imagine my imaginary interlocutor saying something like this when I, in 
appealing to the existence of a horizon of interpretation inescapably shaped by the scientific 
tradition, seem to absolutize this tradition: that in the history of science there are power 
relations at work that have left us with a discourse about science that is in some sense tilted; 
and that the exposure of the processes behind this could work in an emancipatory way, by 
unhinging the apparent legitimacy of the tradition from which our understanding indeed 
first proceeded – for Habermas does not deny the situatedness and fore-structuring of 
understanding by tradition. Gadamer, however, responds by, first, pointing out the 
artificiality with which Habermas needs to construct the faculty of reflection.  
 
What is the relation of historical [wirkungsgeschichtliche] reflection to the tradition of which it 
becomes aware? My thesis, which I think is the necessary conclusion of recognition of our 
historical determinedness and our finitude as taught to us by hermeneutics, is [that we need] 
to see through this opposition between living, ‘spontaneous’ tradition and reflective 
appropriation, and see that it is a dogmatic one.679 
 
Also misleading, according to Gadamer, is Habermas’ drawing an opposition between the 
realm of cultural tradition and the other ‘determinants’ of social reality. Yes, his own Truth 
and Method might itself have been rather silent about these matters, but all things considered 
it would be an absurdity if, among the prejudices upon which hermeneutic philosophy 
urges us to reflect, it would not involve those related to labor or power as well.680 It is not 
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the case, then, that it ‘absolutizes’ cultural tradition; it only wants to understand anything 
that can be understood. This is the sense in which language is the key: “Being that can be 
understood is language.”681 
 Reflection, Gadamer says, does not necessarily dissolve the structures behind 
authority, since these structures can also be consciously accepted after reflection. Gadamer 
recognizes that tradition is not self-legitimating, and that reflection can challenge it; but not 
all at once. Whoever thinks that this is possible, “I confront with the finitude of human 
existence and the essential particularity of reflection.”682 Reflection, for Gadamer, brings 
‘before us’ what would otherwise have happened behind our backs, and in this way it 
indeed allows us to judge our own pre-understandings – but it cannot bring everything 
before us. 
 Habermas’ counter-reply outlines a distinction between communication and 
pseudo-communication, the latter of which is systematically distorted, and he reiterates the 
point that the background consensus of tradition can be a result of pseudo-
communication.683 More and more, science gets to play a role in transcending the 
circumstances of the dialogue; and this leads Gadamer to remind Habermas that, as far as he 
is concerned, philosophical hermeneutics has little to do with method. It does not try to 
elevate understanding to a discipline; Verstehen is the completed form of human society, the 
‘Gesprächsgemeinschaft.’ It is interesting that he here explicitly includes science within this 
Gesprächsgemeinschaft.684  
 At this point, anyway, it becomes clear that asserting the impossibility of 
transcending ‘tradition’ does not imply reifying or absolutizing this tradition, for the very 
reason that identifying the unifying structure of this tradition and conceptualizing (let alone 
stating prescriptively) the essence of its hold over us would imply having understood it in 
its entirety already.  
 This also means that Eagleton has overestimated the amount of complacency that 
necessarily follows from recognizing that the weight of the past is bigger than we are:685 yes, 
it is hubris to think that if only we find the right methodical way to look at the tradition we 
are in, then we can transcend all distorting contingencies. (In the case of history of science, 
this is not only hubris but also paradoxical: if method transcends tradition, why does history 
of science matter?) But on the other hand, any aspect of the tradition can be criticized, and 
there is nothing we are not allowed to do with it. 
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8.6.4 Neo-Whiggism 
My hypothetical critic also accused me of indirect Whiggism: 
 
You could have spared yourself the complicated 6-step account just now, by admitting in step 
1 that you do in fact mean that we hold our current opinions because they are the best – and 
that in any controversy that influenced the current situation, the best party won. Yes, you 
admit that things could have gone differently, but this denial of inevitabilism will not make 
your position any less Whiggish. If our current views about what nature is like decide what 
we believe nature contributed to the resolution of a controversy at a crucial point, this 
contribution will, unsurprisingly, turn out to be in favor of the ‘side’ that won. A synoptic 
explanation of any scientific development in your approach will always be: “because this was 
right/true/etc.” This is simply a very careful step back to the good old triumphalist 
historiography. 
 
The point here is that the presentism I allow myself with regard to current scientific beliefs 
will tend to some sort of inevitabilism in the end. If this presentism can, as was suggested in 
chapter 3, be countered only by demonstrating that causal anachronisms occur, our current 
scientific knowledge is at a relative advantage, since it is allowed to inform our causal 
beliefs. 
 So, even by provisionally and corrigibly assuming the truth, validity or 
applicability of our own scientific categories and beliefs, an insurmountable asymmetry 
would arise in our view of a past controversy. There may be controversies or other kinds of 
uncertain episodes in past science, of which the following seems to be the case: 
1) It was historically possible for them to be resolved in a different way. 
2) If they had been resolved in a different way, we would have believed something 
different about nature now. 
3) If we had believed something different about nature now, nature would have 
played a different role in our current explanations of the resolutions of past 
controversies. 
4) Therefore, by letting ‘nature as we now believe it is’ play its role in our explanation 
of the resolutions of past controversies, the actual history in which we come to 
believe that nature is as we now believe it is has an ‘unfair’ advantage over other 
possible histories. This imbalance remains true even if we recognize that we hold 
our own beliefs only contingently and fallibly.  
I recognize that points 1 to 3 are true. I believe they fail to support an argument against my 
thesis, because it does not follow from these points that our actual history has an advantage 
over other possible histories, and even if it did, this would not undermine my thesis. It 
would not, for the following three reasons: 
A) Singling out our beliefs about nature as making our accounts of past science 
imbalanced is arbitrary: we have beliefs about how society and culture function as 
well, and they co-determine what we believe about the ways in which past 
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scientific controversies could be resolved. If we believe that the history of science is 
causally integrated with that of societies and cultures, we ought to believe that in 
many cases, a historically possible alternative to our scientific beliefs would not 
leave our beliefs about society and culture undisturbed either. We could as well say 
that in letting ‘social interactions as we now believe they work’ play their role in 
our explanation of the resolutions of past controversies, we give other possible 
histories an unfair disadvantage in our accounts.  
B) The only thing that distinguishes ‘nature’ clearly from any other factors here is that 
it happens to be what we now consider the object of research of scientists. But the 
demarcation between the natural and the social may itself be a historical 
contingency; at least, what scientists are and what their research object is, is itself 
constructed differently throughout history. It is not clear why there would be a 
necessary link between ‘being an entity that current scientists investigate’ and 
‘being an entity the including of which in a historical account tilts the history 
towards its present state’. For instance, the behavior of air-pumps would presently 
fall primarily under the competence of scientists, but that does not mean that 
beliefs about the behavior of air-pumps in the 17th century tilt our historical 
account more towards the present state – or even towards present beliefs about the 
behavior of air-pumps! – than do current beliefs about social power in the 17th 
century. (Ironically, this is especially the case if we believe that social factors are 
causally more important in the resolution of scientific controversies than input 
from nature.) 
C) The argument that under the current approach our actual history attains an ‘unfair’ 
advantage over other possible histories suggests that this advantage could have 
been avoided by another approach. However, we do not have an independent 
overview of the outcomes of other possible histories; there is no way in which we 
can know precisely what we would have believed if other parties to a controversy 
had won. It is impossible for us to average out the different beliefs that we would 
have held as the result of the different histories that are possible subsequent to the 
episode we are studying. 
Behind the accusation of Whiggism lies a premise similar to the one we 
saw Ashplant and Wilson assume in chapter 3 in their argument against Butterfield: 
that presentist categories tend to survive the confrontation with historical sources.  
However, it is essential to the perspective outlined in this chapter that the 
confrontation with historical sources can in principle modify our categories and 
our beliefs. Within one historical study, this effect may be small, since one study 
will usually have limited weight relative to that of the entirety of the traditions 
upon which it reflects; but it is very well conceivable that the collective result of 
history of science modifies our understanding of important scientific categories, 
and thereby indirectly our understanding of the world. 
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In any case, as said, there is no good reason why our understanding of how nature would 
have behaved will lead to us overestimating the chances of precisely that side in a 
controversy whose opinions about nature best match how we think it would have behaved. 
Drawing that conclusion, that applying our own categories and beliefs about nature to past 
controversies inevitably leads us to side with the party who resembles us most, would be 
misleading in two ways. 
D)  First, it would be failing to take into account the historical discontinuity between 
our categories and those in the past: it is not a good summary, when the vacuists 
win a controversy in the 17th century, to say that the party ‘resembling’ us the most 
wins that controversy. The scientific tradition has undergone too many 
transformations after the vacuists-plenists controversy simply to say we agree with 
Boyle’s ‘vacuism’ – or with the whole of his experimental philosophy, for that 
matter.  
E) Second, even if we ‘side’ with a particular party in the sense that in some relevant 
aspects we believe it to be relatively close to our own perspective, this does not 
mean that we should be less able to explain why in a particular context such a 
perspective would be relatively weak. It is perfectly well possible for convinced 
atheists not to remain puzzled by the question of why atheism is a minority 
position throughout most of history. Similarly, it is conceivable that we agree more 
with Galileo than with the Pope about the relative accuracy of the Ptolemaic and 
the Copernican systems, but that we can still fully understand why in a particular 
controversy Galileo’s arguments would fail against those of the Pope – fail, not 
only because of factors ‘extrinsic’ to the debate (such as the coercive powers of the 
Church), but also because of the intellectual context; because what was at stake was 
not just the question of heliocentricity or geocentricity, but the question of how to 
do natural philosophy, and in connection with this, the question of how to do 
theology, and ethics – at stake were, loosely speaking, different paradigms, neither 
of which we completely identify with. Once we realize this, the fact that we happen 
to believe, with Galileo, that it is more accurate to say that the earth goes round the 
sun than that the sun goes round the earth does not significantly distort our view 
of the controversy. 
 
8.6.5 Criticism and Relevance: Some Historiographical Examples 
Finally, my hypothetical opponent said that: 
 
your history of science is also impotent and irrelevant: it can never find anything that 
significantly changes how we look at past or current science, because it is decided in advance 
that any finding will conform roughly to the existing interpretative structure, and that history 
of science, in your view, is simply the handmaiden of science. This severely limits not just the 
plausibility that you will see something new, but also the force that any historical finding can 
exert upon our notion of natural science: just like medieval philosophy would never draw 
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conclusions that challenged Christian theology, and if it would do that, theology would still 
trump philosophy, so your history of science will never find anything that challenges science, 
and if it would, then the ‘authority of the scientific tradition’ still trumps this finding 
 
I have emphasized in the previous section that it is essential to my argument that the 
discipline of history can modify our beliefs and categories; but I have also said that probably, 
the weight of an individual historical study will be less than that of the entire scientific 
tradition. This makes the objection understandable that science always seems to trump 
history. Would our study of a specific episode in the history of science ever lead us to revise 
our scientific theories? If not, it seems that scientific knowledge can inform our historical 
accounts, but historical knowledge cannot inform our scientific accounts; that would imply a 
hierarchical ordering of knowledge. 
 My answer is that in principle it is possible for historical knowledge to modify 
scientific knowledge or the status of this scientific knowledge. The likelihood that a piece of 
information about the past will modify a piece of information in science is not determined 
by an a priori hierarchy between history and science or an inevitably one-way direction of 
influence, but by the relative weight of the considerations already in place for believing 
what we do about history and science.  
 In fact, if there is one ‘normative’ take-away from this thesis, it is that good 
historiography provides an interesting new voice in a dialogue, a perspective that modifies 
traditional thought about science in history. Thus, good historiography is itself contextually 
and historically, rather than normatively and transcendentally defined.  
This converges with Jutta Schickore’s analysis of the relation between history and 
philosophy of science, which she sees as: 
 
neither a bottom-up generalization from historical data nor a top-down ‘test’ of preconceived 
philosophical frameworks. Rather, it is interpretive and hermeneutic in the sense that one 
approaches a portion of science that one deems interesting with a preliminary set of tools one 
deems appropriate, drawn from one’s background knowledge, and see how far it takes one.686 
 
One example is her dealing with the work of Francesco Redi, for the interpretation of whose 
text she initially suspects a notion of testing through replication may be useful. Through 
confrontation with his texts, she moves away from her initial notion of replication and 
rephrases her account in terms of repetition; her analytical framework itself, she notes, has 
changed as a result of her historical analysis, which thereby sheds light on aspects of the 
usage and meaning of current concepts.687 
 Two examples from recent historiography may help to illustrate the hermeneutical 
nature of historiography with specific reference to the relation between science and the 
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world. My first example concerns the historiography of alchemy. Alchemy used to be 
regarded as an irrational, occult activity that did not fit with the enlightened view of rational 
science. (We saw an interesting exception to this mainstream view when we discussed 
Hessen’s paper in chapter 4.) From the 1970s onwards, however, it was increasingly 
recognized that early modern science and alchemy were much more intimately connected 
than this rationalistic view held possible: the scientific revolution was now seen as ‘Janus-
faced’, containing not just elements pointing towards modern science, but also much of the 
old and irrational. Even Newton’s Principia, it was argued, was made possible by concepts 
that its author owed to his immersion in alchemical thinking. Science and the occult were 
inextricably connected here.688 
 More recently, especially Lawrence Principe and William Newman have argued 
that in fact, alchemy itself was not the mystical, esoteric, occult business that both previous 
interpretations had made of it. They argue that it was much more an experimental practice 
than it was previously taken to be, and needs to be interpreted as an attempt to understand 
and manipulate the workings of matter – establishing much more continuity between 
alchemy and modern chemistry than previous interpretations did.689 Part of their argument 
is based on textual analysis – for instance, the fact that throughout the seventeenth century, 
‘alchemy’ and ‘chemistry’ were used interchangeably.690 They also interpret sources for 
alchemical practice, such as the notebooks of George Starkey, as evidence that alchemists 
actually tried their theories “in the fire”.691 Thus, they argue that the historical status of 
alchemy, and its historical relation to modern chemistry, cannot be understood properly if 
we do not take into account that alchemy was a practice where “results from the fire impact 
upon conjectural processes or interpretations”.692 
 Principe’s and Newman’s interpretation of Starkey’s ways of relating theory and 
practice, text and fire, has been modified itself by trying alchemy in the fire. Many 
alchemical (Principe and Newman prefer ‘chymical’ to re-establish synonymy between 
alchemy and chemistry) texts are highly poetical and cryptic, containing entities like a 
“Fiery Dragon, which hides the Magical Chalybs in his own belly”.693 Principe and Newman 
show that these riddles are not necessarily pure fantasy; often, they are intended as 
Decknamen for real substances that could be decoded by genuine adepts. Principe and 
Newman decode some of the riddles themselves, even succeeding in recreating a 
“Philosophical Tree” that is described by one Philaletes and thereby reinterpreting this 
image as not a mere literary trope or a manifestation of a collective unconscious (as Jungian 
interpreters of alchemy suggest), but as rather the result of reproducible alchemical 
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325-331). 
689 Principe and Newman (2001); Newman and Principe (2002, 358-360) 
690 Newman (2006); Newman and Principe (1998, 32-65). 
691 Newman and Principe (2002, e.g. 117). 
692 Newman and Principe (2002, 177). 
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observation. Principe concludes from this that the same images which previously supported 
the idea that alchemy was not experimental “may actually be (at least in some cases) not 
only artifacts of, but arguments in favor of the reality and reproducibility of experimental 
programs carried out by Stone-seeking alchemists.”694 
 There is an obvious interaction here between what we see happening in 
laboratories, what we believe Starkey could (under certain circumstances) have seen 
happening in his 17th-century laboratory, and how we believe we are to interpret Starkey’s 
notebooks. Nor is this an instance of autonomously changing scientific opinion dictating a 
new interpretation in history of science. Not just because reconstructions of past 
experiments are only a part of the story, but also because these reconstructions are 
themselves guided not exclusively by present-day chemistry, but by a combination of that 
and an interpretation of the language of 17th-century notebooks.  
It is not the case that at time t1, our chemistry says that the transmutation of 
elements is impossible and therefore all alchemy, connected as we believe it to be to the idea 
of the possibility of the transmutation of elements, must be wrong and its results illusory, 
and that at time t2, chemistry for independent reasons changes its views on the 
transmutation of elements and the historiography of alchemy changes with it to rehabilitate 
early modern alchemy. The interactions are far more subtle and not unidirectional. Rather, 
at time t1 we believe that the things that alchemists talk about can bear no reference to 
experimental practice because it seems impossible to identify them with material things in 
the world as we know it by our own chemistry; at time t2 a tension arises between the belief 
that alchemy was not an experimental practice and the seemingly experimental passages in 
alchemical notebooks; at time t3 it turns out that it is possible to identify entities in 
alchemical texts with modern chemical entities, and therefore it turns out that we can 
understand the beliefs of early modern alchemists in relation to their experimental practices.  
It does not follow that at any stage we need to drop – methodologically or really – 
our own disbelief in the possibility of the transmutation of elements, let alone the whole of 
our modern chemical knowledge. Our new understanding of early modern alchemists – as 
experimenting with, and writing about material entities that we think really existed in our 
shared world – is made possible only by a tension within our previous understanding of 
early modern alchemists, in which we believed they lived in a world that contained the 
same chemical entities as ours, but in which they did not talk about these entities, instead 
discussing hallucinatory entities such as Fiery Dragons. The historical self-image of 
chemistry, as an experimental activity that must be historically discontinuous with the 
irrational and unreal claims of alchemy, is thus modified by historical research that applies 
modern chemical knowledge and practice to the understanding of alchemical activity, 
interpreting it as taking place in and being about the same world that modern chemistry is 
about.  
                                                     
694 Principe (2000, 67-70 [quote on page 70]). 
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A different example of the way the understanding of past beliefs about the world is 
connected to our understanding of the world and feeds back into our own perspective upon 
this understanding can be found in Daryn Lehoux’s What Did The Romans Know? Discussing 
various themes regarding nature-knowledge in the Roman Republic and (especially) the 
imperial period, Lehoux also turns his attention to the claim that rubbing a magnet with 
garlic cancels its attractive power, which can be found for instance in Pliny.  
Lehoux asks “not just […] why Pliny believed such silly things, but simultaneously 
why we think these beliefs are silly”.695 The answer to the first question involves 
understanding how in Roman thought there is a larger class of cases in which sympathetic 
and antipathetic substances influence each other. This category system was so strong, 
Lehoux suggests, and the relation between garlic and magnets fitted so perfectly in it, that it 
could function as an empirical fact. Lehoux’s point is that even though experience may be 
seen as the final arbiter of belief, it often happens that “inference and testimony […] bleed 
over into the category of experience”.696 It is not just dogmatism or even theory-ladenness 
that Lehoux is getting at; it is our “sloppiness with the very category of the empirical”.697 
 For Lehoux confronts us with the possibility that this sloppiness is ours as well. We 
too, after all, know very well what happens when we rub garlic on a magnet – nothing – 
without ever trying it: our knowledge about the world and our corresponding categories 
and classifications are such that it is immediately obvious that garlic and magnetism have 
nothing to do with each other. But it was just as obvious to the Romans that they did, and 
just as reasonable that they did not feel the need to test this – or rather felt that this belief 
was already being corroborated by experience all the time. Hence their confident 
formulations: “None should be ignorant […] that because of antipathy garlic rubbed on the 
magnet impedes it in its natural action.”698 The crux of Lehoux’s argument is how much he 
shows our epistemic situation to be like that of the Romans: we know just as well as they 
did what happens to the magnet, and our knowledge bears the same relation to our 
experience as theirs. Only, we know what happens to be the opposite. 
 The point is that to the extent that Lehoux’s study of Roman science has helped us 
to become aware of aspects of our own beliefs about the world, it can have done so only 
because in this study we presumed both that the fact that garlic does not demagnetize 
magnets is true about Roman Antiquity as well – that is, we assume that the Romans were 
wrong in this belief – and that Roman nature-knowledge was about the world. Our 
understanding of why they could hold this belief involves our own familiarity with 
phenomena in nature that enable us to make sense of the ancient classificatory and causal 
system where like and unlike things influence each other in certain ways. Thus, we can 
understand the belief that garlic demagnetizes as both wrong and understandable as part of 
                                                     
695 Lehoux (2012, 134). 
696 Lehoux (2012, 145). 
697 Lehoux (2012, 150). 
698 Lehoux (2012, 138). 
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a system of knowledge that is about the world. The self-reflective step characteristic of this 
hermeneutic perspective is the realization that what we have discovered about the relation 
between Roman science and the world may be the case for our own relation to the world as 
well.  
 History can challenge our beliefs or the status of those beliefs, but it can do so only 
because we bring those beliefs to it, not because we leave them at the door when we start 
doing history. Lehoux sums it up in a way that converges perfectly with this thesis:  
 
 All the theories we have been discussing in this book are theories about something, the world, 
that persists and whose observable behavior in the here and now is indispensable to our 
understanding of what ancient science is.699 
 
It is because we understand Roman science as being, like our science, about our world, that 
we can see its relation to this world as shedding light upon the relation between our own 
science and the world.  
  
                                                     
699 Lehoux (2012, 232). 
 
8.6 Four Possible Objections | 183 
Conclusion: Nature in History 
 
 
The answer to our main question – the role of the world in historiography of science – works 
on two levels, since the question itself has turned out to have two sides: it is the question 
what explanatory work nature does, and how what explanatory role it has in historiography 
of science relates to other explanatory factors; but it is also the question in what sense our 
knowledge of nature is capable of providing us any insight into a history of science that 
predates that knowledge. In other words: it is the question of the explanatory role of nature 
as well as the status of our beliefs about nature in history of science. These different readings 
of our question correspond strongly to different parts of the thesis. But in the end, the 
position defended in this thesis can be understood fully only if we bring the two together.  
 The answer is that the role of nature is itself historically variable, not just because 
nature itself develops historically – in this development, there may, after all, be significant 
continuities that some sciences seek to identify – but because its mode of influence is 
dependent on historically formed scientific traditions. Upon these traditions themselves, the 
natural world has also exercised a causal influence, dependent on previous modes of 
interaction between nature and culture.  
It follows that nature is causally integrated within the whole of history of science, 
without thereby rendering final beliefs about itself inevitable. In this, we depart from the 
inevitabilist perspectives in chapter 4, which, in so far as they were genuinely inevitabilist, 
turned out to involve an explicit or implicit belief that the final shape of science reflects only 
the shape of nature; and we depart from the perspectives dealt with in chapter 5, which said 
that science can be understood without referring to nature at all. The reason is not just that 
nature is neither completely impotent nor all-powerful in the history of science, but that its 
mode of causal influence upon the history of science is itself historical and cannot be simply 
disentangled from non-natural influences. Here we agree with Latour, who, as we have seen 
in chapter 6, has done a lot to counter ways of looking at science that need to draw a chasm 
between nature and society. But what we take from him is not the suggestion that we are 
not allowed to use what categories and labels we possess for the mere reason that these 
labels are a contingent product of history; rather, we follow him in saying that there is no 
ontological chasm, and that the entities that constitute science and the entities that constitute 
nature (as the object of scientific interest) are in continuous interaction with each other. 
There is no meaningful sense in which we can claim there to be a ‘net influence’ of society, 
or of nature. 
 This inextricability of nature and culture has repercussions for both sides of our 
original question. With regard to the role that nature plays in determining what science 
looks like, it pushes us, in effect, towards a naturalist perspective. It entails the rejection of 
an ontological dualism between nature on the one hand and science or society on the other 
hand; it is a perspective that recognizes entities for their causal interaction with other 
entities. The most sympathetic account of scientific development, when it comes to the 
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explanatory role of nature, is that by David Hull, discussed in chapter 7. His combination of 
evolutionary and invisible hand mechanisms leads to a plausible picture in which natural 
and non-natural entities are seamlessly integrated, without thereby forgetting that it is 
science and its development which have our interest, and without foregoing the possibility 
to explain this development. His account allows us to say that what physically happens in 
air-pumps matters because different events in air-pumps would have led to different 
observations and a different differential proliferation of beliefs. That is, the selective 
environment of science – which comprises both natural and non-natural entities – would 
have been different if air-pumps behaved differently. However, we need to embrace even 
Hull selectively, and ignore the inevitabilist claims he sometimes makes, especially in so far 
as these are based on the idea that the natural objects that science investigates render the 
development of science inevitable; his own model does not lend support to such an 
inevitabilism, since the content of science does not adapt to an environment that consists 
only of the natural entities it studies. 
With regard to the other side of the question, the answer is that our current beliefs 
about nature are hermeneutically inevitable (or ‘inescapable’, in order to distinguish this 
sense of inevitability from the thesis that our current science is historically inevitable), 
precisely because nature is causally integrated in the whole history of science: we cannot 
understand past science without assuming anything about the natural world in which it 
developed, and there is no reason why in so doing, we would opt for any assumptions 
about the natural world other than those we actually hold. Here our alignment with many 
authors discussed in previous chapters gets inverted relative to that concerning the causal 
question: though we may disagree with Weber, Merton, Koyré and the Marxists about the 
historical inevitability of our science, we embrace their presentism. Though we disagree 
with Bloor and Collins about the explanatory relevance of nature, we follow them in their 
acceptance of current science as providing the best understanding of nature available to us. 
And though we agree with Latour about the contingency and historicity of our current 
beliefs and categories, and about the causal inextricability of nature and science, we decline 
the methodological prescriptions he draws from this, that in order to understand, we need 
to be radical empiricists and simply follow the actors.  
 What we have shaken off, then, is the doublet of assumptions that in order for 
something to be a legitimate point of departure for understanding in history of science, it 
needs to be historically inevitable; and that we can find the history-independence this 
requires in nature more easily than in society. Most other perspectives we have dealt with 
worked by at least one of these assumptions: the inevitabilists we discussed could be 
presentists because they were also inevitabilists; the contingentists we discussed mostly 
decided that since nature failed to render current beliefs inevitable, it could not be used as a 
stable vantage point for historical understanding. Latour consistently concludes this logic, 
by the idea that since everything we have is the result of a contingent history, nothing of it 
can be of help when we want to account for that history. 
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 The hermeneutic perspective we are embracing here allows us to shake off both the 
nature-society polarity, and the preoccupation with identifying the history-transcendent and 
separating it from the historical. If a polarity still remains, it is between historical continuity 
and discontinuity: we build our understanding of the past on what we seem to share with it 
– on the extent to which the horizons of this past and our present overlap – and we seek 
understanding of what seems alien. What we share may be the way air-pumps or other 
experiments seem to behave; or it may just as well be ways of reasoning, or aspects of a 
cultural or political environment – the point here being that what is natural is as such not 
necessarily more robust than what is social or cultural, nor the other way round. Perhaps we 
cannot step in the same river twice, but we can read the same Platonic dialogue twice; but 
then again, perhaps human political systems change their form and behavior, in the sense in 
which those interest us, at a quicker pace than the solar system does.  
 Which things change, when, how much, and under what circumstances, are not 
questions to which we can decide the answers a priori, but neither are they questions to 
which the historical sources will single-handedly teach us the answers. Answers to these 
questions are based on historical knowledge, part of which is accumulated in the traditions 
of which we are part – historical and scientific; for these are not mutually exclusive 
categories, and our belief that air-pumps and other instruments exhibit stable behavior over 
time is itself based on historical knowledge. This is not to say that knowledge about 
vacuums turns out to be subsumed under the expertise of historians and that all other 
disciplines should concede their territories to history; rather, it is to remind ourselves again 
that the tensions between history and science sketched in the introduction of this thesis rest 
on taking a bit too seriously the neo-Kantian distinction between the idiographic and the 
nomothetic, or between the cultural and the natural sciences. 
 It is the productive tension between continuity and discontinuity that makes a 
hermeneutic perspective so well suited for a historical study of science – rather than a 
rationalist, idealist, Marxist, social constructivist, actor network-theory or generic invisible 
hand perspective. The evolutionary perspective discussed in chapter 7 comes closest, in its 
treatment of science as a historical entity and its transcendence of a nature-society 
dichotomy. We can treat the development of science, or developments in science, as 
contingent in the sense described in chapter 2 – with results that are path-dependent rather 
than inevitable, implying that it was historically possible for us to have other scientific 
beliefs, without thereby taking it any less seriously or denying ourselves any of the 
resources it might provide us for understanding its past. 
 How does all this help? Much like Gadamer’s Truth and Method, the aim of these 
considerations is not to draw methodological lessons, but to elucidate what historical 
understanding means within the context of history of science. I believe that this elucidation 
can be helpful in, among else, the following ways:  
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1) Overcoming the Whig – anti-Whig polarity: in this hermeneutical perspective, 
“scientists’ history” and “historians’ history” are no longer separated by an 
unbridgeable chasm, representing incommensurably different epistemic aims and 
attitudes towards the historical sources.  
What remains, is a range of possible opinions about the modal structure of 
history: about what determines – in general, or in particular instances – scientific 
developments, and in what sense and in which ways these could have gone 
differently. In short, what remains is a debate about causality in history of science, 
and a competition between explanations, in which no side a priori carries better 
cards than the other – in which there are very few claims of which we can deduce 
from their language that they must be ‘unhistorical’.  
2) Enabling historians to employ more liberally their actual beliefs about what did 
and could have happened in the past, by showing the real problems that the 
concept of Whig history points at to reside in causal anachronism, rather than in 
presentism or conceptual anachronism. 
We can say that there were microbes before Pasteur, and that people died 
because of them, without worrying too much that we are committing a deadly 
historical sin. We must always remain open to new historical insights into the 
question under which circumstances microbes are and are not possible, but this is 
because we cannot know a priori which of our beliefs may constitute causal 
anachronisms, and therefore none of our claims is ever absolutely historically safe. 
It is certainly not because we are allowed to speak of microbes in our narratives 
only after our actors have started speaking about them. 
3) Showing in what sense history of science can provide and has provided, both in 
principle and in practice, genuine corrections to our understanding of science. This 
is not by leaving our presuppositions about science and the world as we know it 
through science at the door, but precisely by bringing them to our historical 
investigation and keep an open eye to where tensions arise.  
4) Giving a meta-account of what is good historiography: rather than defining the 
methods or desired outcomes of the study of science in history (for instance, Harry 
Collins’ Empirical Programme of Relativism, which is supposed to show how 
science is determined by social rather than ‘scientific’ factors), a hermeneutical 
perspective on historiography of science does justice to the extent to which 
historiographical work is in dialogue with pre-existing understandings of science 
in history. It contextualizes and historicizes, rather than defining generally, the 
very notion of good historiography. 
Thus, it can admit the importance of Collins’ EPOR, and of SSK in general, 
in a specific background, as a critical corrective of a rationalistic and 
transcendentalist view of science. It can see Latourian ANT as in turn in critical 
dialogue with rationalism and SSK, and invisible hand accounts as a response to 
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constructivism. It recognizes that new historiographical perspectives themselves 
build on material from a contingent history. Thus, a hermeneutic philosophy of 
historiography of science unproblematically meets the criterion of reflexivity: 
everything it assumes about science in history it is prepared to assume about itself. 
 
Above all, this thesis has attempted to outline how we can think of science as genuinely 
historical and genuinely about the world. We saw at the start of this thesis that Sarton set 
out to do precisely this but failed to deliver. The rest of our work has been a search for a 
consistent and plausible way to look at the relation between science, history, and the world 
in the writing of history of science. A hermeneutical perspective constitutes such a way, 
however contingent and path-dependent the formulation of such a perspective as provided 
in this thesis may be itself.  
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
Natuur en geschiedenis: naar een hermeneutische wetenschapsgeschiedfilosofie 
 
De vraag die voorligt is: als we als historici de geschiedenis van de natuurwetenschappen 
bestuderen, wat voor rol speelt de wereld die die natuurwetenschappen op hun beurt 
bestudeerden en bestuderen dan in onze historische verklaringen?  
 Deze vraag raakt aan meerdere controverses en spanningen in de 
wetenschapsgeschiedschrijving als vakgebied, die ik in hoofdstuk 1 inleid. De belangrijkste 
hiervan is de vraag in hoeverre wetenschap überhaupt toegankelijk is voor historisering: is 
uit de voltooide producten van wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling de geschiedenis niet 
verdwenen? Een andere vraag is de verhouding van de geschiedschrijving van de 
natuurwetenschappen tot de vakgebieden wier geschiedenis zij bestudeert. Is er een ‘kloof’ 
tussen de humaniora en de natuurwetenschappen, waartussen de wetenschapsgeschiedenis 
een brug kan vormen? Maar hoe ziet die brug – en de kloof trouwens – er dan uit?  
In George Sarton zien we een historicus die wel heel ver meegaat in de 
mythologisering van wetenschap als wezenlijk rationeel of geniaal. Een sympathiekere 
benadering lijkt dan die van Reijer Hooykaas: wetenschap schudt de historische 
omstandigheden waaruit ze voortkomt nooit helemaal af, en de geschiedschrijving laat de 
huidige wetenschap zien als erfgenaam van een traditie. Die traditie is mensenwerk, en we 
moeten haar als zodanig begrijpen. De wetenschapsgeschiedschrijving wordt zo een 
bemiddelaar tussen heden en verleden van de wetenschap. 
 Een vervolgvraag dient zich dan aan, namelijk in welke gezagsverhouding dit de 
historica plaatst tot de wetenschappen in kwestie. Waar Paul Forman betoogde dat historici 
zich om ‘Whig history’ te vermijden verre dienden te houden van de wetenschappen in 
kwestie, en zich dus ook maar beter konden onthouden van een appèl aan de werkelijkheid 
waartoe alleen wetenschappers toegang hadden, staat Hooykaas’ benadering ons niet toe de 
deur zo stevig te sluiten: er blijft, in principe, een dialoog mogelijk tussen 
natuurwetenschappelijke en wetenschapshistorische kennis. Vanaf hoofdstuk 4 zal dit 
perspectief geleidelijk verder ontwikkeld worden, in confrontatie met recente perspectieven 
op de aard van wetenschapsgeschiedschrijving. 
 Ter voorbereiding analyseer ik eerst enkele centrale maar meerduidige concepten. 
In hoofdstuk 2 werk ik toe naar definities van ‘contingentism’ en ‘inevitabilism’ – termen die 
(meestal) verwijzen naar de extreme uiteinden van een spectrum van posities waarop men 
zich kan bevinden met betrekking tot de vraag of de wetenschap zich ook anders had 
kunnen ontwikkelen dan ze in werkelijkheid heeft gedaan. Een belangrijke stap is om in te 
zien dat dit spectrum niet hetzelfde is als de tegenstelling tussen indeterminisme en 
determinisme: als we vragen of de huidige of een latere stand van wetenschap 
onvermijdelijk was, bedoelen we (meen ik) niet te vragen of de geschiedenis deterministisch 
is, maar of meer of minder nabije mogelijke geschiedenissen allemaal ongeveer convergeren 
naar de bedoelde toestand.  
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 ‘Contingentism’ en ‘inevitabilism’ drukken dan opvattingen uit over de mate 
waarin ‘historisch mogelijke’ alternatieve paden (d.w.z. paden die niet uitgesloten zijn door 
onze historische beschrijvingen) in de geschiedenis divergeren of convergeren. Een 
‘contingentist’ is, in tegenstelling dus tot een ‘inevitabilist’, van opvatting dat de wetenschap 
in hoge mate padafhankelijk is: eerdere gebeurtenissen beïnvloeden sterk de relatieve 
kansen van latere. Ze committeert zich daarbij dus niet aan de opvatting dat delen van de 
historische ontwikkeling van wetenschap onverklaarbaar zijn. Dit is in lijn met de manier 
waarop historici de term ‘inevitable’ gebruiken. Vaak is dat ontkennend: de uitkomst van 
wetenschappelijke controverse C of de algemene acceptatie van theorie T was helemaal niet 
zo onvermijdelijk als wel is gedacht. Daaruit volgt echter niet dat de zoektocht naar een 
vollediger en bevredigender historische verklaring wordt losgelaten; integendeel, die begint 
juist doordat de ontkenning van grootschalige onvermijdelijkheid de historische opdracht 
om specifieke episodes in de geschiedenis nauwkeurig te bestuderen van meer gewicht 
heeft voorzien. 
 De tegenstelling contingentie-onvermijdelijkheid houdt verband met de vraag naar 
de rol van de natuur in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis. De claim dat het eindpunt van 
wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling onvermijdelijk is, zou zich immers goed laten 
onderbouwen door de claim dat in dat eindpunt wetenschap enkel een afspiegeling is van 
tijdloze (dus niet-padafhankelijke) natuurwetten. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 ontleed ik de term ‘Whig history’. Losjes gedefinieerd verwijst deze 
term in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis meestal naar geschiedenis zoals wetenschappers zelf 
die zouden schrijven: presentistisch, anachronistisch en met een vanzelfsprekend geloof in 
wetenschappelijke vooruitgang. Mijn positie is dat causale anachronismen, waarmee ik 
bedoel historische onmogelijkheden, in de geschiedschrijving natuurlijk vermijdenswaardig 
zijn en dat geen historica daar anders over heeft gedacht; maar dat een afkeer van 
conceptuele anachronismen (gebruik van concepten en kennis die de historische actoren niet 
voorhanden was) moeilijk te onderbouwen is behalve door die weer, zoals Ian Hacking doet 
voor zijn ‘interactive kinds’, te verbinden aan causale anachronismen. 
 Wat vooruitgang betreft, betoog ik dat de wetenschapsgeschiedenis niet, zoals wel is 
beweerd, een uitzonderingspositie inneemt in de geschiedenis waarop de gebruikelijke notie 
van Whig history stukslaat; het oordeel van vooruitgang is principieel even problematisch 
als elders, en het heden is in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis niet objectief méér bevoorrecht 
dan in andere deelgebieden van de geschiedschrijving. Wat presentisme betreft, betoog ik dat 
presentisme en historisme beide geen bevredigend beeld geven van de relatie tussen onze 
eigen categorieën en opvattingen en de confrontatie daarmee met de bronnen, en dat de 
metafoor van een hermeneutische cirkel die adequater weergeeft. Voor de 
wetenschapsgeschiedenis betekent dit dat ik oproepen om de ‘eigen wetenschappelijke 





 Vanaf hoofdstuk 4 staat de rol van de ‘natuur’ centraal als een mogelijke verklaring 
voor het verloop van de wetenschapsgeschiedenis. In hoofdstuk 4 zelf is deze rol gekoppeld 
aan ‘inevitabilism’: als de wetenschapsgeschiedenis niet contingent is, kan dat komen 
doordat haar uitkomsten uiteindelijk altijd bepaald worden door niet-historische factoren 
zoals de natuurlijke wereld die de wetenschappen bestuderen. Bij Steven Weinberg neemt 
die wereld de functie aan van een ‘onderwijsmachine’, die ons met vallen en opstaan níet 
alleen over de structuur van de wereld leert, maar ook over de methoden van ware 
wetenschap. Het vermeende mechanisme daarachter – plezierprikkels bij succesvolle 
wetenschappers – is echter erg ongeloofwaardig, en wordt niet consistent toegepast.  
 Kansrijker lijkt de stellingname dat de natuur de uitkomsten van rationele 
wetenschap bepaalt, waarbij die ‘rationaliteit’ zich ook ahistorisch en cultuuronafhankelijk 
moet laten identificeren. Een denkbaar bezwaar is dat we in dat geval wel helemaal kunnen 
stoppen met historische en causale verklaring, maar een nauwkeurige lezing van Max 
Weber laat een manier zien waarop geloof in de normatieve universaliteit van 
(wetenschappelijke) rationaliteit te rijmen valt met een causaal-historische verklaring van 
zelfs wetenschappelijke claims: de crux is dat we dat wat we willen verklaren niet 
benaderen als geldig, maar als gewoon bestaand, ook al belichaamt het normen die we wel 
degelijk geldig vinden, en ook al zijn deze normen hermeneutisch relevant, voor het 
afbakenen van het historische object.  
 Dat betekent dat ook Robert Mertons ‘Weberiaanse’, normatieve afbakening van 
wetenschap onverlet laat dat die wetenschap zich op allerlei manieren causaal tot de rest 
van samenleving kan verhouden. Op zijn beurt betekent dit echter weer dat Mertons 
sociologie geen onderbouwing geeft voor zijn eigen ‘inevitabilistische’ intuïties; in het 
algemeen is er geen brug van de claim dat rationele wetenschap bepaalde onvermijdelijke 
uitkomsten heeft naar de claim dat wetenschap zoals die in de geschiedenis daadwerkelijk 
bestaat diezelfde uitkomsten met dezelfde onvermijdelijkheid heeft.  
 Twee andere uitwerkingen van ‘inevitabilism’ en de rol van de natuur erin 
passeren de revu: een idealistische die een noodzakelijke uitkomst ziet in de ontwikkeling 
van wetenschappelijke concepten (soms te bespeuren in het Journal of the History of Ideas in 
de jaren 1940 en ’50, en explicieter in het werk van Alexandre Koyré), die alleen onder 
idealistische metafysische aannames houdbaar is en dan alsnog ondersteund wordt doordat 
de wetenschap de structuur van de wereld benadert (zij het primair via het intellect); en een 
Marxistische, die ik traceer via het werk van Boris Hessen en John Desmond Bernal. In 
Marxistische wetenschapsgeschiedschrijving blijkt de onvermijdelijkheid van de inhoud van 
wetenschappelijke theorieën uiteindelijk toch primair op het conto van de natuur te 
schrijven, en op het vermogen van de wetenschap de objectieve structuren in die natuur 
progressief beter te weerspiegelen. In die zin treden dezelfde problemen in werking als bij 
de eerder besproken varianten. 
 ‘Inevitabilism’ is dus in de praktijk steeds geassocieerd met het idee dat 
wetenschap de unieke structuur van de wereld steeds beter doorgrondt, en geeft die wereld 
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zo alle verklaringskracht. In hoofdstuk 5 bekijk ik het andere uiterste: de stelling dat 
verklaringen in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis de natuur helemaal niet als verklaarder mogen 
gebruiken. David Bloor suggereert vaak deze positie in te nemen en onderbouwt die via de 
onderdeterminatie van theorieën door data (maar ik laat zien dat dat principe niet sterk 
genoeg is), en via de stelling dat de natuur als gezamenlijke achtergrond waartegen 
theorieën zich ontwikkelen nooit het verschil tussen theorieën kan verklaren (maar dat is 
niet altijd de vraag die aan de orde is). Verder gaat Bloor ervan uit dat onze concepten 
volledig sociaal gedetermineerd kunnen zijn zonder dat hun relatie tot de natuurlijke 
wereld ontkend hoeft te worden, omdat de samenleving deel is van de natuur en er dus ook 
altijd toegang toe geeft. Taal en sociale instituties zijn bijvoorbeeld altijd deels 
zelfverwijzend en deels representerend. Maar daarmee doet Bloor eigenlijk al te veel 
concessies om de stelling overeind te houden dat referentie aan de natuur in verklaringen 
altijd overbodig is. 
 Harry Collins voegt enkele argumenten toe om die stelling toch te handhaven. Zijn 
belangrijkste bijdrage is de notie van methodologisch relativisme: historici en sociologen 
moeten niet naar experimentele data of andere ‘wetenschappelijke’ motieven kijken voor 
theoriekeuze, niet omdat die er niet toe doen maar omdat die niet hun belangstelling hebben 
of ze er niet competent over kunnen oordelen. Het is echter zonder verdere reden 
onverstandig om een categorie potentieel causaal relevante factoren uit te sluiten, en het is 
misschien zelfs problematisch wetenschap überhaupt te identificeren zonder 
veronderstellingen over de natuur die ze bestudeert. Collins’ verdere reden is een 
circulariteitsbezwaar: we willen verklaren waarom conclusies uiteindelijk voor waar werden 
gehouden, en de waarheid van die conclusies mag daarbij volgens Collins niet 
verondersteld worden.  
 Het antwoord dat ik op dit bezwaar aandraag, komt neer op een uitgebreid “hoezo 
eigenlijk niet?”. Als we het circulariteitsbezwaar ontleden, zien we dat het slechts ten dele 
daadwerkelijk om circulariteit gaat en ook deels om meta-oordelen over de 
betrouwbaarheid van wetenschap. Verder ontleent het circulariteitsbezwaar zijn kracht 
mijns inziens aan het idee dat het historisch mogelijk was dat de wetenschapsgeschiedenis 
of de episode die we bestuderen anders was afgelopen, en dat wij dan ook iets anders 
hadden geloofd over precies die opvatting waarvan we de geloofwaardigheid willen 
verklaren. Maar de historische contingentie van wetenschappelijke kennis mag voor de 
historica geen reden zijn die kennis te verwerpen. (Meer hierover verderop.) 
 Als laatste bespreek ik in hoofdstuk 5 Karin Knorr-Cetina en haar argument dat 
natuurlijke entiteiten constructies zijn van de wetenschap, dus producten en geen 
verklaringen. Haar argumenten en voorbeelden laten echter steeds ruimte voor de 
mogelijkheid dat de gedragingen van natuurlijke entiteiten wel degelijk cruciaal zijn voor de 





In hoofdstuk 6 bespreek ik een ander soort constructivisme, namelijk dat van 
Bruno Latour. Hij corrigeert de focus van SSK op ‘sociale’ oorzaken, voor zover sociale 
factoren in tegenstelling tot niet-menselijke of materiële gedefinieerd worden: alle soorten 
entiteiten spelen volgens Latour in hun interactie een rol in de fabricatie van nieuwe 
theorieën, en menselijke hoeven hierbij niet in andere termen benaderd te worden dan niet-
menselijke. Latours interessantste innovatie is dat hij het onderscheid tussen de natuur en 
de weergave van die natuur op probeert te heffen, waardoor het in een veel sterkere zin dan 
bij Collins een cirkelredenering wordt om te zeggen dat, bijvoorbeeld, het bestaan van 
microben het geloof van wetenschappers in microben mede verklaart. Het bestaan van die 
microben is namelijk zelf het product van hun fabricatie in een wetenschappelijk netwerk – 
ze worden geconstrueerd door de collectieve uitspraken en daden van alle actoren in dat 
netwerk – en daarmee wordt het anachronistisch om ze als verklaringsgrond te laten 
optreden vóórdat ze opduiken in de sporen die dat netwerk nalaat. 
Latours radicale voorstel is interessant, omdat het natuurlijke entiteiten 
‘historiseert’ (microben bestaan echt maar zijn óók een historische fabricatie), en omdat het 
consistenter dan SSK doet appelleert aan een empiristisch ideaal in de geschiedschrijving: 
we mogen eigenlijk niets veronderstellen van onze huidige categorieën en opvattingen, 
omdat die allemaal (níet alleen de ‘natuurwetenschappelijke’ opvattingen, maar ook degene 
die betrekking hebben op de samenleving) het product zijn van een contingente 
geschiedenis. Zijn voorstel gaat tegelijkertijd in tegen het gezond verstand, en leidt in de los 
beargumenteerde vorm waarin Latour het presenteert tot veel begripsverwarring. We 
kunnen (en moeten) Latour dan ook linksom of rechtsom omzeilen. Rechts inhalen kunnen 
we hem als we hem dwingen zijn principe van (historisch) ‘relatief bestaan’ nog consistenter 
toe te passen, namelijk ook op de historische tijd waarin de historische fabricaties van in 
wetenschappelijke theorieën beschreven natuurlijke entiteiten zich afspelen. Over het 
midden kunnen we hem passeren door erop te wijzen dat zijn positie slechts één mogelijke 
is in een spectrum van opvattingen over de vraag in hoeverre het bestaan van objecten 
causaal samenhangt met wat er over hen gedacht en met hen gedaan wordt. 
                Zodra we in dat spectrum een andere positie innemen – een die bijvoorbeeld niet 
van ons vereist dat we bij wetenschapshistorisch onderzoek ál onze vooronderstellingen bij 
de voordeur achterlaten – kan er ook weer een onderscheid ontstaan tussen hoe wij denken 
dat de wereld in elkaar steekt, en hoe we denken dat vroegere wetenschappers dachten dat 
de wereld in elkaar stak. Dat onderscheid tussen ‘wereld’ en ‘wetenschap’ is niet identiek 
aan dat tussen ‘natuur’ en ‘samenleving’ (de ‘wetenschap’, als drager van theorieën over de 
wereld, omvat bijvoorbeeld ook een hoop niet-menselijke objecten!) en in die zin kunnen we 
Latours nadruk op de historische contingentie van dat onderscheid nog steeds ter harte 
nemen met betrekking tot al onze eigen opvattingen. Maar het voorgaande betekent wél dat 
de wereld tot de wetenschap nog altijd in een complexe relatie staat – en niet een waarin 
beide, zoals Latour meent, in één en dezelfde beweging ontstaan. 
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 In hoofdstuk 7 bespreek ik een een aantal perspectieven op die relatie die gebruik 
maken van ‘invisible hand’ processen, waarbij de handelingen van wetenschappers een 
resultaat opleveren dat door hen niet beoogd is maar dat wetenschap wel succesvol maakt. 
Een voorbeeld is het economische model van Alvin Goldman, waarin wetenschappers niet 
naar waarheid streven maar naar erkenning: hun eigen doelen zijn volledig sociaal van aard, 
maar aangezien hun instrumenten interactie met de wereld vereisen, schrijdt de wetenschap 
wel degelijk voort in haar grip op de natuur. Door die volledig sociale oriëntatie van 
wetenschappers te rijmen met een mogelijkheid van objectiviteit, heeft Goldman althans 
deels een antwoord op SSK; maar zijn model rust wel op een normatieve rationaliteit – het is 
eerder een sociale epistemologie dan een descriptief model.  
 Wel uitdrukkelijk descriptief bedoeld is David Hulls evolutionaire model van 
wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling. Hull zegt dat we wetenschap kunnen beschouwen als een 
stamboom van theorieën of andere inhoudsdragers, die zichzelf repliceren en die via fysieke 
entiteiten – in het bijzonder wetenschappers – in interactie treden met de wereld. Door die 
interactie kunnen verschillende theorieën zich in verschillende mate succesvol repliceren; er 
werkt een zekere selectiedruk op wetenschap. Het is natuurlijk van belang dat de wereld die 
de wetenschap bestudeert deel is van de omgeving die die selectiedruk uitoefent. Soms slaat 
Hull daarbij wel erg teleologische taal uit, die door zijn eigen model niet volledig 
ondersteund lijkt te worden; maar meestal benadrukt hij dat alles aan wetenschap – niet 
alleen theorieën maar ook methoden en doelen – aan evolutie door selectie onderhevig is, en 
dat de ‘fitness’ van theorieën volstrekt contextueel bepaald is.  
 Hull dicht, in lijn met de nadruk op ‘invisible hand’-mechanismen, weinig 
verklarende kracht toe aan de directe intenties van wetenschappers; en hoewel ik zeker met 
hem meega in de gedachte dat wetenschappers niet voorzien wat de geschiedenis zal doen 
met de theorieën die zij dragen, dunkt mij dat de culturele omgeving waarin 
wetenschappers opereren niet alleen invloed heeft op het selectieve behoud van eenmaal 
ontstane of veranderde theorieën, maar ook op de manier waarop die ontstaan en 
veranderen – onder meer omdat wetenschappers intentionele wezens zijn, die op die 
omgeving anticiperen en inspelen. Gedetailleerd begrip van de lokale context waarin een 
episode zich afspeelt – die onder Hulls model sowieso al erg belangrijk is – is dus van des te 
meer gewicht. 
 In hoofdstuk 8 duik ik verder in die vraag naar ‘begrip’, en vertaal ik wat Hull een 
stamboom noemt naar de minder naturalistische term van een traditie. Dan doemt meteen 
een spanning op tussen de contingentie en historiciteit die met zo’n traditiebegrip zijn 
geassocieerd, en het geschiedenisontstijgende van de wetenschap. Tot die spanning hebben 
verschillende wetenschapsfilosofen zich verschillend en genuanceerd verhouden – zowel bij 
Popper, Kuhn als Feyerabend is wetenschap in een weliswaar verschillende zin steeds ook 
deels een historisch specifieke traditie. Bij SSK wordt dat traditiebegrip sociologisch 
begrepen en gezien als in tegenspraak met het (‘traditionele’) zelfbeeld van wetenschap; 




tegelijk welbewust een perspectief van binnen die traditie aannemen. Dat is de positie die ik 
hier uitwerk. Daarbij beschouw ik de hermeneutiek van Hans-Georg Gadamer – waarin 
historiciteit en traditionaliteit niet meer in een noodzakelijke tegenstelling staan tot 
legitimiteit, en elk begrip juist vanuit traditie vertrekt – als een goede gids, ondanks het feit 
dat Gadamer zelf de natuurwetenschappen van zijn stelling uitzonderde. 
 Andere theoretici hebben wel uitdrukkelijk een hermeneutische visie op 
wetenschapsbeoefening geformuleerd. Terugkerend motief daarin is de praktijkgeladenheid 
van wetenschappelijke begrippen – hun relatie tot een historisch specifieke ‘levenswereld’. 
Die praktijkgeladenheid staat zelf dan weer op gespannen voet met een ander motief, 
namelijk dat van de structurering van de wereld door betekenisvolle taal – maar die 
spanning laat onverlet dat wetenschap bij deze theoretici zelf een hermeneutische activiteit 
is, waarin wetenschappers vanuit een specifieke historische situatie in interactie treden met 
de wereld die ze bestuderen én met de traditie waarin ze staan. Anders dan bij SSK wordt 
dit niet gepresenteerd als een demythologiserend inzicht of als een tekort dat aangevuld 
moet worden: de onontkoombare historiciteit van wetenschap is geen defect, maar 
simpelweg deel van de menselijke toestand. En: de interpreterende activiteit die wetenschap 
is laat onverlet dat het belangrijk is dat ze ergens over gaat – zoals Martin Eger bijvoorbeeld 
benadrukt. Dit onderscheidt een hermeneutische blik op wetenschapsbeoefening van een 
constructivistische.  
 Grotendeels in lijn nu met zowel het naturalistische perspectief van David Hull als 
met de hier genoemde hermeneutische denkrichtingen stel ik dat de wereld (en daaronder 
begrepen ook dingen waarvan we geloven dat hun bestaan en eigenschappen onafhankelijk 
zijn van de menselijke geschiedenis) een causale rol speelt in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis, 
die evenwel historisch variabel is en ingebed in verschillende wetenschappelijke 
interpreterende activiteiten. Juist vanwege die historische veranderlijkheid is er geen 
nauwkeuriger stelling over de rol van de wereld mogelijk dan deze – maar die wijkt dan wel 
sterk af van de eerder besproken theoretische perspectieven. Ze betekent bovendien dat we 
vroegere wetenschap niet begrijpen dan vanuit onze huidige historische positie. De 
natuurlijke wereld heeft op de ontwikkelingen die daartoe hebben geleid voortdurend 
invloed uitgeoefend, op zo’n manier dat we – en hierin volg ik Latour – niet moeten trachten 
die invloed eerst te scheiden van niet-natuurlijke ‘sociale’ factoren. We moeten erkennen dat 
ook de wetenschapsgeschiedschrijving in de geschiedenis staat, evengoed als de wetenschap 
wier ontwikkeling ze beschrijft en verklaart. Er is geen reden waarom we, als we vanuit die 
positie een interactie met de sporen uit het verleden aangaan, eerst een deel van onze 
overtuigingen opzij zouden moeten zetten. 
 Ik voorzie vier belangrijke bezwaren tegen deze positie. Ten eerste, dat we wel 
degelijk in de derde persoon over onze eigen cultuur kunnen spreken. Ik erken de 
mogelijkheid van de historica om zich, werkelijk of fictief, buiten een wetenschappelijke 
consensus te plaatsen; maar wordt de afstand daartoe te groot, dan zal die juist ook wel 
degelijk de dialoog met collega-onderzoekers bemoeilijken.  
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 Ten tweede: dat de wetenschappelijke traditie in deze benadering bij voorbaat veel 
te veel gezag toegekend krijgt, en kritiek zo onmogelijk wordt. Ik stel dat dit bezwaar, dat 
ook wel tegen Gadamer te berde is gebracht, berust op een misbegrip van een 
Gadameriaans traditiebegrip: traditie is niet absoluut of zelflegitimerend, maar is beter te 
begrijpen als de som van historische invloeden op onze positie, waaraan geen volledig 
ontkomen is – noch door de wetenschap, noch door haar geschiedschrijvers.  
 Ten derde: dat mijn positie indirect alsnog ‘Whiggish’ is: de historica ‘stuurt’ naar 
iets wat lijkt op de huidige toestand, omdat ze immers alsnog aanneemt dat onze eigen 
wetenschap het wel zo’n beetje bij het rechte eind zal hebben. Ik meen dat de opvattingen 
van de historica over de natuur in dit verband geen andere status hebben dan haar andere 
opvattingen, en dat huidige wetenschappelijke opvattingen meestal niet te identificeren 
zullen zijn met één kant in een vroeger wetenschappelijk debat.  
 Ten vierde: dat de geschiedschrijving de wetenschap zo nooit echt kan corrigeren. 
Ik ontken dat dit zou volgen uit mijn positie: door te bemiddelen tussen heden en verleden 
van de wetenschap, kan de geschiedschrijving juist ook licht schijnen op die wetenschap. 
Voor zover de scheikunde zichzelf definieert in contrast met de haar voorgaande alchemie, 
kan nieuw inzicht in de vroegmoderne alchemie (mede mogelijk door kennis die we menen 
te hebben van hoe de natuur zich in die tijd gedragen zal hebben) dat historische zelfbegrip 
bijstellen. En begrip van hoe de excentrieke Romeinse opvatting dat knoflook een 
demagnetiserende werking had de status kon krijgen van een robuust ‘empirisch’ feit, leert 
ons iets over de status van onze eigen omgang met de grens tussen empirische en niet-
empirische kennis – en dit is des te meer zo als we, zoals de meesten van ons zullen doen, 
ervan uitgaan dat knoflook niet écht een demagnetiserende werking heeft! Als we er, anders 
gezegd, van uit gaan dat die rare Romeinse wetenschap wel een historische afstand heeft tot 
onze eigen wetenschap, die door geschiedschrijving overbrugd moet worden; maar dat ze 
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